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Abstract 
In the following thesis I outline Schopenhauer’s ethics in its metaphysical context 
and in contrast to ethics based on egoism. I look at criticisms of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy which have emerged quite recently, and some of which (if valid) 
would undermine Schopenhauer’s compassion-based moral theory. I have 
explained these criticisms and offered a defence of Schopenhauer. In order to take 
up Schopenhauer’s claim of affinity with Buddhist philosophy, I outline first of all 
early Buddhist then Mahāyāna ethics focusing on the latter’s central idea of 
compassion.  
 
It has been suggested by some scholars that there are specific problems in 
Buddhist ethics which undermine the idea of compassion and I explain, then 
attempt to counter, these claims with specific reference to Śāntideva and his 
rejection of egoism as a means of acting in a moral way or of finding liberation 
from suffering. I then address recent criticisms of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, 
especially the idea that the specific role of compassion in his ethics and its 
soteriological role are illogical – an idea which I argue against.  
 
Finally I compare the core ideas of Schopenhauer’s solution to the problem of 
suffering with what seems similar in Śāntideva. In doing this, I examine whether 
or not Schopenhauer is right in claiming convergence between Buddhism and his 
own philosophy, especially in the area of soteriology as it relates to ethics.
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Conventions 
 
I have not used the term ‘Hīnayāna’ when referring to non-Mahāyāna Buddhism 
(for simplicity, I take Mahāyāna to include Tantric Buddhism) due to its perceived 
derogatory nature and have mostly used the term ‘pre-Mahāyāna’. Although this 
is not strictly accurate, ‘pre-Mahāyāna’ very broadly covers the school(s) which 
are not Mahāyānin. I have also used Yogācāra rather than Cittamātra or 
Vijñānavāda in an attempt to avoid the possibility of confusion. 
 
I have mostly used Sanskrit terminology, but have used Pāli where I thought it 
more appropriate to the discussion, for example when the discussion is more 
focussed on Pāli canonical material. Where appropriate I have given both Sanskrit 
and Pāli, indicated by ‘Skt.’ and ‘P.’ respectively. I have italicised all Sanskrit and 
Pāli words with the exceptions of those which refer to practitioners of Buddhism 
(such as a Bodhisattva, Arhat, Pratyekabuddha etc.) and the names of the various 
Buddhist schools to which I refer. 
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 Introduction 
What is presented in this study is an examination of two systems of philosophy in 
an attempt to elucidate their similarities as well as differences; the systems in 
question are Schopenhauer’s and Buddhist ethics. In a subject as complex as 
Buddhism, with its many schools and 2500 years of uninterrupted development, 
any examination of its central tenets has to be regarded as preliminary. As far as 
Schopenhauer is concerned, it would not be possible to give any detailed 
treatment of his work in total here and I have therefore restricted myself, where 
possible, to his ethics. To do this exclusively would render Schopenhauer’s 
system defective and at times senseless and in order to avoid this I have had to, on 
occasion, broaden out from ethics into some of his wider metaphysical and 
epistemological ideas as I have done with Buddhism. For the sake of clarity I will 
not give any detailed analysis of the history of German Idealism and instead 
devote most of this work to the centrality of the idea of compassion in 
Schopenhauer’s and in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, as found especially in 
Śāntideva. The scope of this thesis does not include other forms of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism – for example there is little mention of Yogācāra, of Tantrism and, 
geographically, there is no treatment of any of the forms of Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean. Mongolian or Tibetan Buddhism. I have restricted the enquiry as far as 
possible to Indian Mādhyamaka Buddhism which had an impact on a number of 
later Buddhist schools.  
 
Why Compare Schopenhauer and Buddhism? 
When Schopenhauer moved from the study of medicine to philosophy at the 
University of Göttingen between 1809 and 1811, he first became acquainted with 
the works of Plato and Kant before moving to the University of Berlin which he 
attended between 1811 and 1813.  At the end of his period of study and at his 
mother’s literary salon, he was introduced to the Orientalist Friedrich Maier where 
we may assume his interest in Asian philosophy and religion arose. 
 
It seems certain that he knew almost nothing of Buddhism at this time – at any 
rate he makes no claims about its confluence with his own philosophy - but his 
sparse acquaintance with Hinduism was augmented when he acquired some time 
between 1815 and 1817 a copy of the Oupnekat.1 It seems that by the publication 
of The World as Will and Representation in 1819 (WWR1) he had only a 
rudimentary understanding of Buddhism and a better, if still flawed, 
understanding of what he calls Brahmanism. By the time the larger supplementary 
volume of The World as Will and Representation was published in 1844 
(WWR2), Schopenhauer was much more confident in his understanding of 
Buddhism and makes greater claims for its similarity to his own work.  
 
Schopenhauer’s approach to philosophy is to start by gathering empirical evidence 
then trying to understand why what is the case is so, then to offer a solution to the 
problem(s) he sees. Specifically, he notices that existence involves suffering, and 
he tries to find out why this is the case then offers an escape from it. This seems to 
me to be practical philosophy (although there is a great deal of abstract 
                                                 
1 A Latin translation of a Persian translation of the Upanişads. The Latin translator was Abraham 
Anquetil-Duperron and the book was published in 1804. 
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philosophy in Schopenhauer too, especially as he tries to find the reasons why 
things are the way they are). Since Schopenhauer seems to be dealing with the 
immediate practical problems of life and thinks his treatment is very similar to 
approaches in Buddhism, it makes sense to compare the two in order to see not 
only if Schopenhauer was right in making this comparison, but also to see if he 
offers something more than Buddhism or if it is the other way round. 
 
In comparing Schopenhauer to Buddhism, we must first decide what in Buddhism 
we can compare him to. General comparisons have been done before2 and do not, 
in my view, offer more than general conclusions. Comparisons can be made in 
more detail between Idealism (and Schopenhauer was an Idealist) and the 
Yogācāra school of Buddhism. However, I believe that comparisons can be made 
also with Mādhyamaka Buddhism and I would specifically like to address the role 
of emptiness (śūnyatā) and compassion (karuňā) in Mādhyamaka Buddhism 
together with the path to liberation from suffering. One prominent Mādhyamaka 
philosopher who offers a full explanation of this path is Śāntideva and I have 
attempted to offer a comparison of his Bodhicaryāvatāra and Śikşāsamuccaya 
with Schopenhauer’s ethical writings. Both believe that compassion is central to 
ethics and neither follows a system of strictly prescriptive ethics. I think this is a 
much more realistic approach to ethics than what has been offered hitherto (in 
Western philosophy at any rate). 
What is Comparative Philosophy? 
In a comparative study like this, one of the first questions concerns what exactly 
we are dealing with. In other words, what is comparative philosophy? 
Comparative philosophy is, as the name suggests, philosophy which involves 
comparisons, but it also involves contrasts. It is ‘philosophy, and qua philosophy 
is not better off than any philosophy. It is simply another philosophy with the 
limitations of all the rest.’ (Panikkar in Larson and Deutsch, 1988, p. 120.) The 
comparisons it makes can be between traditions of philosophy which involve 
different cultures, languages and/or periods of time. (See Balslev, 1997, p. 361.) It 
may involve, for example, a comparison of two or more thinkers, texts or ideas 
which appear to share common features. Very broad comparisons aimed at the 
production of a world system of philosophy cannot be considered to be 
comparative philosophy since the remit is much wider; comparative philosophy 
must involve a more specific and detailed comparison than world philosophy can 
treat. I agree with Heim that: 
 
Advances in comparative work will come from more finely grained 
studies than those of the preceding generation of comparativists; they 
will seek not to compare Buddhist ethics as a unified whole, but rather 
more circumscribed thinkers, discourses, or texts from within 
particular traditions. 
(Heim, 2007, p. 110) 
 
Critics have forwarded the objection that comparative philosophy is pointless, or 
not even philosophy at all, because different traditions are incommensurable and 
that any attempt to compare involves false interpretations of a culture in which 
                                                 
2 See below, p. 162. 
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one has no background. This view assumes that each tradition sees things in its 
own specific way, which precludes relevant and valid comparison: 
 
Many scholars and philosophers would argue that comparative 
philosophy (especially a comparison of Eastern and Western 
philosophical ideas, theories, systems, traditions) is just another 
pointless comparison of apples and oranges – Eastern and Western 
philosophies are simply too different to bear fruitful comparison. 
(Fleming, 2003, p. 259)3
 
Of those who think a limited comparison is possible, there is a view that what is 
being studied is ‘tainted’ by the broader background of the person making the 
comparison: 
 
Can we really translate and interpret Sanskrit, classical Chinese, or 
other non-western texts without imposing our own linguistic, cultural, 
historical, ontological, and other categories thereon? 
(Rosemont in Larson and Deutsch, 1988, p. 38) 
 
The answer to this is, I think, no, but that does not mean we cannot understand 
non-Western texts at all. Taking the above argument to its extreme conclusion 
means we ought not to be able to understand Western texts if they are in another 
language, culture and time.4 For example, it should be impossible, then, to make 
sense of Descartes, Duns Scotus or Kant if your first language is modern English. 
This is clearly not the case and cannot be the case for non-Western philosophy 
either. It is true that language and culture may be barriers to understanding but 
these are not insurmountable. If they were then Buddhism would have been 
unable to spread through much of India and to then travel through the whole of 
North, South, East and parts of Western Asia. In fact one could argue that 
Buddhism encountered a more alien culture when it travelled from India to China 
that it encounters in Europe today. What is certain is that many European 
languages are related to Sanskrit/Pāli but not to Chinese, yet Buddhism still took 
root in China. Clearly there must be something in some systems of thought which 
are comprehensible to all human beings, and if that is the case then comparisons 
can be made. In its strongest form, the incompatibility argument is self-defeating 
because if the incommensurability is so strong then even a mutual understanding 
would be an impossibility. The relativist, in this case, would have so say that s/he 
is unable to understand any other culture, but cannot then say anything about 
another culture, including saying other cultures are incommensurate with their 
own.  In its weaker form, if they admit understanding is possible, then they admit 
some form of translation is possible (understanding is an act of translating) and 
this allows us access to another culture. They do not, then, have a strong argument 
against comparing philosophies from different cultures. 
                                                 
3 Also see Rosemont, op. cit., pp. 36-70. 
4 I take it as obvious that the culture in, for example, Schopenhauer’s time is very unlike the 
culture in the United Kingdom now; I think it would be wrong to argue that they are 
commensurate simply because they are ‘Western’. I would go as far as to say that culture, broadly 
speaking, in the United Kingdom now is significantly different to the way it was twenty years ago, 
never mind in Schopenhauer’s time which was before the zenith of the nation state, the existence 
of Germany, communism or European unity and peace to take some completely random yet 
significant examples. 
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Another possible problem for comparative philosophy is that, in comparing, an 
assumption could be made that one’s own tradition is progressing whilst an alien 
tradition is something static and historical. The comparative philosopher has to 
see that any tradition of thought undergoes permanent reinterpretation and inner 
conflict and it might therefore be difficult to exactly pin down what the other 
culture means in its philosophy. All philosophy, East, West, North and South 
changes and can only be seen from the viewpoint of the present (which will be at 
the period of writing) and in that regard all philosophy is in a state of flux. The 
comparative philosopher needs to be aware of this and not attribute something 
simpler to the lesser known philosophy, culture or tradition, but neither should 
they attribute something superior to another philosophy unless they can argue for 
so doing. 
 
The Genesis of Comparative Philosophy 
Comparative philosophy is normally regarded as a fairly new area of philosophy 
with its roots going back especially to the point in history when Western thinkers 
became aware of developed systems of thought in other countries and cultures. 
One view is that it has an ‘illustrious forerunner’ in comparative philology (see 
Panikkar op. cit., p. 117). Most relevant in this regard is the West’s encounters 
with Indian, Chinese and Japanese philosophy and religion at the point when 
knowledge of these cultures filtered back in sufficient detail to Western thinkers 
in the eighteenth century for them to be able to interpret a system at work. As 
more information became available in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
more in-depth comparisons became possible. It must be said, though, that many 
commentaries and studies of non-European philosophy for much of this time 
treated Asian philosophy as inferior and cannot properly be regarded as 
comparative philosophy, but, nevertheless, contributed to the development of the 
field. I would argue that these Western attitudes are far from extinct and this is 
evidenced by the fact that Asian philosophy is almost entirely ignored in most 
Western university philosophy departments: 
 
It is regrettable that…philosophers like Śankara, Nāgārjuna, Dignāga 
or Uddyatokara – to mention a few great names at random from the 
Indian thought traditions – are not taught in the same department 
where Hegel, Husserl or Hume, etc. are venerated. 
(Balslev op. cit., p. 366, also see Smart, 1999, p. 372) 
 
Although ‘venerated’ is a bit strong, what is clear is that even now Asian 
philosophy is only regarded as something to engage with by a minority of 
Western thinkers. As far as comparative philosophy is concerned, it is easy to 
imagine that it is often a case of whether or not Eastern philosophy ‘measures up’ 
to a ‘superior’ Western way of thinking. Comparative philosophy is not, however, 
mono-directional: in Asian countries comparisons have also been made between 
traditions both there and with those of the West, although it is not clear that those 
engaged in such comparisons would have seen themselves as doing comparative 
philosophy. 
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Does Comparative Philosophy Make Sense? 
The reason it makes sense to do comparative philosophy is that doing comparative 
philosophy is doing philosophy: any philosophy which involves an examination of 
more than one thinker or text is comparative. Almost no Western philosopher 
would question the fact that a fuller understanding of some of the problems of 
deontological ethics can be gained by examining utilitarian objections to them and 
vice versa. Again, very few such philosophers would question the validity of a 
comparison of Plato’s political philosophy as written in The Republic vis-à-vis 
that written in The Laws. If this is regarded as unproblematic then it ought not to 
be regarded as an obstacle if the comparison is between, say, a Western and an 
Eastern text or between two Asian texts or systems of philosophy. (Also see 
Fleming op. cit., p. 262). Any argument that we cannot make comparisons with 
traditions which are alien to us ought also to exclude making any real sense of 
Ancient Greek culture and philosophy, which is pre-Christian, written in a now 
dead language and in a tradition which we can only interpret. This is broadly 
MacIntyre’s view in After Virtue and MacIntyre is not alone: 
  
We are dealing here with that part of Western self-understanding 
which views philosophy as a unique creation of the Greeks and 
consequently the exclusive enterprise of those who are the [supposed] 
direct inheritors of that culture. Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, for 
example, have all denied that there is any such project of thinking like 
Greek ‘philosophia’ in the East. 
(Balslev op. cit., p. 360) 
 
In fact it could be argued that some of the traditions of Asian Buddhism and 
Hinduism (and others) are easier to be genuinely aware of since they are still 
living and evolving. 
 
Dilworth believes that all major worldviews are related, which I accept since the 
world has produced philosophies which have features in common without being 
influenced by one another. I would regard this as a simple, straightforward and 
common fact. The reason for this is that humans may think slightly differently as 
a result of differing cultures and traditions, but philosophically humans must 
explore questions in basically the same way, otherwise humanity consists of more 
than one species. The commensurability of thought can be illustrated by the 
following example: the reason there are pyramids in Egypt and in South America 
is not that the South Americans were influenced by the Egyptians (they never 
met), but simply that, if your aim is to reach the gods, then a pyramid is the 
optimal geometric shape which affords both height and strength to structures 
designed by those lacking in advanced building techniques. In other words 
civilizations with very different cultures can reach similar conclusions. That 
means that in some areas they think the same way - and I have no doubt that that 
must apply to philosophical thought. 
 
Any idea that Eastern philosophy is not commensurable with Western philosophy 
is an assumption that is usually made in ignorance. I would be very surprised if 
any Western philosopher who actually knew something substantial about Eastern 
philosophy regarded it as ‘not philosophy’ or as inferior to Western philosophy. I 
would even reject the whole idea of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ philosophy. If we 
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take ‘Western’ philosophy on its own, there was a time in very recent history 
when ‘modern continental philosophy’ was regarded in Britain as ‘not 
philosophy’ (with one or two exceptions) but as more was found out about it, the 
less that view prevailed. (Also see Smart, 1999, pp. 368-70.) I think ‘Eastern’ 
philosophy is being treated the same way and for the same reason (ignorance) and 
will be more respected as more about it is learned. It is astonishing to believe that 
philosophy in Ancient Greece is considered by some in the West to be 
‘mainstream’ philosophy whilst Indian philosophy is regarded as alien. This view 
partly rests on the assumptions that there is an unbroken link from modern 
Western philosophy to Ancient Greece and that Western philosophy has been 
more productive or substantially ‘better’ than other philosophies. Both erroneous 
in my view. 
 
let us note that Western domination of the subject is not necessarily 
healthy, even when it may be felt that modern Western philosophy has 
been remarkably dynamic and productive.  
(Smart op. cit., p. 364) 
 
‘What is philosophy’ is in itself a philosophical question (cf. op. cit., p. 121). It 
does not make sense to say that some cultures are ‘doing’ philosophy and others 
are not if the subject matter is the same: for example ‘how should we behave’, 
‘who or what am I’ and ‘how do I know?’. 
 
One tangible benefit of conducting a project in comparative philosophy is that 
views - even subconsciously inherited from one’s own tradition - are challenged 
and clarified as well as an appreciation for another tradition developed. (See 
Balslev op. cit., p. 363.) This is enriching and demands a rigorous approach to 
what one thinks one knows about philosophy in the West. By exposing 
Schopenhauer’s work to a rigorous comparison with Indian Buddhism, a richer 
and newer understanding is hopefully explicated. 
 
How Should we Conduct Comparisons? 
Comparative philosophy involves discussion on the commensurability of 
philosophical traditions and in this particular case the comparison is between the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer and that of some Indian Buddhism. A question 
addressed here is how comparisons between different philosophical traditions, in 
this case Indian and European, should be conducted. As long as at its base, in both 
systems, any claims maintain the principle of non-contradiction then I feel 
comparisons can be made. (See Balslev ibid. p. 368f.) 
 
Philosophies share in common with all texts the property of 
conceiving of, or interpreting, the world. Their special function is to 
interpret the world fundamentally. Philosophies conceive of the world 
comprehensively. But while each worldview does this individually, on 
its own terms, they still belong to a common realm of discourse. 
(Dilworth, 1989, p. 17) 
 
Although I believe it is possible to compare philosophies from different cultural 
traditions, what I am engaged in is nevertheless an interpretation from my own 
perspective. This is not something negative though: it is a fact for everyone no 
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matter what they examine. We cannot transcend our own background, but do need 
to decide when conducting a comparative enquiry what tools we want to use for 
the job. 
 
In my view, if we can employ rational thinking to any philosophical problem we 
will reach rational conclusions regardless of the culture compared or examined. 
We can still disagree as to the exact meaning of, for example, nirvāňa, 
eudaimonia, or even mind, but it would be extreme to believe that we can have no 
conception of Buddhist, Greek or modern English-speaking philosophy at all 
unless we are brought up in that culture and speak that language. Reason is the 
connection which overrides the genuine differences in culture, language and 
history and if there was a philosophy which did not use reason then its weaknesses 
would surely be illuminated quite easily. In the case at least of Indian Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, rational thinking is a requirement in understanding it as is the case for 
understanding Schopenhauer. 
 
No special tools are therefore needed in this comparison and the same tool, 
reason, will be applied equally to the two areas to be compared. 
 
I am confident that by applying a rational analysis of Schopenhauer and Buddhist 
philosophy we will find a valid set of conclusions regarding compassion in 
Schopenhauer’s and Buddhist ethics. 
 
Outline of the Argument 
Schopenhauer advises us that in order to understand his philosophy we must 
understand Plato, Kant and Indian philosophy.5 Most Western commentators on 
Schopenhauer have hitherto focussed on his relationship to Kant and his influence 
on later philosophers (primarily Nietzsche and Wittgenstein), but I want to follow 
Schopenhauer’s request as best as I am able and that means examining his 
relationship to Buddhism, if there is any. In order to do this I intend to explain the 
two main schools of Buddhism, a little of its history and then to focus on Buddhist 
ethics then address recent controversies. Any coherent explanation and analysis of 
Buddhism, with its near two and a half millennia of development and its wide 
geographical spread, is a large undertaking which will naturally result in the thesis 
appearing more concerned with Buddhism than with Schopenhauer but this is 
only superficially true; in order to understand Schopenhauer, Buddhism must be 
explained at some level of detail. 
 
In conducting this enquiry, I have had the following questions in mind: 
 
1. What is Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy and how does it differ from that 
of the other Western philosophers who preceded him? 
2. How does Schopenhauer argue against other forms of moral philosophy? 
3. Have there been criticisms of Schopenhauer’s philosophy as it relates to 
ethics? 
4. Can Schopenhauer be defended against these criticisms? 
                                                 
5 At least the two major ones, Hinduism and Buddhism. In WWR1 he mentions the Upanişads in 
this respect, but later (in WWR2) it seems clear that he thinks we need to know about Buddhism. 
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5. What is Buddhist Ethics? 
6. Are there differences in approach to ethics within Buddhism? 
7. What are the criticisms of Buddhist philosophy as it relates to ethics? 
8. Can Buddhist ethics be defended against these criticisms? 
9. Is Schopenhauer correct to claim that his philosophy is similar to Buddhist 
philosophy? 
10. Can Schopenhauer’s claims for concurrence between Buddhist ethics and 
his own be validated? 
11. Is the soteriological role of compassion the same, similar or different in 
the philosophy of Buddhism and that of Schopenhauer? 
12. What is the significance of these findings? 
 
I approach these questions as follows: in my first chapter I outline Schopenhauer’s 
ethics in its metaphysical context. Schopenhauer takes compassion to be central to 
ethics and this chapter explains his ethical system, which relies on a metaphysical 
framework which Schopenhauer inherits from Kant and modifies. What is 
explored, then, is Schopenhauer’s specific form of idealism as it relates to his 
ethics.  
 
In Chapter 2, I explain how compassion forms the nucleus of Schopenhauer’s 
moral philosophy and how he compares with philosophy which denies the place 
of compassion; that is any egoism-based philosophy. I have taken Thomas Hobbes 
to be the chief exponent of such a philosophy and examined Schopenhauer’s 
ethics in contrast to Hobbes’. Hume is also important in this regard since Hume, 
who does not follow Hobbes in saying that egoism is the primary motivation in 
our dealings with others, does nevertheless afford a place to egoism in his ethics. 
Schopenhauer can be seen as overlapping with Hume in that both regard 
compassion as the cornerstone of ethics, yet Schopenhauer differs from Hume. 
The reasons are explained here. Schopenhauer also rejects Kant’s ethics and his 
system does not accord with either Aristotle or with Utilitarianism. These last 
three are examined in Chapter 4 where they are also contrasted with Buddhist 
ethics.  
 
The third chapter looks at criticisms of Schopenhauer’s philosophy which have 
emerged quite recently, and some of which (if valid) would undermine 
Schopenhauer’s compassion-based ethics perhaps even fatally. I have explained 
them here and offered a defence of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s claim of 
affinity with Buddhist philosophy is taken up here too.  
 
Chapter 4 gives an outline of Buddhist ethics in general, looking first at early 
Buddhism then explaining how compassion developed to become the central 
theme of ethics in Mahāyāna Buddhism. There is a particular emphasis on the role 
of compassion in the ethics and ethics within the epistemological and 
metaphysical framework of both pre-Mahāyāna and Indian Mahāyāna thought. 
There are also specific problems in Buddhist ethics which are explained and an 
attempt made to counter them. The problems include the aims of the Bodhisattva 
who has to reconcile emptiness (śūnyatā) with compassion (karuňā).  
 
In Chapter 5 I have given some background to Śāntideva in order to contextualise 
his contribution to Mahāyāna thought. What arises, according to some claims, are 
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metaphysical and epistemological problems as well as negative philosophical 
implications for the central role of compassion, and these claims are examined, 
some responses explained and my own conclusions given. In conducting this, I 
outline the structure of Śāntideva’s works (the Bodhicaryāvatāra and the 
Śikşāsamuccaya), and examine the way he deals with egoism and self-interest as 
well as how self-interest becomes interest in others then the exchange of self with 
others. The problems identified in the previous chapter involving the aims of the 
Bodhisattva who has to reconcile emptiness (śūnyatā) with compassion (karuňā) 
are addressed here.  
 
In Chapter 6 I explain and address recent criticisms of Śāntideva, especially the 
idea that the specific role of compassion in his ethics and its soteriological role are 
illogical. I will explain what is pertinent in this discussion and offer a defence of 
Śāntideva against these criticisms.  
 
In the final chapter (Chapter 7) I compare the core ideas of Schopenhauer’s 
soteriology especially as it relates to ethics and compare this to Śāntideva’s. I will 
revisit Schopenhauer’s dismissal of other forms of ethics, examine whether or not 
Schopenhauer’s work was influenced by Buddhism and examine whether or not 
Schopenhauer is right in claiming convergence between Buddhism and his own 
philosophy.  
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Chapter 1: An Outline of Schopenhauer’s Ethics 
Schopenhauer’s main ideas on ethics are to be found in the fourth book of 
WWR1, in FW, OBM, in some essays in WWR2 and in PP2 where they are less 
systemised and take the form of short essays and aphorisms. His views are wide 
ranging and span a period of over thirty years yet still retain a level of coherence 
when placed in the context of his wider philosophical system. That system, at 
least as far as the first three parts of the four-part The World as Will and 
Representation is concerned, has been leading up to a discussion of ethics – which 
he regards as the most important: ‘The last part of our discussion [book four of 
WWR1] proclaims itself as the most serious, for it concerns the actions of men, 
the subject of direct interest to everyone, and one which can be foreign or 
indifferent to none.’ (WWR1 §53, Payne, 1969, p. 271.) He goes on to say that the 
previous three books have been purely theoretical whereas this book deals with 
practical philosophy, insofar as it deals with the actions of humans,6 yet remains 
essentially theoretical since he does not accept that theoretical philosophy can 
transform character:  
 
In my opinion…all philosophy is always theoretical, since it is essential 
to it always to maintain a purely contemplative attitude…to enquire, not 
to prescribe. But to become practical, to guide conduct, to transform 
character, are old claims which with mature insight it ought finally to 
abandon. 
(WWR1 §53, Payne, 1969, p. 271) 
 
One problem this immediately raises is what is the point of Schopenhauer’s moral 
philosophy if character cannot be transformed? Furthermore how can one be 
morally responsible if one’s character is not amenable to change? These questions 
are not fully answered in the fourth book of The World as Will and 
Representation, and we must look elsewhere to find a more extended treatment of 
ethics and his answers to the above questions and he treats this most thoroughly in 
the two essays submitted for the Scandinavian prizes.7
 
Schopenhauer’s ethics is descriptive in that it relies on an examination of what he 
thinks is reality and it is virtue ethics in terms of its commendation of what he 
takes to be ‘right’ behaviour and condemnation of what he takes to be its opposite. 
 
Schopenhauer is the first Western philosopher to examine Eastern philosophy and 
to claim that it is closely linked with his own. The most distilled incidence of this 
is in his adoption of the Sanskrit phrase tat tvam asi or this art thou (OBM §22, 
Payne, 1995, p. 211) which is intended to convey his agreement with what he 
takes to be the Upanişadic idea that we are all, under the illusory surface, one and 
                                                 
6 ‘Men’ is the translation. 
7 In 1838 Schopenhauer submitted his essay On the Freedom of the Will to the prize competition 
set by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences which asked ‘Can the freedom of the will be 
proven from self-consciousness?’ and in 1839 he submitted his essay On the Basis of Morality to 
the Royal Danish Society of Scientific Studies which asked ‘Are the source and foundation of 
morals to be looked for in an idea of morality lying immediately in consciousness (or conscience) 
and in the analysis of the other fundamental moral concepts springing from that idea, or are they 
to be looked for in a different ground of knowledge?’ The former won first prize, the latter did not 
despite being the only entry. 
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the same.8 A further distillation of what he calls the ‘genuine substance of all 
morality’ is to be found in his maxim ‘Injure no one; on the contrary, help 
everyone as much as you can’.9 Although it may seem that he is being 
prescriptive, he is merely stating what he takes to be a founding principle of any 
serious system of morality – whether or not we are prepared to adhere to this 
principle is another matter and this again raises the question of why bother to 
postulate a system of morality if few, or any, would adhere to it? 
 
Although Schopenhauer draws much from Kant, he does not accept Kant’s ethics 
since he thinks reason cannot be helpful if you cannot change your fundamental 
nature, which he believes is the case.  You just either are or are not morally good, 
do or do not understand what it is to behave well. He still wants to see moral rules 
in society and you can see moral rules as something pragmatic in Schopenhauer, 
although they are not geared at creating good consequences: more to create less 
bad consequences which emanate especially from those naturally incapable of 
being good since such people cannot be made good. 
 
Schopenhauer thinks that people will at a deep and non-conscious level either 
know how to behave morally or they will lack this knowledge. If they lack this 
knowledge then nothing can be done to make it available to them. They are stuck 
with what they already have. So society has to set up strictures to contain such 
people as those who lack moral knowledge, or an ability to act with compassion, 
but it cannot fundamentally change the way they are. This begins to sound like 
Schopenhauer believes there is no free-will, which once again raises the question 
of how responsible someone is for their actions, but this is not the whole picture 
and continued explanation of Schopenhauer’s ethical system is necessary before 
this is addressed in full.  
 
Whatever ‘good’ or ‘moral’ behaviour is for Schopenhauer it must take account 
of what he sees as the empirical evidence of individual self-interestedness or 
egoism. He gives many examples of egoism in action and says this is the real way 
that people are and the world is and that since man is self-interested, he is also, on 
                                                 
8 This is a debateable interpretation of the metaphysics of the Upanişads: other Vedānta schools 
have rejected it. However Schopenhauer appears to have taken it as I have suggested above: ‘all 
plurality is only apparent…in all the individuals of this world, however infinite the number in 
which they exhibit themselves successively and simultaneously, there is yet manifested only one 
and the same truly existing essence, present and identical in all of them. Such a doctrine, of course, 
existed long before Kant; indeed it might be said to have existed from time immemorial. In the 
first place, it is the main and fundamental teaching of the oldest book in the world, the sacred 
Vedas, whose dogmatic part or rather esoteric teaching is to be found in the Upanishads. There we 
find that great teaching on almost every page. It is tirelessly repeated in countless adaptations and 
elucidated by many different similes and parables.’ (OBM, §22 , Payne, 1995, pp. 207-8) and 
‘Individuation is mere phenomenon or appearance and originates through space and time. These 
are nothing but the forms of all the objects of my cerebral cognitive faculty and are conditioned by 
them. And so even plurality and diversity of individuals are mere phenomenon, that is, exist only 
in my representation. My true inner being exists in every living thing as directly as it makes itself 
known in my self-consciousness only to me…In Sanskrit tat tvam asi (this art thou) is the formula, 
the standing expression, for this knowledge.’ (Ibid., p. 210.) 
9 Which he gives in Latin as Neminem laede, imo omnes quantum potes, juva in OBM §7, p. 92. 
This is similar to Socrates’ response to Polemarchus in Republic 332d – 336a where the 
conclusion is that it can never be morally right to harm anyone – even your enemies. 
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occasion, barbaric:10 ‘At bottom, man is a hideous wild beast. We know him only 
as bridled and tamed, a state that is called civilization; and so we are shocked by 
the occasional outbursts of his nature’ (PP2, §114, Payne, 1974, p. 211). He tells 
us of the existence of reports ‘which will suffice to convince you that man is in 
no way inferior to the tiger or the hyena in pitilessness and cruelty’ and of 
atrocities visited upon American slaves which are ‘one of the heaviest of all 
indictments against mankind’ (Ibid., p. 212). In another such example, this time 
from The Times (20, 22 and 23 September 1848) he tells us of a husband and wife 
in England who systematically poisoned their children in order to claim insurance 
money. His intention with such horror stories is to show that, in life, injustice, 
suffering and acts committed in the name of self-interest are the natural and 
inevitable order of the day. He tells us that: 
 
Reports of this kind, of course, belong to the blackest pages of the 
criminal record of the human race; yet the source of this and of 
everything like it is the inner and innate nature of man [where] there is 
established in everyone a colossal egoism that leaps with the greatest of 
ease beyond the bounds of justice, as is taught by daily life on a small 
scale and by every page of history on a large. 
(Ibid., p. 212) 
 
No previous moral theories will do since any moral theory which can lead to a 
justification of any of the horrors of existence, is of no use to Schopenhauer - for 
example any consequentialist theory which allows something we are likely to 
regard as unpleasant to happen for the greater good is not going to furnish us with 
an adequate or acceptable moral theory. Rationality will not necessarily lead us to 
moral behaviour either and can in fact lead us to immoral behaviour when it is tied 
in with egoism.11
 
Schopenhauer’s judgment on the human race is that we are primarily egoistic or 
self-interested and this leads us to strive after things and this self-interestedness 
and attempted fulfilment of self-interested aims is what causes the sufferings of 
the world of existence. The remedy to this (although it seems on a superficial 
reading to be contradictory to suggest there is a remedy when he has previously 
said our character is unchangeable) is an ethic of compassion and if we were 
compassionate this would alleviate the sufferings of the world enormously 
although not completely since some people will always be living on the edge of 
                                                 
10 This is one area where Schopenhauer and Buddhism do not concur. In the Yogācāra School 
(with which Schopenhauer’s form of Idealism can be most closely compared) and in subsequent 
Mahāyāna thought, even the most pessimistic Buddhist would not agree with Schopenhauer about 
human nature being so negative. In fact Buddhists who accept the idea of Buddha-nature would 
say that even wild beasts have it. (See Conze (1962), pp. 198, 229, Prebish and Keown (2007), pp. 
99, 218, Williams (1989) p. 98 and his references to the Mahāparinirvāňa Sūtra. 
11 I am reminded here of Aristotle’s virtues in ‘clusters’ (Nicomachean Ethics) where the ability to 
practice one virtue but not another may compound your moral weaknesses which would be the 
case if you were, say, industriously dishonest. Aristotle requires that you have all the virtues 
together. There is a parallel with having a limited ‘virtue’ in Schopenhauer (reason) but it is not 
exactly the same thing as Schopenhauer has in mind, which is that reason can be employed as a 
tool to satisfy our self-interest at the expense of others. Although reason is useful it can cause 
compassion to be overridden if it is not fully employed in the same way as the employment of an 
incomplete set of Aristotelian aretēs will preclude you from eudaimonia. 
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existence and we have such things as illness and death to contend with which no 
amount of compassion can extinguish. 
 
So much for his empirical observations, he has to explain what comes before these 
observations i.e. why compassion is good and egoism is not good and although he 
has dismissed Kantian ethics and gives extended treatment of this in The World as 
Will and Representation and On the Basis of Morality, he still relies on Kant’s 
metaphysics, as he acknowledges, for some of the background to his own ethics 
and this involves especially the phenomenon/noumenon distinction. In 
understanding what Schopenhauer means by this, we should briefly examine the 
terminology he uses: noumenon/noumenal; world as Will and thing-in-itself. 
Schopenhauer inherits the word noumenon from Kant and for Kant, the noumenal 
world is simply a postulate: it is what there needs to be for us to have any 
knowledge, but we have no knowledge of things-in-themselves – things as they 
actually are and not as we take them to be after elements of them have been 
scanned by our imperfect senses and cognised by our limited intellect operating 
within a framework of three dimensional space and linear time.12 Schopenhauer 
differs in some important respects from Kant in that the noumenal for 
Schopenhauer is not plural, it objectifies itself in conscious creatures and the 
phenomenal world is not apart from it – it is rather the same thing seen from a 
different angle.13 The reason Schopenhauer changes Kant’s things-in-themselves 
to thing-in-itself is that he does not believe space and time – and therefore 
subject/object duality – exist in the noumenal world: the noumenal world and the 
world of thing-in-itself are the same thing for Schopenhauer. He gives the rather 
misleading name Will to the thing-in-itself and thinks he has corrected Kant with 
this slight modification. This means that for Schopenhauer the noumenal world, 
the thing-in-itself and the world as Will are essentially all the same thing which 
manifests itself in self-aware creatures as a motivating force. 
 
We are, for Schopenhauer, phenomenally different from one another, individuated 
and self-interested, but noumenally we are the same. He thinks that this 
phenomenal difference leads us to be wary of others and at times jealous of one 
another and that this separation between us is false and can be overcome by some 
sort of fellow-feeling: ‘envy more firmly builds up the wall between You and I: 
for sympathy it becomes thin and transparent; in fact it is sometimes completely 
demolished by this quality then the distinction between I and not-I vanishes.’ 
(PP2, §110, Payne, 1974, p. 204). Several times he points out that we are 
                                                 
12 We do have knowledge of the noumenal world, for Kant, insofar as we have knowledge of our 
capacity to rationally determine the moral law - that is our noumenon and it is something we are 
aware of. When we are conscious of our own freedom we have experience of the noumenal world 
and our freedom consists in our ability to legislate rules of conduct. With Schopenhauer it is not 
clear if the noumenon is knowable or not since he argues that it is inferable and is a blind, 
purposeless, malevolent force yet at other times states that it is unknowable. (I shall give a detailed 
explanation of this disputed area of interpretation later.) Schopenhauer does not agree with Kant’s 
attempts to use the supposed self-knowledge of the noumenon to justify a deontological ethic and, 
instead, uses it to attempt to justify his compassion-based ethical theory. 
13 In a similar way to that in which nirvāňa and saņsāra are (for the Mahāyāna) the same thing 
viewed from a different perspective. Also, in this interpretation, the animal realm is seen through 
animal eyes but inhabits the same physical space as the human realm. In short, the cat sitting 
beside me is in the same world but views it as a cat world whereas I view it as a human one – we 
have no choice since I am not a cat and it is not a human and I am a human and it is a cat. 
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fundamentally unchangeable then suggests that we can create changes in our 
behaviour.14 This means either that he simply contradicts himself or that he has 
two lines of thinking, one of which takes the former view and the other the latter 
and that he is able to tie these seemingly incompatible views together. This needs 
extended treatment which I will give later. 
 
If our phenomenal differences are illusory then acts of egoism and malice, 
directed against others, are based on false motivations unlike compassion which 
reflects the world as it is – since the world is one and unindividuated and 
compassion breaks down the artificial barriers between us. If I insist on retaining 
the false barriers between myself and others and I harm them then I also harm my 
metaphysical self. 
1.1 Incentives to Action 
What are the parts that would make up a moral human for Schopenhauer?15 The 
three underlying motives with ethical significance are egoism, malice, and 
compassion.16 This outlook can be described as virtue ethics since he regards 
moral (compassionate) behaviour as containing certain virtues17 and the other two 
broad types of behaviour (egoism and malice) to be constituting vice.  
 
A reference to the special vices that spring from the above mentioned 
two fundamental forces [egoism and malice] would find its place only 
in a detailed system of ethics. Such a system would perhaps derive 
from egoism, greed, intemperance, lust, selfishness, avarice, 
covetousness, injustice, hardness of heart, pride, arrogance, and so on.   
From spite, however, it would derive envy, disaffection, ill will, 
malice, malicious joy at another’s misfortune, prying curiosity, slander, 
insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery, perfidy, thirst for 
                                                 
14 These are too numerous to mention but are found all through his relevant works from FW and 
OBM to WWR1 and 2 and in mostly aphoristic form in PP1 and 2. 
15 A moral human, for Schopenhauer, can only exist in the phenomenal world since morality 
requires plurality – if the noumenal is non-plural then there is no possibility of morality there as 
there are no doers and no beings having things done to them. In the phenomenal world there is 
plurality and therefore a need for morality: i.e. compassion.  
16 In Buddhism there are three roots of evil: greed, hatred and delusion. The first of these involves 
a strong identification with self and can be compared to Schopenhauer’s egoism element. The 
second, hatred, could be compared to Schopenhauer’s malice element and the third, delusion, 
although not a root of moral behaviour for Schopenhauer, has a part to play in reinforcing ideas of 
self and other – which can lead to selfishness. It does so by not taking account of the idea that the 
world as we normally perceive it, with ‘you’ and ‘I’ is the ‘deluded’ phenomenal world. 
Schopenhauer mentions a fourth constituent (in WWR2 XLVIII, Payne, 1969, p. 607) which is the 
desire for your own woe which he ties to certain ascetic practices. He says ‘I mention this here 
incidentally merely in the interests of systematic consistency’ and tells us that he had deliberately 
omitted to mention it in his essay On the Basis of Morality since it would not have, he felt, 
satisfied the criteria of the prize-question which the essay was intended to answer. Nevertheless 
this idea of self-woe is not mentioned again and does not play a central part in his ethics. 
Interestingly he recognises correctly that Buddhism does not advocate extreme asceticism of the 
kind which can be found in some Indian sects, such as self-torture, and elsewhere in, for example, 
the wearing of ‘the hairy garment’, but he is incorrect in saying that Buddhist asceticism requires 
celibacy and abstinence from animal foods. Traditionally celibacy was encouraged but monks 
were not forbidden from eating meat – as one of the Five Moral Precepts monks would try to 
refrain from killing sentient beings and as a consequence vegetarianism became widespread, but 
there was no proscription of the eating of meat. 
17 Voluntary justice, pure philanthropy and real magnanimity. 
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revenge, cruelty, and so on. The first root is more brutal, the second 
more devilish…No one is entirely without something of all three. 
(PP2, §85, Payne, 1974, p. 136) 
 
He believes that we all have a mixture of egoism, malice and compassion and that 
some people have a great deal of compassion, some have practically none and the 
rest of us sit somewhere in between; the same permutation applies for egoism and 
malice. Schopenhauer accepts that we will be egoistic, malicious and to some 
extent compassionate but that compassion is the only incentive which is of moral 
worth. He then has to tell us why he rejects acting in an egoistic and a malicious 
way respectively and explains that egoism is present in humans and animals and 
has helped us secure our survival and so it would be difficult to say it is evil or 
morally wrong to have self-interest. Self-interest should not be regarded as always 
necessarily bad but is the motive for morally indifferent actions – for example, 
eating is an action of self-interest but it is not regarded as morally bad.18 It is not 
productive, however, of actions of moral worth but in a sense cannot be 
condemned since there is nothing wrong with something which assists self-
preservation. Nevertheless, to focus on acting in a self-interested way can cause 
suffering for others and for yourself (since it will lead you to desire things which 
give no lasting satisfaction) and self-interest can be judged then as a hindrance to 
morality rather than as something immoral – morality being tied to acts of 
compassion which self-interest precludes. Indeed it is possible to gain from an 
egoist’s behaviour provided the egoist helping you helps themselves more than 
they would have been able to had they not helped you,19 so the egoist may on 
occasion perform seemingly altruistic actions but these actions are not of moral 
worth for Schopenhauer because their aim is the self-interest of the agent rather 
than compassion for the person they have helped. They do not have compassion 
for another but appear to from the sheer coincidence of their actions mirroring 
those of a compassionate person – their motivation is quite different. Malice on 
the other hand is morally reprehensible and blameworthy since it has no benefit to 
the person who indulges in it or the person it is used against, unlike self-interest, 
and this is the major distinction between the two. Unlike egoistic thoughts or 
actions, there is nothing to be gained from malice and malicious thoughts are seen 
as futile to Schopenhauer, except to satisfy some psychological lust for the 
misfortune of others, and, materially at least, are quite pointless.20 They are a 
                                                 
18 This is Julian Young’s example in Schopenhauer, Routledge (from the series ‘The Routledge 
Philosophers’), Abingdon, 2005, p. 175. 
19 For example, imagine I learn bushcraft in order to protect myself on my next trip to the jungle 
and I, once there, stumble upon you who have no knowledge of how to survive. I may benefit by 
helping you since you will provide another pair of eyes and ears and a possible food-source for me 
if things do not work out. My helping you is, in this case, nothing but a by-product of my wish to 
preserve myself, and if I do not have to eat you then you may mistakenly think that I am an 
altruist. You have benefited from my acts of self-interest. 
20 Schopenhauer might be wrong about this; perhaps malice is psychologically necessary to inflict 
punishment and affect justice. It could be argued that malice motivates us in finding retribution 
and therefore has a valid purpose outside of psychology. For what it is worth, Hobbes did not think 
malice was possible: ‘that any man should take pleasure in other mens [sic] great harmes, without 
other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.’ (Hobbes, §28,Rogers and Schuhmann, 2005, 
Chapter 6, p. 49.) Hobbes was clearly wrong about this unless ‘other end of his own’ is taken to 
mean something like even psychological ‘gain’. Again it can be argued that malice is either 
important for a practical outcome (justice) or simply for a feeling of superiority – which 
practically all human beings appear to enjoy experiencing. 
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negative indulgence unlike the positive indulgence of self-interested actions – 
positive in this sense not necessarily meaning something to be approved of.21
 
It is only with the concrete or phenomenal manifestations of the three ‘moral’ 
incentives that we are best acquainted, and although he thinks egoistically 
motivated actions are not morally blameworthy – malicious ones are – he does 
spend some considerable time discussing ego-driven actions. Compassion is the 
moral incentive of which Schopenhauer approves and compassion for 
Schopenhauer is made up of three elements: voluntary justice, pure philanthropy 
and real magnanimity. As far as practical examples of them go, he warns us that it 
may be easy to find examples of just, philanthropic and magnanimous deeds but 
difficult to find out if the motive which gave rise to them was genuine or self-
interested. (See OBM §15.) 
 
Examples of the three constituent elements of compassion are short on the ground 
in Schopenhauer and the reason for this is that he feels he has covered them by a 
general principle which is that: 
 
egoism and the moral worth of an action absolutely exclude each other. 
If an action has as its motive an egoistic aim, it cannot have any moral 
worth. If it is to have moral worth, its motive cannot be an egoistic aim, 
direct or indirect, near or remote. 
(OBM §16, Payne, 1995, p. 141) 
 
For Kant, of course, you can follow an action with an egoistic aim and still be 
moral. It is in your interests to behave in certain ways and egoism and moral 
worth are not mutually exclusive since at the end of the day there must be some 
benefit to you or you would not be motivated to behave in moral ways.22 If you 
would have so behaved anyway then morality would be nothing worth talking 
about and we would all be moral as a matter of course.  
 
Since it is clear enough what an egoistic aim is, it follows that what is left is of 
moral worth. Schopenhauer is aware of the possible objection that malicious 
                                                 
21 A Buddhist would recommend that you act morally (compassionately) since it is part of the 
eightfold path which leads to enlightenment. A criticism of this is that it is nothing but self-
interest: you want to be enlightened so that you no longer experience duųkha (unsatisfactoriness) 
and the cultivation of compassion is for your own benefit. This may be more applicable to the 
Arhat in the Theravāda tradition than the Bodhisattva in the Mahāyāna. For the Mahāyāna we 
cannot maintain self-interest into enlightenment and it is necessary to have it only as an initial 
step. Your enlightenment will help other sentient creatures escape the rounds of rebecoming in 
samsāra and it is therefore ultimately a selfless act or an act of compassion even if it was initially 
motivated by self-interest. Śāntideva, at least, is aware of the criticism that a quest for 
enlightenment could be seen as selfish and explains why someone who tries to maintain such an 
attitude could not become properly enlightened. (See BCA 8:129-31.) 
22 For Aristotle too, self-interest is important for ethics and although part of living the eudaimon, 
flourishing or ‘good’ life involves making great effort (such as keeping physically fit as well as 
cultivating the various arêtes (virtues) until they become hexes (habits or entrenched dispositions)) 
the end result is ultimately a self-interested one since happiness (a workable definition of 
eudaimonia) is the telos (end) and can be achieved if this effort is made. As a by-product the 
society will flourish and this also has an appeal to self-interest. Self-interested actions, on the 
Aristotelian model, then, have a direct relationship to moral behaviour and ultimately contribute to 
the happiness of the individual and the good of the society. Schopenhauer is briefly critical of this 
view on p. 25 here. 
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actions, even malicious thoughts such as Schadenfreude (which he feels is 
particularly vile and repugnant), do not necessarily result in the self-interest of the 
agent, but he claims that: 
  
such actions cannot be meant for they are the very opposite of those 
we are considering. But anyone who insists on the strictness of the 
definition may expressly exclude those actions because their essential 
characteristic is that they aim at the suffering of others. 
(OBM §15, Payne, 1995, p. 140) 
 
Schopenhauer is not able to fully explain everything about compassion: why we 
have it, exactly what it is other than a set of ‘virtues’ or a recognition of and 
fellow-feeling for someone else’s pain - he does not feel that we take the person’s 
pain on ourselves but we do recognise pain in another. There is, of course, an 
argument that all actions are egoism in a mask including those of compassion and 
that the volunteer working in the charity shop is ultimately satisfying their own 
desire to feel valued or useful. This argument is, I think, flawed but difficult to 
dismiss completely even if we were to cite common objections to it such as its 
failure to adequately explain the existence of friendship, the institution of the 
family and generally benevolent actions which do not appear to be selfishly 
motivated. Schopenhauer is aware of the problem of this extreme egoistic point of 
view and handles it in OBM (§13) and says that continued belief in scepticism 
regarding compassion as an independent incentive is ‘quibbling and an obstinate 
refusal to accept the facts’ (Ibid., §15, Payne, 1995, p. 139). Since he cannot find 
a way to dismiss it, he decides that he will address himself ‘to those who admit 
the reality of the matter.’ (Ibid.) This is basically an appeal to those he would 
consider to be reasonable and there is much of this in Schopenhauer. 
 
Obviously it is a weakness in Schopenhauer’s argument, if he wants to be taken 
seriously, to simply say that those who disagree with him are quibbling and 
refusing to accept the facts (both sides in any argument could make that claim), 
but he fortifies his position with examples of actions which are carried out without 
a view to self-interest: 
 
it is…certain that there are actions of disinterested philanthropy and of 
entirely voluntary justice. To appeal not to the facts of consciousness, 
but simply to experience, I refer to isolated, yet indubitable cases as 
proofs of such actions. Not only was the danger of legal prosecution 
entirely excluded here, but that of discovery and even of suspicion, 
and yet the rich man was given his property by the poor: for instance, 
something is lost, found, and returned to the owner; a deposit made by 
a third party, who has since died, is restored to the rightful owner; a 
sum of money is privately entrusted to a poor man by a fugitive for 
whom it is faithfully kept and to whom it is returned…. Indeed there 
are really honest people just as there are actually four-leaved clover… 
It may be objected that ultimately religious dogmas, and thus regard 
for punishment and reward in another world, underlie the above-
mentioned actions; but against this, cases could perhaps be indicated 
wherein the performers of such actions belonged to no religious faith 
at all. This is by no means as rare as people profess. 
(OBM §13, Payne, 1995, p. 126) 
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He believes that although certain actions are motivated by egoism, there are 
actions which are motivated without it and are not carried out for any personal 
gain – in fact sometimes people act to their detriment and surely Schopenhauer is 
right in saying that this can hardly be seen to be motivated by egoism unless you 
take the rather torturous view that the gain is masochistic and therein lies the 
reason for its motivation: a view which I would regard as rather far-fetched if we 
were to claim that it applies to all or even most people.  
 
He also uses the example of Arnold von Winkelried who, at the battle of Sempach 
between the Old Swiss Confederacy and Leopold III of Austria in 1386, saved the 
day for the Swiss by sacrificing himself against the Austrian lances in order to 
open their lines to attack, and says: ‘some may imagine that he had a selfish 
intention, but I cannot.’(Ibid., §15, Payne, 1995, p. 139.) 
 
He also points out that if that extreme egoist is right and all actions are motivated 
by egoism alone, then there is no such thing as morality since we would all be 
acting without regard to others, and this view is difficult to sustain.23
 
if anyone should persist in telling me that such actions [selfless ones, 
or ones of ‘voluntary justice’ as he puts it] do not occur, then, 
according to him, morals would be a science without any real object, 
like astrology and alchemy, and it would be a waste of time to 
continue to discuss its foundation. All argument with such a man 
would, therefore, be at an end…24
(Ibid., p. 139) 
 
Compassion is naturally occurring whereas egoism, although the incentive is 
natural enough, does require our judgement and decision on what actions to 
undertake. Compassion may tell you that you do feel sympathy for, for example, 
the people being led into the gas chamber but a self-interested judgement may tell 
you that you will not try to help them yet your sympathy remains. The fact that 
you feel sympathy prior to deciding what to actually do or not do leads 
Schopenhauer to think that sympathy or compassion is an independent faculty and 
not a sub-branch of egoism. 
 
Schopenhauer asks the question why people differ in their moral behaviour and 
why some people are influenced by compassion and some are not and he asks if 
ethics can transform a bad man into a compassionate man (see OBM §20). He 
thinks it cannot and that ‘the difference in characters is innate and ineradicable.’ 
(Ibid, p. 187.) He then goes on to quote Plato and Socrates in support of this idea 
and the gist of what he says from The Meno, is that we cannot learn virtue25 and 
what Schopenhauer has in mind here is the Platonic notion that we are born with 
innate ideas and the process of learning is nothing but the rediscovery of these 
                                                 
23 Others may benefit coincidentally by our egoistic actions but no-one, except the most extreme 
optimist, would want to live in the hope that such coincidences befall them all the time. 
24 This also clearly puts him at odds with Hobbes. 
25 When he talks about Socrates, he quotes from Aristotle - obviously Aristotle could not concur 
with the Platonic view that virtue cannot be learned since the Nicomachean Ethics is largely 
concerned with the cultivation of the habits of virtue. 
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ideas which are actually in us all the time.26 When you ‘learn’ you are not actually 
changing what is fundamentally you and virtue is not, for Schopenhauer, 
learnable. With regard to the metaphysical foundations of the ethics, the interplay 
between noumenon and phenomenon, the reality of the world is noumenal, 
undifferentiated, unindividuated: phenomenal differences are illusory and 
adherence to the notion of phenomenal difference is ignorance of the true nature 
of reality. Apart from the fact that it leads to the sufferings of the world it is also a 
failure to acknowledge the way things really are: one undifferentiated whole. It 
simply seems that we are different from one another and all the objects of space 
and time are different to one another. In their essence they are all noumenally the 
same. This has implications for Schopenhauer’s ethics since if we are ultimately 
the same we should not, he thinks, act against one another since this is like acting 
against one’s ultimate ‘self’. This is problematic for at least two reasons: firstly 
why should the ultimate nature of things influence us if we perceive ourselves as 
not inhabiting that ultimate world and secondly surely if I (influenced by the 
ultimate oneness of the world) want to act with compassion, I must be able to 
change or at least adapt my character? 
 
Schopenhauer is disparaging about those who claim that normal human beings 
can be changed in this way or ‘morally improved’ and says: 
 
Ethical writers who promise to produce a system of ethics that will 
morally improve man and who speak of a progress in virtue are always 
triumphantly refuted by reality and experience, which have 
demonstrated that virtue is inborn and cannot result from sermons. As 
something original, character is unchangeable… 
(OBM §20, Payne, 1995, p. 190) 
 
He says further in the same section that it is possible to force someone to behave 
in a way coincident with morality and compassion simply by deceit or varying 
levels of compulsion but that at their core that person is not a compassionate 
person despite their outward appearances guided by social strictures, legal 
sanctions or false ideas of gain: 
 
The motives of loving kindness which are for the good character such 
powerful incentives can as such have no influence on a man who is 
susceptible only to egoistical motives. If, however, we wish to induce 
the egoist to perform actions of loving-kindness, we can do it only by 
deluding him…In this way his will is merely misled, not 
improved…This, [improvement] however, is certainly much more 
impossible than changing lead into gold. 
(Ibid., p. 193) 
 
                                                 
26 The obvious example here is from the Meno 81e – 85c, when Socrates ‘demonstrates’ that the 
slave has innate knowledge of mathematics, although you could argue that, by Socrates’ process of 
elimination and guidance in the conversation, the slave could have been led to ‘know’ the route 
from Glasgow to London provided his interlocutor knows in the first place, but that is a different 
matter, my point being that Schopenhauer’s argument is well connected to Platonic thinking in that 
for Plato virtue is impossible without knowledge and Schopenhauerian virtue (compassion) can 
also be found from knowledge of your noumenal oneness with others.  
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What is not changeable about them is their ‘real’ nature beyond the mere 
appearance of their actions or what we or they take to be their knowledge of 
themselves. Here we find a glimpse of his solution to the problem he has created 
in saying we cannot change yet we can: there appears to be two parts to us and 
one is an unchangeable core with the other being a superficial and influencable 
façade. This ‘self’, if it has a strong measure of self-interest, seeks to avoid what 
is detrimental to its well-being and to avail itself of what is beneficial.27 This 
glimpse will be magnified in the next chapter but it is not the only method he uses 
in an attempt to overcome what Julian Young describes as his ‘self-undermining 
position’ (Young, 2005, p. 159).28
 
Non-compassionate actions can only have a justification in the world where there 
appear to be phenomenal differences between us. Since this is illusory in fact such 
actions, such failures of knowledge, are in error when seen against the backdrop 
of the reality of our noumenal sameness. To be compassionate, to have no barriers 
between yourself and others is more in keeping with the world as it really is and 
not with the world as, say, Thrasymachus, Callicles or Machiavelli take it to be.29
 
When you sympathise, for Schopenhauer this means you are obliterating the 
distinctions between yourself and another person. This means you are doing away 
with your egoism on this particular occasion. This notion of the oneness of life, of 
the illusoriness of our current fleeting existence is in keeping with the teachings of 
Hinduism and Buddhism (respectively) and Schopenhauer discovered that the 
Indian conclusions paralleled his own although this discovery came after he had 
written WWR1. It is important to note though that Schopenhauer did not accept 
the idea of God or gods, souls, or reincarnation30 or any continued recognisable 
existence of the phenomenal manifestation of the self after death. He was a 
celebrated atheist. 
 
What actually constitutes a human being for Schopenhauer is not merely their 
phenomenal physical appearance, it is also the fundamental will plus their 
knowledge. There are some philosophers who have wanted our knowledge, our 
                                                 
27 This is not Hobbesian since Schopenhauer wants to go beyond what the dictates of self-interest 
compel us to do and not do: he involves the element of compassion and places it centre stage and 
this makes him differ markedly from Hobbes. Furthermore, as we shall see, there is a close 
metaphysical connection for Schopenhauer between our moral behaviour and the idea of self 
which connects to Indian philosophy and again marks it out as different from Hobbes’ happiness-
seeking man. 
28 In context Young thinks it is worth pursuing this seeming paradox. 
29 Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias argues that might is right and that the weak espouse ‘morality’ in 
order to undermine the strong. With Machiavelli I am, of course, referring to The Prince where 
pretending to be moral but not being so is advised for effective rulership: ‘A prince...need not 
necessarily have all the good [moral] qualities...but he should certainly appear to have them. I 
would even go so far as to say that if he has these qualities and always behaves accordingly he will 
find them harmful; if he only appears to have them they will render him service. He should appear 
to be compassionate, faithful to his word, kind, guileless, and devout a prince...cannot observe all 
those things which give a man a reputation for virtue, because in order to maintain his state he is 
often forced to act in defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of religion...he should not 
deviate from what is good, if that is possible, but he should know how to do evil, if that is 
necessary.’ (The Prince, Machiavelli, tr. Bull, G. (1985), p. 100). 
30 It is also important to note that Buddhism does not accept God or a permanent ‘self’. I will 
return to Schopenhauer’s ideas on reincarnation or rebirth later. 
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intellect, to play a central part in directing our moral lives (Plato for example), and 
although we can bow to our knowledge and allow it to affect our behaviour, 
Schopenhauer thinks that lurking beneath this are the egoistically driven desires 
which we all have and which lie behind the masks of knowledge, civilization, 
manners, etiquette and so on which we impose upon them. Any time an occasion 
arises where, say, our life is threatened, our fundamental existence is in danger, 
these masks slip and we reveal ourselves as we are: ego-driven manifestations of 
the noumenal Will, and this Will, it must be remembered, is a bad thing. Although 
it is not purposely bad (it does not have any aim in mind or even a mind in which 
an aim could exist), it is blind, purposeless and ultimately negative in its 
manifestations in the phenomenal world. 
 
He thinks the self-consciously knowledgeable part of us is capable of being kept 
in the dark by our underlying will,31 that we may think we know ourselves, we 
may think we know how we will act in certain situations, but we may be surprised 
at how we do act. We may be surprised at how brutal, for example, we could 
become but we make our way in life thinking that we have some kind of measure 
of ourselves when in fact we do not.32 The reality of us lies in the Will and not in 
the knowing subject as we often believe – the knowing subject being us; the 
individual.  
 
1.2 Death 
Since Schopenhauer obviously did not think much of human existence, at least in 
so far as it is suffering and we cause suffering to other sentient beings, the 
question inevitably arose in his mind as to why we should continue with it. One of 
the reasons he gives is that many people continue to live despite hating their 
existence simply because they are more terrified of death than life. He thinks this 
fear of death is ill-founded for two reasons. The first is that since the phenomenal 
you, the self-conscious you, did not exist in self-conscious form for immeasurable 
aeons of time prior to your birth and you do not have any remnants of fear from 
this period, then it does not make any sense to fear the same non-existence after 
you are dead. It may be wise to fear the process of dying since this may be 
unpleasant or even painful, but not to fear the annihilation which comes after.33 
You are merely returning to the normal state and it is the state of self-conscious 
phenomenal existence as a human which is the aberration, the accident and our 
short existence torn away from the reality of the noumenon should actually 
surprise us: ‘To his astonishment, a man all of a sudden exists after countless 
                                                 
31 This is not done deliberately, the thing-in-itself is Will and this inhabits and makes up the 
noumenal realm. It manifests itself in the phenomenal realm as will (with a small ‘w’) in self-
aware creatures (similar to the way a tree is manifested in several wooden doors) and moves us to 
action, bypassing the intellect and knowledge of all but the wisest or most ‘saintly’. 
32 Some war veterans have claimed their experiences show that there are levels and depths to our 
character of which we are entirely ignorant until tested at the extremity of existence and then we 
may be surprised at ourselves and our actions and those of others whom we thought we knew. 
33 Although, he thinks it is rational to fear the process of dying (the transition from phenomenal 
being to non-phenomenality) since it may be unpleasant, he, as a student of Plato would 
undoubtedly have been aware of Socrates’ suggestion that death might actually be something good 
and that we simply cannot know either way: ‘no one knows whether death, which men in their fear 
apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good.’ (Apology, Plato and Jowett, 1938, 
29a-b.) 
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thousands of years of non-existence and, after a short time, must again pass into a 
non-existence just as long.’ (PP2, §143, Payne, 1974, p. 282). The other argument 
is that since ‘you’ will no longer exist in any recognisable form after your death, it 
cannot make sense to fear something which does not exist. These views, of 
course, rely on acceptance of the idea that there is no ‘soul’ or afterlife for the ‘I’ 
which currently takes phenomenal form. 
 
For those who decide that they cannot take any more of life and wish to commit 
suicide, he feels that their wish to die is actually a perversion of their strong wish 
to live, of their strong wish to satisfy their phenomenal will. In other words a 
hatred of life so strong that one is prepared to end it is an identification with the 
striving, wanting, egoistic, phenomenal self and that because of the (inevitable) 
disappointments of life, the lack of satisfaction of the ego-driven desires, the 
terrors of life, as he puts it, outweigh the terrors of death and at that point suicide 
takes place. Perhaps this is best illustrated by its opposite: if you have overcome 
or transcended the phenomenal self then you cannot wish to extinguish it; if you 
do not have egoistic, will-driven desires then you do not have desires which can 
be disappointed. ‘I am happy to be phenomenally negated’ is more what 
Schopenhauer is saying. What happens after that does not and cannot matter to me 
since there will be no ‘me’ anymore. It is not a phenomenal desire, it is an 
identification with the noumenal reality of ‘my’ (temporary) situation. At its 
crudest, and putting a more modern spin on it, everything is a force, I recognise 
this current manifestation of it as ‘me’ and I recognise another manifestation of it 
as ‘you’. Before we were recognisably me and you, we were part of the great 
force of existence and after we die we will go back to it. In fact we are still it – the 
only thing which has changed is that we are beings with perception and I perceive 
‘me’ and ‘you’, who are really a bunch of phenomenal chemicals which are part 
of a greater unexplainable reality. Transcendence of the phenomenal self is simply 
identification with this truth. Ideally, the phenomenal entity which is me should be 
regarded as a temporary illusion and all Schopenhauer is asking in his wish to 
transcend the individual will is that we recognise that we are illusions and that 
reality is a noumenal unity. He is simply saying that he wishes that will which is 
manifested in the phenomenal entity ‘me’ to be negated, to be overcome, to be 
transcended and mixed back in with the noumenal world. What this means, at this 
stage, in practice is hard to judge since the mechanism by which we transcend is 
not clear apart from his argument that in moments of aesthetic contemplation we 
transcend self and are in touch with the noumenal world where self as we know it 
is impossible.34 A problem here is that it does not seem to be a mechanism which 
allows us to permanently fuse with the noumenal world and if we cannot 
permanently transcend then Schopenhauer does not offer a permanent solution to 
what he sees as the sufferings of existence.35 That, however, is not the terminus in 
Schopenhauer’s soteriology and I shall offer his further ideas on this later. 
                                                 
34 Not every commentator agrees that Schopenhauer is saying this: Bryan Magee is the most 
prominent of those who take the view that Schopenhauer does not think the noumenal is directly 
knowable. His comments on this can be found in the 1989 Blithell Memorial Lecture, 
Misunderstanding Schopenhauer, at the Institute of Germanic Studies at the University of London, 
ISBN 0 85457 1485; ISSN 0144-9850. 
35 In A History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell could not see why someone in 
Schopenhauer’s world should not go around drunk all the time since they would be in some sense 
escaping ‘self’ whilst inebriated. The answer is that permanent drunkenness (assuming it achieves 
as much as aesthetic contemplation) is not sustainable and therefore does not offer a permanent 
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1.3 Redemption 
The only way to overcome the inevitable sufferings of life is to overcome the 
phenomenal will and this involves a recognition that the custody of an individual 
will is a wasted and pointless possession since its destiny, like our own, is 
annihilation: 
 
The most perfect phenomenon of the will-to-live, which manifests 
itself in the exceedingly ingenious and complex mechanism of the 
human organism, must crumble to dust, and thus its whole essence and 
efforts are in the end obviously given over to annihilation. All this is 
the naïve utterance of nature, always true and sincere, that the whole 
striving of that will is essentially empty and vain. If we were something 
valuable in itself, something which could be unconditioned and 
absolute, it would not have non-existence as its goal. 
(PP2, §147, Payne, 1974, p. 288) 
 
Not only does existence have non-being as its goal, for Schopenhauer, he also 
feels that for the brief period we do exist we will suffer continual torments and 
disillusionments. Amongst these periods of strife there are, however some 
peaceful moments he thinks, and he draws an analogy between the peaceful 
periods of human life and the peaceful periods between nations: he tells us that 
history demonstrates that nations are constantly at war and that peaceful years are 
nothing but brief interludes in this process of continual strife. For humans too, life 
is a constant struggle against want, boredom and other individuals: 
 
Work, worry, toil and trouble are certainly the lot of almost all 
throughout their lives. But if all desires were fulfilled as soon as 
they arose, how then would people occupy their lives and spend 
their time? Suppose the human race were removed to Utopia where 
everything grew automatically and pigeons flew about ready 
roasted; where everyone at once found his sweetheart and had no 
difficulty in keeping her; then, people would die of boredom or 
hang themselves; or else they would fight, throttle, and murder one 
another, and so cause themselves more suffering than is now laid 
upon them by nature. 
(Ibid., §152, p. 293) 
 
This leads him to conclude that pain and dissatisfaction are the natural order of 
things and as such constitute the normal and positive state. Since each individual 
is also self-interested, there will be constant conflicts of interests among all 
human beings, and he sees what he takes to be the injustices and suffering which 
are produced from such conflicts as coming about as a result of our identification 
with an individual or phenomenal will rather than identifying our existence with 
the universal will which is a singular and non-plural will and which effectively 
makes us all the same behind the veil of phenomenal illusion. 
 
The gulf between noumenon and phenomenon is colossal for Schopenhauer and 
the noumenal will which lies behind everything that is and everything which 
                                                                                                                                     
transcendence. Russell was not serious in any of his written comments on Schopenhauer and is 
reputed to have admitted he had never read a word of Schopenhauer when he wrote critically about 
him in the above book. 
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cannot be perceived by human beings just is. It has no purpose, no aim, is no form 
of consciousness and on a tiny speck of the phenomenal universe life has 
appeared and some of that life is self-aware. This is completely subsidiary to the 
world as noumenon and in this world there are phenomenal objects and creatures 
which perceive these phenomenal objects. This is a phenomenal drop in the 
noumenal ocean yet we humans, on the whole, consider that this drop is the reality 
of the situation and go about our short lives driven by the phenomenal egoistic 
will to satisfy our impulses regardless of how that puts us at variance with others 
whilst taking no account of the fact that this entire perceived existence is a 
delusion. It seems real enough to us here and now. 
 
The wish to transcend could be seen as some kind of greater egoism and attempts 
to be compassionate as self-motivated since if you harm others you are actually 
harming your noumenal self and it is therefore self-injury. It may look like 
Schopenhauer is saying that we ought to be phenomenally compassionate and 
noumenally egoistic, but that is the wrong conclusion to draw because noumenally 
there is no ego, there is no ‘I’, there is no individuation, and individuation is a 
feature of the phenomenal world and is in reality an illusion.  
 
Transcendence of the individual will to live by the overcoming of our natural 
egoistic and malicious dispositions and the adoption of compassion for others is 
the path, he feels, to overcoming the sufferings of the world – although how this is 
achievable when he thinks the character is fundamentally unalterable is something 
which will have to be explained in more detail later. 
 
Again this brings back the thought of why we should not kill ourselves since we 
will then return to the noumenal world and the bad dream of life would be over 
together with suffering – suicide seems not only attractive in terms of avoiding 
suffering but also philosophically sensible since you return to the Truth all the 
quicker and are no longer taking part in the folly of the phenomenal and illusory 
world. His answer is that people generally do not commit suicide because most of 
them do not dwell on philosophical questions and are busy their whole lives 
chasing one desire after another, unaware that they will never find anything but 
dissatisfaction this way, and the small number who do philosophise have reason 
to fear the process of dying since this may be unpleasant or even painful. Those 
who are able to overcome this fear actually do commit suicide and he gives us an 
outline of such a person and their motivation to ending their phenomenal 
existence: 
 
this tendency [to gloomy thoughts] may reach such a height that 
permanent discomfort produces a weariness of life. So arises an 
inclination to suicide, which even the most trivial unpleasantness may 
actually bring about; nay, when the tendency attains its worst form, it 
may be occasioned by nothing in particular, but a man may resolve to put 
an end to his existence, simply because he is permanently unhappy, and 
then coolly and firmly carry out his determination; as may be seen by the 
way in which the sufferer, when placed under supervision, as he usually 
is, eagerly waits to seize the first unguarded moment, when, without a 
shudder, without a struggle or recoil, he may use the now natural and 
welcome means of effecting his release. Even the healthiest, perhaps 
even the most cheerful man, may resolve upon death under certain 
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circumstances; when, for instance, his sufferings, or his fears of some 
inevitable misfortune, reach such a pitch as to outweigh the terrors of 
death. The only difference lies in the degree of suffering necessary to 
bring about the fatal act, a degree which will be high in the case of a 
cheerful, and low in that of a gloomy man. The greater the melancholy, 
the lower need the degree be; in the end, it may even sink to zero. But if a 
man is cheerful, and his spirits are supported by good health, it requires a 
high degree of suffering to make him lay hands upon himself. There are 
countless steps in the scale between the two extremes of suicide, the 
suicide which springs merely from a morbid intensification of innate 
gloom, and the suicide of the healthy and cheerful man, who has entirely 
objective grounds for putting an end to his existence.36
(Schopenhauer and Bailey Saunders, tr., 1995, p. 25) 
 
An opposed viewpoint could be taken with regard to suicide as a liberation if we 
ask, remembering that the noumenal Will is a blind and malevolent force, why it 
could possibly be a good thing to return to this state? I think Schopenhauer is 
saying something quite different here: he is not claiming that death is a blissful 
reunification with the long lost Will, simply that it is escape from phenomenal 
suffering or suffering in the world of duality. This disintegration of phenomenal 
self will come to everyone – guaranteed – since we all die. When we are dead 
there is no morality and neither can there be morality in the noumenal world since 
it is undifferentiated and there are no doers and no-one having anything done to 
them. Morality is something which is possible only in the phenomenal world and 
to be moral is the highest goal of man for Schopenhauer, therefore to commit 
suicide is to return to the noumenal world and bypass the chance of becoming a 
moral person as you rush to escape suffering. Your escape from suffering has not 
helped those left in the phenomenal world of which ‘you’ (as a dead or ex person) 
are no longer a part, therefore you have done nothing to alleviate the sufferings of 
others and have not reached the pinnacle of moral behaviour – your suicide was 
selfish and you have not understood that selfishness is not conducive to moral 
behaviour, which is defined by compassion. To transcend the phenomenal world 
yet not be physically annihilated (i.e. to have residual remains in the phenomenal 
world) provides at least an opportunity for understanding what moral behaviour 
consists in (a recognition that we are not, in reality, differentiated and that we 
should therefore feel compassion for others since they are in fact not others) and 
suicide precludes this whilst seeming to offer a pretence of peace when the 
physical entity is extinguished: ‘The only moral argument against suicide is that it 
is opposed to the achievement of the highest moral goal, inasmuch as it substitutes 
for a true redemption from this world of misery a merely apparent one.’ 
(Schopenhauer and Hollingdale, tr., 1970, §157, p. 78.) 
 
It is true that the sufferings of your world should be cured once you are finally 
dead, but the process of dying makes this unattractive for almost all of us whether 
we philosophise or not: 
 
It will generally be found that where the terrors of life come to outweigh 
the terrors of death a man will put an end to his life. But the terrors of 
death offer considerable resistance: they stand like a sentinel at the exit 
                                                 
36 This volume consists of selected extracts from Parerga and Paralipomena and Bailey 
Saunders’ translation is clearer than Payne’s. 
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gate. Perhaps there is no one alive who would not already have put an 
end to his life if this end were something purely negative, a sudden 
cessation of existence. 
(Ibid., §157, pp. 78-9) 
 
In Buddhism and in Schopenhauer, any form of violence whether self-violence or 
violence from without is a source of fear for all (see Dhp 10:129-30), and is 
therefore something which is very difficult to overcome. Overcoming the fear of 
violence in the form of the self-harm of suicide, is still seen in Buddhism as an act 
of killing, and creates bad karma which leads to a bad rebirth. Monks sacrificing 
their lives is actually seen as good but suicide for self-interested or ego-driven 
reasons is not good since the motivation is wrong. This is very similar in 
Schopenhauer. 
 
Since he rejects suicide, Schopenhauer has, then, to find other ways to escape the 
sufferings of the world and this is achieved through abstraction during the 
contemplation of art and philosophy. 
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Chapter 2: Contrasts and Comparisons to 
Schopenhauer’s Ethics 
We can best understand Schopenhauer’s position by exercising comparison and 
contrast, first of all with those people who recognise a very strong human 
propensity towards self-interest, the main exponents being Thomas Hobbes, and 
in a less extreme way, on a standard reading, Hume, and second, Kant who 
distinguishes sharply between actions of moral worth and actions which are self-
interested. The main elements of Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy consist of an 
emphasis upon the centrality of self-interest and an account of moral worth as 
being distinct from that. I would firstly like to examine the relationship of 
Schopenhauer to Hobbes and to find where they are similar and, more 
importantly, as part of an assessment of Schopenhauer’s ethics, where they differ, 
before moving on to Hume. Schopenhauer’s relationship to Kant will be examined 
later. 
 
2.1 Hobbes 
For Hobbes, morality begins with the supposed entry of humankind into Civil 
Society from the State of Nature from which we originally, if hypothetically, 
came. Hobbes’s view of this State of Nature is well known and can be generally 
summed up as being violent, insecure and without peace or the chance of mental 
development. (See Leviathan, Hobbes and Oakeshott (ed.), 1946, p. 82.) Hobbes 
thinks that people would struggle against one another in order to secure their lives 
as best they are able, and, especially if there is scarcity, there will be conflicts of 
interest which will mean that not everyone can get what they need in order to 
guard their existence. Hobbes tells us this results in a permanent state of war 
between individuals in the State of Nature, which makes life arduous and 
unpleasant as well as dangerous. 
 
Hobbes believes that we would be driven to behave in ways which result in this 
unpleasant state by a motivation of self-interest, and that in turn is regulated by 
our appetites and aversions. The influence of appetites and aversions upon us 
individually is the guiding force of action, and any action thus guided must be, for 
Hobbes, in our own interest. Therefore individuals will act only in accordance 
with what they think will satisfy their desires unless they are hindered from so 
doing by a greater force. Such desires, he tells us, ‘are in themselves no sin. No 
more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that 
forbids them.’ (Ibid, p. 83.) 
 
There is a controversy about the degree of egoism in Hobbes’ work where the 
interpretation of Hobbes as an extreme egoist has been challenged by Gregory 
Kavka (c1986), who takes the line that Hobbes was egoistic to a lesser degree 
than has normally been attributed to him, and, separately, by Bernard Gert (1967) 
who argues that Hobbes does allow for compassion and is much more 
sophisticated than the blunt egoist he is traditionally portrayed as being. However 
I go along with the traditional interpretation that he is a thoroughgoing egoist 
since he argues himself that the only motive anybody ever has is self-interest – 
‘good to oneself’: 
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of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to 
himselfe. [Hobbes’ italics.] 
(Leviathan, Hobbes and MacPherson (ed.) 1985, p. 192 [66]) 
 
And: 
 
all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and 
those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. 
(Ibid., p. 204 [72-3]) 
 
And: 
 
For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because 
Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every 
man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there 
will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of 
mutual help… 
(Ibid., p. 209 [75]) 
 
And: 
 
COMMAND is, where a man saith, Doe this, or Doe not this, without 
expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it 
followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his 
own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely, 
and the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe. 
(Ibid.,  p. 303 [131-2]) 
 
According to traditional readings, in Hobbes’s State of Nature you are not obliged 
to consider the best interests of others where these come into conflict with your 
own interests. Moral obligations, for Hobbes, are bound up with self-interest and 
do not go beyond it. Since there is no requirement to consider the best interests of 
others, any action, including fraud and force, is legitimate provided it serves your 
interests: ‘To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; 
that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice 
have there no place.’ (Leviathan, Hobbes, Wilson and MacCallum (eds.), 1946, p. 
83.) 
 
Coming into Civil Society does not extinguish this self-interest; you do not lose 
your sense of being an individual because you have associated with others, and 
although you can do anything you like in a State of Nature which is conducive to 
your preservation and well-being, it is not clear that this is ever given up in Civil 
Society because as soon as the Sovereign threatens your life, you can challenge 
them – you do not commit to a lessening of your self-interested aims but, rather, 
benefit from Civil Society until and unless it threatens you then you have the right 
to reject the Leviathan figure. It is in our interest to participate in society and to 
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benefit from it but it is not in our interest to be subordinated to it if this is 
detrimental to us.37
 
 
The primary purpose of the Sovereign, or Leviathan, is to ensure that there is not a 
war of all against all, driven by this egoistic propensity people intrinsically have. 
The Sovereign, exercising power over everyone in society, can curtail the 
activities of those ‘masterless men’ (Ibid., p. 238) who wish to behave as though 
still in a State of Nature. 
 
Schopenhauer is like Hobbes in emphasising the pervasiveness and the natural 
motivation of self-interest, but unlike Hobbes in that he does not place the 
motivational emphasis for our actions on egoism alone. Although accepting that 
Hobbes is correct in saying egoism is a fundamental source of what drives most 
people, Schopenhauer nevertheless considers actions caused by egoism to be 
devoid of moral worth. He does not say egoism is immoral, but, rather, that it 
cannot lead to moral behaviour since the motivation is self-interested. 
 
Schopenhauer shares a similar view to Hobbes in that, although most of us are 
egoistically driven, we do modify our behaviour and are kept in check, to some 
extent, by the law and also, Schopenhauer thinks, social customs and spurious, 
invented codes of behaviour.38
 
The thousands who throng before our eyes in peaceful intercourse are 
to be regarded as just so many tigers and wolves whose teeth are 
secured by a strong muzzle. Therefore, if one imagines the power of 
the State as abolished, in other words, the muzzle as cast off, every 
thinking man will recoil at the expected scene, and in this way, he will 
show us what little confidence he really has in the efficacy of religion, 
conscience, or the natural foundation of morals, whatever this may be. 
(OBM §13, Payne, 1995, p. 129) 
 
He, again, sounds Hobbesian when he tells us that: 
 
where egoism is not opposed either by external force, which must also 
include all fear whether of human or supernatural powers, or by a 
genuine moral incentive [compassion], it pursues its purpose without 
reserve. Therefore without such checks and in view of the infinite 
number of egoistic individuals, the bellum omnium contra omnes 
[Hobbes’ war of all against all] would be the order of the day, to the 
undoing of all. And so reflecting reason very soon invented the 
machinery of the State which, springing from the mutual fear of 
mutual violence, obviates the disastrous consequences of universal 
egoism…On the other hand, where those two forces opposing egoism 
[external force and internal compassion] fail to be effective, it will at 
                                                 
37 There is also a social dimension in the evolution myth from the Aggañña Sutta where although 
the beings have developed greedy and self-centred tendencies they are still in a way socially 
programmed and some wish to overcome this greed through the appointment of the Leviathan-like 
figure and later through their own self-improvement. 
38 He cites the example of the code of honour amongst the wealthy classes (as with, say, Victorian 
gentlemen) and what he describes as ‘the fool’s code called knightly honor.’ OBM §13, Payne, 
1995, p.127. 
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once show itself in all its fearful dimensions, and the spectacle will 
not be attractive. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Schopenhauer agrees that some thing or things are needed to curb the subjects’ 
egoistic motivations otherwise there would be nothing to stop them acting on this 
egoistic impulse with impunity.  
 
In itself right is powerless; by nature might rules. The problem of 
statesmanship is to associate might with right so that, by means of the 
former, the latter may rule…This, of course, is brought about solely 
by the State machine. For only physical force can always have an 
immediate effect, since only this impresses and instils respect in 
people, constituted as they normally are. If, to convince ourselves of 
this through experience, we once tried to remove all compulsion and 
to urge people most clearly and emphatically to be reasonable, just, 
and fair-minded, but to act contrary to their interests, then the 
impotence of merely moral force would be obvious, and in most cases 
only a mocking laugh would be the answer to our attempt. 
(PP2, §127, Payne, 1974, pp. 249-50) 
 
He continues, in contrast to Hobbes this time, by telling us that he does not regard 
egoism as moral and speaks of it as some kind of enemy of justice: 
 
Egoism is…the first and principal, although not the only force with 
which the moral incentive [sympathy/compassion] has to contend. 
Already we see that to stand up to such an opponent, the moral 
incentive must be something more real than a hair-splitting sophism or 
an a priori soap bubble. Meanwhile, in war we must first recognize the 
enemy; in the impending struggle, egoism, as the chief force on its 
own side, will be the principal opponent of the virtue of justice, 
which, in my opinion, is the first and really cardinal virtue. 
(OBM §14, Payne, 1995, pp. 133-4) 
 
His comment about a ‘hair-splitting sophism’ relates to the argument that egoism 
is the sole motivation for our actions and that we do nothing without consideration 
of our own advancement. This Hobbesian view is rejected by Schopenhauer and 
he is aware that contained in such a view is the idea that since all actions are ego-
driven then apparent acts of altruism must be too. Schopenhauer regards this as 
hair-splitting and believes that there are other things which motivate us besides 
egoism and this is where he thinks we will find what he refers to above as the 
‘moral incentive’ and the ‘virtue of justice’. He is, of course, talking about 
compassion and this is where he has his major disagreement with Hobbes (see p. 
24 above) and Schopenhauer again explains this disagreement with a view 
traditionally attributed to Hobbes: 
 
I believe there will be very few who question the matter, and are not 
convinced from their own experience that a man often acts justly 
[compassionately], simply and solely that no wrong or injustice may 
be done to another. In fact I believe there are those who have, as it 
were, an inborn principle of giving others their due, who therefore do 
not intentionally hurt anyone’s feelings, who do not unconditionally 
seek their own advantage, but who in this connection also consider the 
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rights of others…Similarly, it will be admitted, I think, that many a 
man helps and gives, carries out services and denies himself, with no 
other intention in his heart than that of helping another whose distress 
he sees. 
(Ibid., §15, Payne, 1995, p. 139) 
 
As we have seen, Schopenhauer does not deny the importance of egoism as a 
motivating factor and indeed accepts almost all of what Hobbes says with regard 
to a State of Nature being a war of all against all and individuals coming into 
society, relinquishing many of their natural freedoms and being kept in check by 
the law since this is beneficial to them and therefore satisfies their ego-driven 
desires to some extent. Schopenhauer would criticise Hobbes, though, as having a 
pessimistic view of human nature and assuming that we will only display altruism 
if it appeals to our self-interest. The difference here between Hobbes and 
Schopenhauer is that Schopenhauer claims that compassion is not a sub-branch of 
egoism and that actions of genuine moral worth cannot spring from state 
commandments or restrictions but must be voluntarily carried out without a 
thought to any necessary advantage. He may be pessimistic (or realistic, 
depending on your view) as to the chances of this actually taking root in the 
majority of people and in lieu of this does propose strong executive powers of 
government, but nevertheless does believe that acts of genuine moral worth must 
be based on compassion and do occur quite often. It is unrealistic, Schopenhauer 
feels, to think of humans as some kind of Felicity Machines which attempt to 
calculate how much they can benefit from others within a framework of law. 
There are examples of people laying down their lives for a complete stranger and 
this is evidence enough that some form of fellow-feeling, compassion or call it 
what you will, but something which can even act to your detriment exists within 
human beings to varying degrees. This I take to be Schopenhauer’s main defence 
against strict egoists and moral sceptics of the Hobbesian kind.  
 
There is also a Buddhist mythical explanation of the move from a State of Nature 
to a Civil Society which is found in the Aggañña Sutta. Not only is there a world 
foundation myth and explanation of human evolution, but also an account of the 
development of human greed and the need for a ‘Leviathan’ figure to keep order 
and stop people stealing from one another. This comes in the form of the Mahā 
Sammata (the Great Elect) and it seems that some sort of contract is instigated 
whereby he will be given certain rewards if he keeps law and order or stops 
people from acting immorally. Going beyond Hobbes, though, once people 
identify that the problem of greed is within themselves, they become ascetics.39
                                                 
39 I have abridged this extract and removed footnotes. The full text can be found in the reference 
at the end of this footnote: ‘Then those beings [which feasted on hoarded rice], Vāseţţa, gathered 
themselves and bewailed this, saying: Evil customs, sirs, have appeared among men. For in the 
past, we were made of mind, we fed on rapture, self-luminous, we traversed the air in abiding 
loveliness; long long the period we so remained. When…rice appeared…we plucked and took 
away for the evening meal every evening, there next morning it had grown ripe again. Where we 
plucked and took away for the morning meal, there in the evening it had grown ripe again. There 
was no break visible. Enjoying this rice, feeding on it, nourished by it, we have so continued a 
long long while. But from evil and immoral customs becoming manifest among us, powder has 
enveloped the clean grain, husk too has enveloped the clean grain, and where we have reaped is no 
regrowth; a break has come, and the rice-stubble stands in clumps. Come now, let us divide off the 
rice field and set boundaries thereto! And so they divided off the rice and set up boundaries round 
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 2.2 Hume 
Neither Hume nor Schopenhauer have any difficulty in agreeing with Hobbes that 
there must be some executive power of state to maintain the basic conveniences of 
society. Their true comparisons lie elsewhere – firstly in their rejection of self-
interest as the sole motive for acts of seeming altruism and, in a closely connected 
second point, in their view of sympathy as a mark of virtue and selfishness as a 
mark of vice. The final comparison I wish to draw is in their view of reason as 
inadequate in guiding or discovering moral behaviour. Their major points of 
contrast concern the genesis of sympathy and selfishness, where Hume sees no 
point in chasing explanations all the way back to remote (and what he sees as 
increasingly irrelevant) first principles whereas Schopenhauer does just that. This 
causes him to expand his theory into a grand ethical-metaphysical system which, I 
will argue in the next chapter, leaves Schopenhauer’s moral theory vulnerable to 
attack. Other contrasts concern mysticism and Indian philosophy – both of which 
are important for Schopenhauer but not for Hume. I shall give a brief outline of 
the above points to elucidate the comparisons and contrasts therein. 
 
The Rejection of Self-Interest as Sole Motivation 
As we have seen (p. 35), Schopenhauer accepts much of the pessimism Hobbes 
has for people’s behaviour were we to live without the powers of state as does 
Hume who shares Hobbes’ view that life without executive powers of government 
would be very unpleasant since people would act, most likely, in selfish ways: 
 
After men have found by experience that their selfishness and 
confined generosity, acting at their liberty, totally incapacitate them 
for society, and at the same time have observed that society is 
necessary to the satisfaction of those very passions, they are naturally 
induced to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules as may 
render their commerce more safe and commodious. 
(Hume, in Aitken, 1972, p. 67) 
 
                                                                                                                                     
it. 19. Now some being, Vāseţţa, of greedy disposition, watching over his own plot, stole another 
plot and made use of it. They took him and holding him fast, said: Truly, good being, thou hast 
wrought evil in that, while watching thine own plot, thou hast stolen another plot and made use of 
it. See, good being, that thou do not such a thing again! Ay, sirs, he replied. And a second time he 
did so. And yet a third. And again they took him and admonished him. Some smote him with the 
hand, some with clods, some with sticks. With such a beginning, Vāseţţa, did stealing appear, and 
censure and lying and punishment became known. 20. Now those beings, Vāseţţa, gathered 
themselves together, and bewailed these things, saying: From our evil deeds, sirs becoming 
manifest, inasmuch as stealing, censure, lying, punishment have become known, what if we were 
to select a certain being, who should be wrathful when indignation is right, who should censure 
that which rightly be censured and should banish him who deserves to be banished? But we will 
give him in return a proportion of the rice. Then, Vāseţţa, those beings went to the being among 
them who was handsomest, the best favoured, the most attractive, the most capable and said to 
him: Come now, good being, be indignant at that whereat one should rightly be censured, banish 
him who deserves to be banished. And we will contribute to thee a proportion of our rice. And he 
consented, and did so, and they gave him a proportion of their rice. 21. Chosen by the whole 
people, Vāseţţa, is what is meant by Mahā Sammata…(the Great Elect)...’  (Aggañña Sutta, in DN 
27:18-21, tr. Rhys Davids, T.W. and C.A.F., pp. 86-8). 
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And: 
 
in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks 
and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a 
knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private 
interest…It is therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must 
be supposed a knave. [Hume’s italics throughout.] 
(Hume, 1903, Essay VI, ‘Of the Independency of Parliament’, pp. 40-2) 
 
So far Hobbes, Hume and Schopenhauer are in agreement. However, Hume does 
not think (and Schopenhauer agrees with him) that, having exchanged the State of 
Nature for Civil Society, we would act on self-interest alone: 
 
I am sensible that, generally speaking, the representations of this 
quality [selfishness] have been carried much too far; and that the 
descriptions which certain philosophers [chiefly Hobbes, I assume40] 
delight so much to form of mankind in this particular are as wide of 
nature as any accounts of monsters which we meet with in fables and 
romances. 
(Hume, in Aitken, 1972, p. 56) 
 
There are also, he believes, natural virtues which do not require the man-made 
institutions civil society throws up in order to protect us from selfish people, for 
example benevolence, generosity and charity. These natural virtues are important 
for Hume because he believes that things such as justice are unnatural and are 
merely conventions set up by humankind in order to promote and maintain (for 
example) the stability of property ownership. But the important difference 
between Hume and Hobbes is that Hume does not accept that we are driven solely 
by egoism, and Schopenhauer again agrees with him. Hume says: 
 
The most obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis is that, as it is 
contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions, there 
is required the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so 
extraordinary a paradox. To the most careless observer there appear to 
be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity, such affections as 
love, friendship, compassion, gratitude. 
(Ibid., pp. 272-3) 
 
In fact Hume goes so far as to say: 
 
I shall not here enter into any detail on the present subject. Many able 
philosophers have shown the insufficiency of these [self-interest-
based] systems. And I shall take for granted what, I believe, the 
smallest reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer.41
(Ibid.) 
                                                 
40 Although Hume notes on p. 190 that ‘This fiction of a state of nature, as a state of war, was not 
first started by Mr. Hobbes, as is commonly imagined. Plato endeavours to refute an hypothesis 
very like it in the second, third, and fourth books De Republica.’ Hume’s Moral and Political 
Philosophy. 
41 Compare Schopenhauer on the same subject: ‘[It is] quibbling and an obstinate refusal to accept 
the facts…and I address myself to those who admit the reality of the matter.’ (OBM §15, Payne, 
tr., 1995, p. 139.) 
Page 39 of 173 
 
Hume thinks sympathy is a naturally occurring phenomenon and that people 
would naturally feel compassion for those in distress without obvious benefit to 
themselves, as in the following example: 
 
I must think on the miserable condition of those who are at sea in a 
storm, and must endeavour to render this idea as strong and lively as 
possible, in order to make me more sensible of my own happiness... 
But suppose this idea to become still more lively. Suppose the ship to 
be driven so near me, that I can perceive distinctly the horror, painted 
on the countenance of the seamen and passengers, hear their 
lamentable cries, see the dearest friends give their last adieu, or 
embrace with a resolution to perish in each others arms: No man has 
so savage a heart as to reap any pleasure from such a spectacle, or 
withstand the motions of the tenderest compassion and sympathy. 
(Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, ‘Of Morals’, p. 594) 
 
Hume and Schopenhauer share this in common: acting out of self-interest alone is 
unnatural; acts of self-interest and sympathy are witnessed daily. 
 
When it comes to sympathy as a mark of virtue and selfishness as a mark of vice, 
Schopenhauer shares Hume’s position that this is generally obvious. Hume says 
that:  
 
[we]…must pronounce the impression arising from virtue to be 
agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy. Every 
moment’s experience must convince us of this. There is no spectacle 
so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action; nor any which 
gives us more abhorrence than one that is cruel and treacherous. 
(Hume, in Aitken, 1972, p. 44) 
 
Schopenhauer agrees: 
 
A man who by virtue of his character is reluctant to thwart the 
aspirations of others, but rather favours and promotes them as far as 
he reasonably can, and who thus does not injure others but helps and 
supports them where he can, is called good by others in regard to 
themselves… 
(OBM §22, Payne, 1995, p. 204) 
 
2.2.1 The Origins of Sympathy and Selfishness 
One major contrast between Hume and Schopenhauer is found in their views on 
the origins of sympathy and selfishness, where Hume takes the position that there 
is no point in digging further than what is immediately apparent: 
 
An action, or sentiment, or character, is virtuous or vicious; why? 
Because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. 
In giving a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness, we 
sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have the sense of virtue is 
nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the 
contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or 
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admiration. We go no further; nor do we inquire into the cause of the 
satisfaction. 
(Hume, in Aitken, 1972, p. 44) 
 
Hume sees no point in searching for the source of this since he thinks it is a self-
evident truth to be found in observation: 
 
It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have 
humanity or fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient that this is 
experienced to be a principle of human nature. We must stop 
somewhere in our examination of causes. 
(Hume and Selby-Bigge, 1963, pp. 219-20) 
 
And: 
 
it is absurd to imagine that, in every particular instance, these 
sentiments [which distinguish between virtue and vice] are produced 
by an original quality and primary constitution. For as the number of 
our duties is in a manner infinite, it is impossible that our original 
instincts should extend to each of them, and from our very first 
infancy impress on the human mind all that multitude of precepts 
which are contained in the completest system of ethics. 
(Hume, in Aitken, 1972, p. 46) 
 
Schopenhauer, on the other hand, whilst agreeing that there must be some point at 
which one stops asking ‘why’, feels it is necessary to travel much further down 
the line of enquiry than Hume and ends up with something quite different to him: 
 
Just as at the end of every investigation and of every exact science the 
human mind stands before a primary phenomenon, so too does it in 
the case of ethics. It is true that this primary phenomenon explains 
everything that is comprehended under it and follows from it, but it 
itself remains unexplained, and lies before us like a riddle. And so 
here too we see a demand for a system of metaphysics, in other words, 
for a final explanation of primary phenomena as such, and, when these 
are taken collectively, of the world. Here also this demand raises the 
question of why that which exists, and is understood, is as it is, and 
not otherwise; and the question of how the exhibited character of the 
phenomenon results from the essence-in-itself of things. In fact, with 
ethics, the need for a metaphysical basis is the more urgent, since 
philosophical as well as religious systems agree that the ethical 
significance of actions must at the same time be metaphysical. 
(OBM §21, Payne, 1995, pp. 199-200) 
 
And: 
 
I have never professed to propound a philosophy that would leave no 
questions unanswered. In this sense, philosophy is actually 
impossible; it would be the science of omniscience. But est quadam 
prodire tenus, si non datur ultra;42 there is a limit up to which 
reflection can penetrate, and so far illuminate the night of our 
existence, although the horizon always remains dark. This limit is 
                                                 
42 ‘There is a limit up to which one can go, even if one cannot go beyond it.’ Payne. 
Page 41 of 173 
reached by my doctrine of the will-to-live that affirms or denies itself 
in its own phenomenon. To want to go beyond this is, in my view, like 
wanting to fly beyond the atmosphere. We must stop here, although 
new problems arise from those that are solved. 
(WWR2, Ch. XLVII, Payne, 1969, p. 602) 
 
Where Hume is content to accept that there is no detectable first principle from 
which moral behaviour can be derived, Schopenhauer thinks he has found the 
source from which compassion springs, but, as he concedes, this ‘discovery’ 
raises more questions than it ‘solves’. 
 
A distillation of Schopenhauer’s view of sympathy in contrast to Hume comes in 
the following dense quote from Schopenhauer himself: 
 
sympathy is to be defined as the empirical appearance of the will’s 
metaphysical identity, through the physical multiplicity of its 
phenomena. 
(Ibid., pp. 591-2) 
 
Or, to offer a clearer interpretation: sympathy originates in the noumenal world 
and manifests itself in the world of phenomena; the phenomenal world is one of 
plurality and if it were not then egoism would be impossible since there would be 
no ‘I’ and ‘you’. This is at odds with Hume’s definition of sympathy which is that 
it is a naturally occurring and obvious disposition the appearance of which gives 
us pleasure. 
 
2.3 Reason, Mysticism and Indian Philosophy 
Reason 
Hume’s arguments for objecting to reason-based morality (which, unlike 
Schopenhauer’s, are not direct criticisms of Kant for obvious reasons of 
chronology) can be briefly summarised as follows: there are natural inclinations 
such as feelings of sympathy and there are social conventions which are learnable 
and which change through time. Our particular notion of morality is informed by 
these two influences and reason plays no part in this framework: 
 
the course of the argument leads us to conclude that since vice and 
virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of 
ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they 
occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them. 
(Hume, in Aitken, 1972, p. 43) 
 
Hume also says ‘Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason 
of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are 
not conclusions of our reason.’ (Hume in MacIntyre (ed.) 1965, p. 185.). Or, even 
more succinctly ‘Morality…is more properly felt than judged of…’ (Hume, in 
Aitken, 1972, p. 43). 
 
Schopenhauer’s position here is, I believe, ambiguous. Firstly, in agreement with 
Hume, he is critical of the idea of reason alone as the arbiter of morality; that is an 
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abstract form of reason-as-such in Schopenhauer’s case. Secondly he agrees with 
Hume that reason is a slave of the passions and lastly he introduces mysticism and 
Indian philosophy to the discussion of morality, claiming that the mystical and the 
True are contained in both Brahmanism and Buddhism – views which have 
nothing at all in common with Hume. 
 
Schopenhauer uses alternative terminology to Hume but basically expresses the 
same view that reason is the slave of the passions when he tells us that ‘Reason, 
like the cognitive faculty in general, is something conditioned by the organism…’ 
(OBM §6, Payne, 1995, p. 64), and that the will directs reason rather than the 
other way round ‘the intellect…[is]…in the service of the will…’ (PP2, §1, Payne, 
1974, p. 4) and ‘the intellect…is originally destined to serve the will alone…’ 
(Ibid., p. 9) or, putting the same thing another way ‘knowledge is serviceable to 
the aims of the will, and in this way reflects the will…[my italics]’ (WWR2, 
XLVII, Payne, 1969, p. 610), or in more detail but expressing the same idea: 
 
the outwardly directed intellect, as mere organon for the purposes of 
the will and consequently something merely secondary, is nevertheless 
only a part of our entire human nature. It belongs to the phenomenon 
and its knowledge merely corresponds thereto, since it exists solely 
for the purpose of the phenomenon. 
(PP2, §1, Payne, 1974, p. 11) 
 
 
Mysticism and Indian Philosophy  
Although Schopenhauer accepts Hume’s line that reason is a slave of the passions 
he is left with only a part-Humean account. He wants to go on and explain, as 
much as he feels able, how morality comes to be and this takes him to mysticism 
and Indian philosophy. I shall say more on this later, but for now I would like to 
provide a very brief overview of Schopenhauer and mysticism. On this subject 
Schopenhauer says: 
 
The readers of my Ethics know that with me the foundation of 
morality rests ultimately on the truth that has its expression in the 
Veda and Vedanta in the established mystical formula tat tvam asi 
(This art thou) which is stated with reference to every living thing, 
whether man or animal, and is then called the Mahavakya or Great 
World. 
 In fact, we can regard the actions that occur in accordance with 
it, for example those of benevolence, as the beginning of mysticism. 
Every good or kind action that is done with a pure and genuine 
intention proclaims that, whoever practises it, stands forth in absolute 
contradiction to the world of phenomena in which other individuals 
exist entirely separate from himself, and that he recognizes himself as 
being identical with them. 
(Ibid., §115, p. 219) 
 
What Schopenhauer ends up with is something which he accepts cannot entirely 
satisfy us: ‘The ultimate basis on which all our knowledge and science rests is the 
inexplicable.’ (Ibid., §1, p. 3) or, expanding on this: 
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[the intellect]…is a mere superficial force, clinging to the surface of 
things, and grasping mere species transitivae, not their true being. The 
result is that we cannot understand and grasp a single thing, even the 
simplest and smallest, through and through, but in everything there is 
something left over that remains entirely inexplicable to us. 
(Ibid., p. 3) 
 
I do not believe this is as strange as it may seem since the subject matter – 
unknowable noumenal Will manifested as knowable phenomenal representations 
– is part observable and part metaphysical. Schopenhauer may simply be 
constrained by what is available to the limited human mind in the same way that 
the realm of the saņsāric world is all you can explain to another in the same 
realm and neither of you can explain what it is to live in an animal realm or to 
experience nirvāňa even if you have done so.43 Schopenhauer has a similar 
problem and a superficial reading may give the impression that he is confused 
whereas a more detailed reading should give the impression that he cannot help 
but seem that way. Schopenhauer is well aware of this problem: 
 
In all the centuries, poor truth has had to blush at being paradoxical; 
and yet it is not her fault…I too am well aware of the paradox which 
this metaphysical explanation of the primary ethical phenomenon 
must have for western scholars, accustomed as they are to ethical 
foundations of quite a different kind; yet I cannot do violence to truth. 
(OBM §22, Payne, 1995, p. 213) 
 
He returns again to Indian philosophy and says: 
 
On the contrary all I can bring myself to do in this circumstance is to 
show by quotation how that metaphysics of ethics was the 
fundamental view of Indian wisdom already thousands of years ago. 
(Ibid.) 
 
And, having established that our explanations of the foundations of ethics cannot 
be without flaws, Schopenhauer returns to the mystical and to Indian philosophy: 
 
Now it is precisely here that the mystic proceeds positively, and 
therefore, from this point, nothing is left but mysticism. Anyone, 
however, who desires this kind of supplement to the negative 
knowledge to which alone philosophy can guide him, will find it in its 
most beautiful and richest form in the Oupnekhat [Schopenhauer’s 
version of the Upanişads]. 
(WWR2, Ch. XVII, Payne, 1969, p. 612) 
 
We can see how Schopenhauer’s thought developed then diverged significantly 
from points of agreement with Hume until it could in no way be regarded as 
Humean despite having the common thread of compassion running throughout. 
                                                 
43 In a Western example, the prisoner from Plato’s cave is incapable of explaining what he 
experienced outside to the remaining prisoners when he returns (Republic 514a – 518b). In fact 
when Socrates is directly asked by Glaucon to explain the Good, which exists beyond the world of 
change and delusion, he cannot do so except by analogy (Republic 506d-e; beginning of Book VI 
in older translations).  
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This is an admittedly brief sketch of Hume and Schopenhauer on virtue and vice 
but it is enough to expose the point of departure for Schopenhauer who insists that 
there is a root source of compassion which transcends not only the individual, the 
society and fashions of character, but also the entire phenomenal realm altogether 
and is to be found in the noumenal oneness of the world as Will. This is very 
unlike Hume’s account of sympathy. 
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Chapter 3: Contemporary Criticisms of Schopenhauer’s 
Ethics 
What I intend to do now is to examine some contemporary criticisms of 
Schopenhauer’s ethics and to offer a defence against them which, I will argue, ties 
Schopenhauer to Buddhist explanations of ethics and the underlying metaphysical 
(supposed) validation for such ethics. The main criticisms against Schopenhauer, 
as I see them, are twofold: firstly that what he says leads to confusion as to 
whether or not the noumenal is knowable and, secondly, that Schopenhauer’s 
form of compassion is nothing but a form of metaphysical egoism.44 This latter 
criticism, I believe, rests on a mistake and I shall address that towards the end of 
this chapter, but the former point has many implications for the stability and 
credibility of Schopenhauer’s system. The implications, as I see them, are as 
follows: if the Will is unknowable then why (and how) does Schopenhauer make 
claims for it? If it is knowable then in what way is it distinct from the phenomenal 
world? If it is indistinct from the phenomenal world then this is a massive 
contradiction to his whole system which relies on this distinction. If it is distinct 
from the phenomenal world and we can know nothing about it then Schopenhauer 
cannot make any claims about it, including the claim that the noumenal world is 
one from which compassions springs; this is a claim he does make. This undoes 
the main justification Schopenhauer has for saying that we ought to act 
compassionately. My defence of Schopenhauer tackles these joint criticisms, the 
most serious of these being by Julian Young. 
 
3.1 The Knowability of the Will 
In order to unravel the first point above, I will briefly explain why Schopenhauer 
has been criticised for creating confusion with regard to the knowability of the 
Will. The confusion comes about since there are two positions as to whether the 
Will is knowable or not. In what follows it is important to note the distinction I 
make between Will and will. As I see it, ‘Will’ for Schopenhauer is the 
undifferentiated noumenon: the thing-in-itself, whereas ‘will’ refers to 
manifestations of Will in the phenomenal entity, object or world.45 The argument 
can be summarized as follows: firstly Schopenhauer seems to say that the Will is 
knowable when he claims that it is a blind, purposeless and malevolent force: 
‘The [W]ill, considered purely in itself, is devoid of knowledge, and is only a 
blind, irresistible urge…’ (WWR1 § 54, Payne, 1969, p. 275). 
 
And: 
 
absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of the 
[W]ill in itself, which is an endless striving…although a final goal for 
it is obviously impossible. 
(Ibid., §29, p. 164) 
 
                                                 
44 ‘Metaphysical egoist’ is Julian Young’s phrase, (Young, 2005, p. 183). 
45 Schopenhauer believes there is as much will in a stone as there is in a human being; the 
difference is that a human being perceives will whereas, to the best of our knowledge, stones do 
not: ‘Spinoza says that if a stone projected through the air had consciousness, it would imagine it 
was flying of its own will. I add merely that the stone would be right.’ (WWR1 §25, Payne, 1969, 
p. 126.)  
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And: 
 
The [W]ill as the thing-in-itself, constitutes the inner, true, and 
indestructible nature of man; yet in itself it is without consciousness. 
(WWR2, Ch. XIX, Payne, 1969, p. 201) 
 
He also suggests a knowability of the Will/noumenon/thing-in-itself which is in 
some way discoverable through aesthetic contemplation: when a person is 
abstracted from ‘self’ and no longer sees a distinction between subject and object. 
We see a glimpse of this world as it is and are released from our blinkered human-
centric viewpoint even if for a fleeting moment, where the world appears as an 
undifferentiated whole, where there is no distinction between the entity doing the 
thinking and the things being thought about, where we are taken out of and 
beyond ourselves, obliterating the distinction between subject and object and 
conveying something of the noumenal to us: 
 
the transition from the common knowledge of particular things to 
knowledge of the Idea takes place suddenly, since knowledge tears 
itself free from the service of the will precisely by the subject’s 
ceasing to be merely individual, and being now a pure will-less 
subject of knowledge…we do not let abstract thought, the concepts of 
reason, take possession of our consciousness, but, instead of all this, 
devote the whole power of our mind to perception, sink ourselves 
completely therein, and let our whole consciousness be filled by the 
calm contemplation of the natural object actually present, whether it 
be a landscape, a tree, a rock, a crag, a building, or anything else. We 
lose ourselves entirely in this object…we forget our individuality, our 
will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the 
object…and thus we are no longer able to separate the perceiver from 
the perception, but the two have become one… 
(WWR1 §34, Payne, 1974, pp. 178-9) 
 
Prominent scholars and commentators who see this strand of thought in 
Schopenhauer as evidence that he believes the Will is knowable include Frederick 
Copleston, Patrick Gardiner, David W. Hamlyn and Christopher Janaway. 
 
Secondly there is the claim by other scholars and commentators that the noumenal 
is not knowable, such as John E. Atwell, Julian Young and Bryan Magee amongst 
others.46 Magee makes, I think, the strongest case for this in The Philosophy of 
Schopenhauer where he says that: 
 
[Several]… passages rule out any interpretation of Schopenhauer to 
the effect that he taught that we have direct knowledge of the 
noumenon. He says over and over again that we do not, and I do not 
see how he could have been more explicit on the point.. 
(Magee, 1997, p. 447) 
 
                                                 
46 See Janaway, (1998), pp. 258-65; Copleston, (1946), pp. 63-69; Gardiner, (1980), pp. 92-94; and 
Janaway, (1989), pp. 192-93. Those on the latter side of the debate include: Simmel, (1986), 
pp.33-34; Hübscher, (1989), pp. 382-85; Magee, (1983), pp. 141-45, and 1990; Atwell, (1995), pp. 
120-28; Neeley, (1996): 85-112; Young, (1987), pp. 27-35. Also see Cartwright (2001), p. 50 and 
n.2 and 3. 
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And: 
 
The will is in us only because it is in everything. It constitutes us as it 
constitutes everything. But it is not directly accessible to our 
knowledge. 
(Ibid., p. 447) 
 
One scholar who has recently attempted a synthesis of the opposing views is 
David Cartwright (2001, pp. 31-54) who points out the main areas of 
Schopenhauer’s writings where he (Schopenhauer) seems to give ammunition to 
each side. (Also see Ch. 2 ‘Text and Counter-text’.) There is no need to give any 
more than a summary of the argument as above but my point in raising it is 
twofold: firstly to point out that my uses of some Schopenhauerian terminology – 
specifically noumenon/noumenal, Will/will and thing-in-itself are debateable; and 
secondly because it has implications for my interpretation of Schopenhauerian 
compassion: to understand the undifferentiatedness of Schopenhauerian Will is to 
understand compassion and to have the possibility of ‘salvation’ from a world 
which Schopenhauer sees as wretched. If the Will is unknowable then this has 
implications for compassion and compassion is central to this work.  
 
Both sides of the debate quote Schopenhauer directly to validate their claims and 
this leaves us with either a straight contradiction in Schopenhauer or a more 
straightforward answer. I believe the answer lies in Schopenhauer’s restrictions on 
exactly who is capable of losing themselves in the aesthetic or transcending the 
self. My contention is that Schopenhauer would take it that ‘normal’ people can 
know the ‘will’ but not the ‘Will’ – remembering that ‘Will’ is noumenal and 
‘will’ constitutes its phenomenal mirror images.47 That means they can know only 
as much of the ‘Will’ as is manifest in the phenomenal world – the world of 
‘will’.48 A very special entity (Schopenhauer calls this person a saint) can know 
something of the ‘Will’:  
 
such a man who, after many bitter struggles with his own nature has at 
last completely conquered, is then left only as pure knowing being, as 
the unclouded mirror of the world. Nothing can alarm or distress him 
any more; nothing can any longer move him; for he has cut all the 
thousand threads of willing which hold us bound to the world… 
(WWR1 §68, Payne, 1969, p. 390) 
 
This ‘saint’, however, cannot communicate what they have experienced to the rest 
of us: 
the actual, positive solution to the riddle of the world must be 
something that the human intellect is wholly incapable of grasping and 
conceiving; so that if a being of a higher order came and took all the 
trouble to impart it to us, we should be quite unable to understand any 
part of his disclosures. 
(WWR2, Ch. XVII, Payne, 1969, p. 185) 
                                                 
47 This unusual grammar is quite deliberate since the ‘Will’ is singular but ‘will’ exists in multiple 
forms in the phenomenal world like leaves from a single stem. They are different and not different 
to the stem at the same time. 
48 This is the world as Representation as in the title of his main work: the ‘will’ is a representation 
of the ‘Will’. 
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Anyone who claims to know the ‘Will’ or thing-in-itself in any greater detail is 
dismissed as a fraudster: 
 
Accordingly, those who profess to know the ultimate, i.e., the first 
grounds of things, thus a primordial being, an Absolute, or whatever 
else they choose to call it…are playing the fool, are vain boasters, if 
indeed they are not charlatans. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Those of us who are not saints or enlightened people – i.e. the vast majority of us 
- cannot know the ‘Will’ unless we have the ability to transcend everyday life 
through contemplative activity.49 Therefore it is correct for Janaway et al to claim 
the noumenal is knowable (since it is for special enlightened people) and it is right 
for Magee et al to say that it is unknowable (since it is unknowable for the rest of 
us).50 To state this simply: we can all know the ‘will’ but only the enlightened can 
know something of the ‘Will’ but we must suspect that even they cannot know it 
completely nor be able to communicate it to the rest of us. It must be remembered 
that Schopenhauer only speaks of two worlds (noumenon and phenomenon; thing-
in-itself and representation) by way of explanation. There is really only one world 
which is perceived in different ways depending on your level of metaphysical 
understanding or compassion. This one world is us yet what we do not understand 
of it seems to be (and might as well be) another world when in fact the two are 
one. A parallel in Buddhism is between the six realms of saņsāra and another is 
in saņsāra/nirvana. 
 
In my view there is a misunderstanding of Will/will and that is why I have some 
sympathy with Cartwright’s attempt to reconcile the debate; there is a problem in 
even talking about the things we are talking about as Schopenhauer was aware 
and this concurs to some considerable extent with Indian Mādhyamaka which I 
will examine later. 
 
We are left with two problems: firstly what part does aesthetic contemplation play 
– do you have to be a saint to contemplate? If not then the saint is no more special 
than the contemplative person or is there a barrier to aesthetic contemplation for 
the normal people? Secondly how can anyone know something of the ‘Will’ 
which is noumenal when they themselves are phenomenal? 
 
The first problem is best explained by looking at what Schopenhauer says about 
aesthetic contemplation and some kind of redemption or salvation through it:  
 
when we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for the 
moment above all willing, above all desires and cares; we are, so to 
speak, rid of ourselves. We are no longer the individual that knows in 
the interest of its constant willing, the correlative of the particular 
thing to which objects become motives, but the eternal subject of 
knowing purified of the will, the correlative of the idea. And we know 
that these moments, when, delivered from the fierce pressure of the 
                                                 
49 This point is debated too. 
50 Magee argues we cannot know the ‘Will’ directly which is not the same as saying we cannot 
know the ‘Will’ at all. 
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will, we emerge, as it were, from the heavy atmosphere of the earth, 
are the most blissful that we experience. From this we can infer how 
blessed must be the life of a man whose will is silenced not for a few 
moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but forever, indeed 
completely extinguished, except for the last glimmering spark that 
maintains the body and is extinguished with it. Such a man who, after 
many bitter struggles with his own nature, has at last completely 
conquered, is then left only as pure knowing being, as the undimmed 
mirror of the world. 
(WWR1 §68, Payne, 1969, p. 390) 
 
 
The second point, I would suggest, requires someone who is able to straddle both 
worlds much like the Bodhisattva straddles the worlds of Conventional and 
Ultimate Truth. Such a person, if they exist, would be unable to explain what they 
have encountered or experienced since what is beyond our understanding must 
remain ineffable. 
 
The transcended state experienced during aesthetic contemplation is not to be 
confused with happiness; it is a state which is neither happy nor unhappy. Even 
the word ‘contentment’ will not do since the state cannot really be described 
except as a detachment from a describable positive or negative. Although this is 
difficult if not impossible to explain, Wilhelm Halbfass gives an elegant portrayal:  
 
Schopenhauer’s invocation of Vedanta and Buddhism is most genuine 
and significant in connection with his doctrine of the negation of the 
will, which even his devoted follower J. Frauenstädt called the 
“Achilles heel” of the system...51 More than other traditions the Indian 
tradition provides him with documents of an “immediate experience” 
(“unmittelbare Erfahrung”) of true resignation and “releasement” 
(“Gelassenheit”) to which he does not and cannot add any attempts of 
theoretical explanation…Those who understand its true and concrete 
meaning are the practitioners of detachment and self-liberation, i.e., 
the yogins and sannyāsins who forget the entire world “and 
themselves with it.” What remains in their state of awareness or being 
is the “primal essence” (“Urwesen”) itself. 52
(Halbfass, 1988, pp. 119-120) 
 
This will-less state is important for understanding Schopenhauerian salvation and 
the above debate regarding the possibility or not of apprehending the noumenon 
will affect the discussion of whether or not salvation is possible in 
Schopenhauer’s system. The view that in moments of contemplation some contact 
or even harmony with the noumenon is possible also creates the problem of how 
there can be peace with a negative and purely blind, destructive and insatiable 
force. Another view, that there can be no direct knowledge of the noumenal 
                                                 
51 Halbfass refers us to Metaphysik der Sitten, (ed.) Spierling. München, 1985, 39 (introduction). 
52 Halbfass refers us to the following: Schopenhauer’s Parerga und Paralipomena  §189 (Deussen 
V, Hübscher VI, 426f.). On ‘quietism’ in its connection with mysticism and asceticism, see also 
WWR2, Ch. 48 (Deussen II, pp. 702ff.; Hübscher III, pp. 704ff.) 
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whatsoever, would claim that detached contemplation cannot provide much of an 
insight into something ultimately unknowable.53
 
In answer to the point raised by the first view above, as to why we ought to 
connect with the noumenal Will since this Will is something negative and in its 
manifestation in us causes the sufferings of the world, Schopenhauer says that we 
are not actually trying to be that Will (although it is at the foundation of our 
essence) we are simply to be conscious of it. What you are effectively doing by 
having this knowledge of what the will-driven ego is up to is recognising the 
world for the dreadful thing that it is and your existence for the dreadful thing that 
it is. The point in transcending our ego-driven will is twofold: firstly it is to 
temporarily escape this supposedly wretched existence (WWR1, p. 390 and p. 
411) and secondly it is to permanently escape it. The former is done through 
aesthetic contemplation and the latter is undertaken by a kind of saint who 
becomes an ascetic and turns his back on life entirely. Schopenhauer does not 
exactly provide a Bodhicaryāvatāra to guide us towards transcendence and it is 
doubtful that he really believed there would be many ‘saints’ produced from the 
multitudes of human beings anyway. This leads to what some scholars class as a 
pessimistic conclusion and what Schopenhauer, I am sure, would class as a 
realistic one. 
3.2 Metaphysical Egoism 
Returning to the second contemporary criticism of Schopenhauer – that his form 
of compassion is nothing but a metaphysical egoism - Christopher Janaway says 
that: 
 
At first sight this idea [that we ought to be phenomenally 
compassionate to be in tune with our noumenal oneness] seems so 
extreme as to expunge the possibility of compassion altogether. If I 
really believed that you were not distinct from me, the attitude with 
which I regarded you could only be a strange kind of egoism. Genuine 
compassion, on the other hand, surely presupposes belief in 
distinctness as a minimum condition.[54] An even more graphic 
objection is that, if the world in itself is without individuation, it does 
not even contain me…it is hard to see how the belief in the 
illusoriness of all individuals, including the individual which I am, 
could support a compassionate attitude between the individual that I 
am and the individual beggar to whom I give money. 
(Janaway, 1994, pp. 83-4) 
 
Janaway then concedes that the situation might not be as easily dismissed as that 
if we consider the psychology of the motivation to be compassionate seen in the 
light of Schopenhauer’s ethical-metaphysical system: 
 
                                                 
53 This is Bryan Magee’s view in The Philosophy of Schopenhauer. Magee admits that his 
argument is ad hominem, and although he is correct when he quotes many instances of where 
Schopenhauer claims that the noumenon cannot be known, there are other instances where 
Schopenhauer makes claims about it despite this: most obviously that it is undifferentiated, 
malevolent and destructive. 
54 This is relevant to the Williams debate below in Ch. 6, where a similar objection is raised 
against Śāntideva. I will explain this in more detail in that chapter. 
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But perhaps this is too simplistic a response. What Schopenhauer has 
recognized is the possibility of an attitude to the world which does not 
take one’s existence as a particular individual to be of paramount 
significance: a ‘universal standpoint’ as opposed to a particular one 
[The World as Will and Representation Volume II, pp. 599-600]. In 
order to adopt this standpoint, one need not abandon the belief in 
separate individuals altogether. Compassion is supposed to motivate 
actions which one must carry out as an individual, towards other 
individuals. What might ground such actions is the idea that, though 
individuals are separate, there is nothing of any fundamental 
importance about the individual which I am. If the beggar and I are 
both equal portions of the same underlying reality, equal 
manifestations of the same will to life, then from the point of view of 
the world as a whole, it is a matter of indifference whether my ends 
are promoted and the beggar’s thwarted, or vice versa. This thought 
seems genuinely capable of grounding a compassionate outlook. The 
belief that I simply am not an individual separate from the rest of 
reality is not what does the work here; rather it is that, though being an 
individual (and naturally egoistic) thing in the world, my perspective 
does not always have to be one of identification with the individual 
that I am. As in Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic experience, I 
need not accept the natural standpoint of individuality as the one from 
which I must always regard things. 
(Janaway, 1994, p. 84) 
 
 
One of the most interesting commentaries and criticisms of Schopenhauer’s 
ethical-metaphysical system is by Julian Young who interprets Schopenhauer’s 
argument as follows: there is no plurality without space and time since 
phenomena exist in space and time such as sentient beings which postulate 
themselves as subjects and whatever things they perceive as objects. If we do 
away with space and time (by, say, transcending or overcoming the world as 
Representation) there would be no plurality since there would be no beings which 
regarded themselves as subjects perceiving objects, therefore we are left with 
undifferentiatedness (the world as Will). Young is unconvinced that space and 
time are limited to this plural world we inhabit – he feels we may find them 
elsewhere too - secondly, even if Schopenhauer is right and the phenomenal world 
is mere representation, then there may be more than one way of ‘making sense of 
plurality’ (Young, 2005, p. 182) and claims ‘numbers, for example, are a plurality 
but are not in space and time.’ (Ibid.) 
 
Thirdly, Young argues that if we give Schopenhauer the benefit of the doubt and 
accept that space and time are embodied as necessary parts of the framework of 
the world of phenomena ‘and are the only way we can make sense of plurality’ 
(Ibid) then it is still not evident that the thing-in-itself, the noumenon, is singular 
since ‘that treats what is supposed to be beyond the realm of objects as itself an 
object.’ (Ibid.) Fourthly, and finally, ‘even if reality in itself were to be ‘one’ it 
doesn’t follow that it is any kind of a self.’ 
 
I think Young is right about the last point here but the other three need closer 
inspection. The most obvious thing to say about the first point is that we will 
never know if we assume that the ‘real’ world is beyond the knowledge of the 
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ordinary human being. This means that the ‘real’ world – call it what you will: the 
noumenal, the realm of thing-in-itself, nirvāňa, God, Brahma, or any scientific 
term – cannot really be spoken about if it is beyond our knowledge and is 
therefore always going to involve a certain amount of speculation. I do not accept 
that Young has managed to prove anything contrary to what Schopenhauer 
himself thought about the world as representation by claiming that we might find 
space and time outside the phenomenal world. If Young could prove that time and 
space exist outside the world of representation (and no-one could reasonably 
expect him to try) then he would have successfully pulverised Schopenhauer’s 
reasoning on this area of metaphysics which is crucial to his (Schopenhauer’s) 
ethics. But this would be quite a task since it would involve explaining at least 
part of the nature of something which is supposed to be beyond our knowledge.55 
If Young is right and space and time exist beyond our phenomenal world then 
there would be elements of the world beyond, which we could apprehend since 
we could exist there as subjects perceiving objects – a situation made possible by 
the existence of space and time. That raises the obvious point that Young’s other 
world which also contains space and time is in fact the same as this world as far 
as space and time coincide but has extra unfathomables tacked on. If this is the 
case then the elements of that world which are the same as the elements of the 
world as our representation are, or could be, one and the same and the extras are 
nothing but the noumenal world!56 This argument leads us back to 
Schopenhauer’s position. What it does not do is prove anything about the nature 
of the noumenal world save that space and time as we know them57 do not exist 
there. I also believe a Buddhist interpretation of the world as 
representation/phenomenal world – the world of Conventional Truth/Ultimate 
Truth in Buddhist terminology – would be completely at odds with Young’s idea 
that space and time might exist in a place beyond our knowledge. If we can know 
then they are not beyond our knowledge and what is beyond our knowledge is 
only available to those who have been able to transcend human knowledge. That 
is surely a requirement for knowing what it is not possible for humans to know. It 
can be objected that the resultant ‘person’ is no longer human. But this is not an 
objection to a Buddhist – it is a stark fact that the enlightened are beyond human 
and this was the case also for Schopenhauer, whose moral man was ‘saintly’ 
rather than normal. 
 
Young’s second point – that even if Schopenhauer is right and the phenomenal 
world is mere representation, then numbers, since they are not in space and time 
but are plural, may give us another way of ‘making sense of plurality’ – is 
confusing rather than making any headway against Schopenhauer. It is confusing 
                                                 
55 Whether or not Schopenhauer does this himself is open to interpretation and the answer rests on 
whether or not you accept he says we can have direct knowledge of the noumenon. Even if 
Schopenhauer does make this mistake, Young’s following him does not defeat Schopenhauer’s 
argument for the phenomenal world encompassing space and time – it simply means that Young is 
mistaken here and Schopenhauer elsewhere. 
56 Again a parallel in Buddhism is the six realms – the world is merely experienced in different 
ways depending on how you look at it. A hell being looks at it one way, an animal another and a 
human yet another. 
57 i.e. as three dimensions of space: length, breadth and depth, and one of linear time where an 
object cannot be in two spaces at the same time nor can two objects be in the same space at the 
same time otherwise it would make no sense in human reasoning and would be one and the same 
as the phenomenal world. 
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since it can be argued that the very concept of numbers requires the existence of 
space and time in order that they are perceived. Numbers at least require sequence 
and that requires time, true geometrical shapes (and even their two-dimensional 
representations on paper) require space.58 That at least puts numbers into the 
realm of the knowable whether or not their reliance on space and time validates 
Young’s argument, which at least makes them different from the unknowable 
world beyond the phenomenal. We do know numbers and can replicate relations 
between them by means of calculations. This cannot be the same thing as the 
unknowable, which is just that: unknowable. 
 
Young’s third point – that it is not evident that the thing in itself is singular – 
appears glued to human reasoning of the phenomenal world; what else is available 
to us? However this reasoning is missing a step: just because something is not 
plural it does not mean it is singular. Our reasoning tells us it is either one or the 
other, but it could quite simply be that it is unexplainably ‘whole’. Although this 
initially seems counter-intuitive, this way of thinking has been in existence from 
at least Plato’s time. Plato questions the idea of opposites as absolutes and tells us 
in The Symposium that just because Eros is neither good nor beautiful it does not 
mean she is bad and ugly. He also questions, through Socrates, whether it makes 
sense to say that one plus one equals two: 
 
I will not even allow myself to say that where one is added to one, 
either the one to which it is added or the one that is added becomes 
two, or that the one added and the one to which it is added become 
two because of the addition of the one to the other. I wonder that, 
when each of them is separate from the other, each of them is one, but 
when they are come near to one another, this is the cause of their 
becoming two, the coming together. Nor can I any longer be 
persuaded that when one thing is divided, this division is the cause of 
its becoming two, for just now the cause of becoming two was the 
opposite. At that time it was their joining, and one was added to the 
other, but now it is because they are separated from each other. 
(Phaedo: 96e-97b, Plato and Grube (tr.), 1977, pp. 47-8) 
 
I think Socrates is quite justified in questioning this since any sense made of 
things in the phenomenal realm (the place our knowledge is limited to) does not 
necessarily translate beyond it. That means there is not much we can say about the 
mathematics of the world beyond the knowable since it involves, as I have already 
said, nothing but speculation.59
 
As I have mentioned above, Young is right, in my view, in saying that it is 
difficult to see how this supposedly ‘singular’ noumenon is in any way a ‘self’. I 
do not believe, however that Schopenhauer says or means this. Young says: 
                                                 
58 It would be too much of a tangent to take this further but I generally agree with Magee (1997, p. 
480) on this. 
59 Socrates continues in the same vein in a very interesting quote not least because of his 
questioning of the basic ‘rules’ of arithmetic but also his postulation (borrowed, as he says, from 
Anaxagoras) of the world existing as Mind: ‘I do not any longer persuade myself that I know why 
a unit or anything else comes to be, or perishes or exists by the old method of investigation, and I 
do not accept it…it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything.’ Phaedo, 97b-c, Plato and 
Grube, 1977, p. 48. 
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Though most commentators have accepted [Schopenhauer’s claim 
about the] …‘blindness’ of the will without demur, it seems to me 
important to take note of the fact that it is, fairly clearly, a mistake. 
For at least two reasons. First Schopenhauer treats it as a suitable 
object of moral evaluation and condemnation which a blind, 
‘knowledge-less’ being could not possibly be. And second, at least in 
the central passages we have been examining, the world-will is very 
clearly a designer of things, a being equipped with the full range of 
the human faculties, with reason as well as will. 
(Young, 2005, p. 83) 
 
As we have seen (above p. 46), Schopenhauer does make claims for the Will such 
as that it is ‘devoid of knowledge, and is only a blind, irresistible urge…’ (WWR1 
§54, Payne, 1969, p. 275) which is the ‘absence of all aim, of all limits…’ 
(WWR1 §29, Payne, 1969, p. 164) and, most importantly contra Young: ‘The 
[W]ill as the thing-in-itself, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of 
man; yet in itself it is without consciousness [my italics].’ (WWR2, Ch. XIX, 
Payne, 1969, p. 201.) 
 
It does not have reason and it does not design anything – this is why 
Schopenhauer rejected the word ‘Force’ since he thought it had some sort of 
direction which he explicitly denies the Will has. I do not see that Schopenhauer 
is claiming the noumenon is either a self or singular or both. I take it that it is not 
a self and has no consciousness and that although it is not plural, this does not 
mean it is singular for reasons I have given above (p. 52). I believe the majority of 
commentators with whom Young disputes are right on this particular issue. 
 
Schopenhauer also believes that although he has spent most of his time explaining 
his metaphysical doctrine, the important thing he wants to impart concerns ethics 
and that everything he has said so far has been a preamble for this: 
 
The last part of our discussion [book four The World as Will and 
Representation I] proclaims itself as the most serious, for it concerns 
the actions of men, the subject of direct interest to everyone, and one 
which can be foreign or indifferent to none. In my opinion…all 
philosophy is always theoretical, since it is essential to it always to 
maintain a purely contemplative attitude…to enquire, not to prescribe. 
But to become practical, to guide conduct, to transform character, are 
old claims which with mature insight it ought finally to abandon. 
(WWR1 §53, Payne, 1969, p. 271) 
 
What he proposes in this final section is that we embrace compassion and attempt 
transcendence of the ‘will’: both of which he takes to be things which alleviate the 
supposed misery and suffering of existence. This might seem to be more 
commonsensical than philosophical just as the Parable of the Arrow is in 
Buddhism. (See the Cūĺamālunkya Sutta in MN 63.) 
 
This does not let Schopenhauer off the hook though in that he does make 
metaphysical claims which have been regarded as unsubstantiated or problematic 
by many scholars of his work. Schopenhauer seems to be aware of the problem to 
a certain extent and tells us that at the end of the day no-one can really answer 
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these issues philosophically and that the closest person to an understanding is the 
mystic. In the last book of WWR1 he attempts to complete the circle he started 
when he asserted that suffering is a precondition for living, that it is caused by 
ego-driven desires and by an acceptance of the phenomenal world as real (when it 
is a representation, a Vorstellung) and that the overcoming of desires through 
negation of self and adoption of compassion (which complement one another – 
the less you are a self the less selfish you are and the more you cultivate 
compassion the less you can have an idea of a strictly independent self) and that 
this saintly self-overcoming brings the circle of thought to a close. This cannot be 
regarded as a complete circle since large parts of it (the metaphysical) have to be 
left unproven. 
 
This is definitely a problem for Schopenhauer but he did not cause it – he 
discovered it. It will be a problem for any moral theories of any hue if we assume 
that they must postulate a self and others in the first place. No philosopher’s 
account of self hitherto has proven ultimately tenable. 
 
The relationship between ethics and its metaphysical justification in 
Schopenhauer sees us pressing up against the window to the noumenon where we 
cannot describe what we see inside. We are not in the ‘room’ we can see and 
therefore do not have direct experience of it, yet it would be invalid to say there is 
no experience of it possible. 
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Chapter 4: Compassion in Buddhist Ethics 
Introduction 
In this chapter I intend to cover three main areas: (1) to give a brief account of the 
debate surrounding the nature of Buddhist ethics, (2) to explain the place of 
compassion in Buddhist ethics and (3) to examine special problems with Buddhist 
ethics.  
 
Before we can begin to examine these areas it may be helpful to give a brief 
outline of Buddhist ethics. In doing so it is important to ground that outline in one 
of the fundamental teachings (perhaps the fundamental teaching) which is at the 
root of all schools of Buddhism: that of the Four Noble Truths (catvāri 
āryasatyāni). The Four Noble Truths are concerned primarily in dealing with the 
idea of duųkha which has commonly been translated as ‘suffering’ but might be 
better characterised as ‘unsatisfactoriness’, ‘frustration’ or ‘not to get what one 
wants’ (see Harvey, 2000, p. 31 and Schmidt-Leukel, 2006b, p. 32) and I will 
leave it untranslated from here on. The first truth concerns the existence and 
nature of duųkha which permeates many aspects of life such as birth, aging, 
illness and death, the second truth explains the origin of duųkha, which is a kind 
of craving or thirst (tŗşňā), the third truth claims that there is a way to end duųkha 
and the fourth and final truth points to the Noble Eightfold Path as the means to 
that end.  
 
The Noble Eightfold Path consists of (1) right view, (2) right intention, (3) right 
speech, (4) right action, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness 
and (8) right concentration and these eight features have traditionally been divided 
into three concomitant sections. The first section concerns Wisdom (prajña) and it 
contains (1) right view and (2) right intention; the second section concerns 
Morality (śīla) and contains (3) right speech, (4) right action and (5) right 
livelihood and the final section concerns Meditation (samādhi) and contains (6) 
right effort, (7) right mindfulness and (8) right concentration. The path as a whole 
leads not only to the cessation of duųkha but to wisdom and moral perfection 
through the eradication of the ‘defilements’ (kleśa), which are greed, hatred and 
delusion. Correctly following the Path leads to salvation or liberation from duųkha 
ultimately through not being reborn. 
 
In traditional Indian Buddhism the relationship of ethics (śīla) to elements of the 
Noble Eightfold Path can be seen when looking, firstly, at right intention. Right 
intention connects wisdom (prajña) with the moral principle since acts stem from 
intention, or thought, and the right kind of act can only be committed with the 
right thoughts or intentions behind it. This means that right intention is connected 
to wisdom and morality. Next on the path are right speech, right deeds and right 
livelihood which are connected to morality in the narrower sense since speech and 
deeds come from intention and livelihood also involves deeds. Next comes right 
effort, which has a moral dimension in that it takes the right kind of effort to 
cultivate what is good and get rid of what is evil. Gaining the right attitude which 
leads to right effort comes through meditation, which requires right concentration. 
 
So ethics appears in Buddhism firstly as part of the Noble Eightfold Path and is 
part and parcel of the Buddhist path to salvation and, secondly, ethical issues are 
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addressed in classical Buddhism as part of the karma doctrine since the ten tracts 
of karma60 in classical Buddhism cover thought, word and deed and will be 
explained in more detail later. These, then, are the two major realms we encounter 
in classical Buddhism in which we can locate ethics. One further component 
which is central to my enquiry is the role of compassion in ethics, especially in its 
soteriological context. 
 
4.1. A Discussion of the Nature of Buddhist Ethics 
There has been disagreement amongst scholars regarding the relationship between 
Buddhist ethics and soteriology, with the basic issue at heart being what 
Buddhism has to say about karma and whether or not it is related to the Buddhist 
understanding of the mechanism that leads to salvation. There are scholars who 
believe that the teaching of karma has nothing to do with the path of salvation and 
on the basis of their studies of Burmese Theravāda Buddhism, King (1964) and 
Spiro (1970) have adopted this view whereas other scholars (such as Aronson, 
1980, Katz, 1982, Dharmasiri, 1989, Keown, 1992 and Harvey, 2000) do not 
accept it. King and Spiro have concluded that there are basically two forms of 
Buddhism, nibbanic and kammatic - the former aiming at ultimate salvation in 
nibbana (Skt. nirvāňa) and the other at improving one’s kamma (Skt. karma) to 
achieve a better rebirth. If these two are unconnected, as King and Spiro claim, 
then the implications for ethics are that for the lay person, who strives for a better 
rebirth, it involves practical morally good deeds while, according to their claims, 
the monastics are only concerned with abstaining from negative deeds and not 
necessarily performing good ones because that would create good karma which 
would not lead to their goal (being karmaless and therefore not reborn). 
 
In opposition to this interpretation is the view that the Buddhist understanding of 
karma has a precise connection to the understanding of the path of salvation and 
the major reason for this is that the roots of all evil (greed, hatred and delusion) 
are responsible for the production of negative karma and getting rid of these roots 
is also essential for achieving salvation. That is, in a sense, the connecting link 
and therefore every improvement of your karma involves at least a softening or 
reduction of greed, hatred and delusion and therefore by implication improving 
your karmic tendencies gets you nearer to the goal of salvation even if that might 
not be intended. Therefore, of course, a Buddhist monk or nun is always expected 
to do positive good as did the Buddha himself. 
 
King’s and Spiro’s challenge is important because of the question ‘what is the 
place of ethics in Buddhism at all?’ One way of answering this question is to look 
at the causes of immoral behaviour, and in Buddhism immoral behaviour occurs 
as a result of the influence of greed, hatred and delusion (the defilements) which 
are manifestations of attachment. Attachment itself (according to the concept of 
pratītyasamutpāda, or Dependent Origination), has its root in tŗşňā (which the 
Four Noble Truths identify as the cause of duųkha) and more needs to be said 
about the nature of tŗşňā in order to clarify the relationship to attachment, the 
defilements and non-moral behaviour. 
 
                                                 
60 There is a list of ten karmically wholesome actions in thought, word and deed and a list of ten 
karmically unwholesome or negative actions in thought, word and deed. (See Harvey, 2000, p. 48.) 
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Tŗşňā (P. taňhā), as we have seen, has been translated as ‘thirst’, ‘craving’ or 
‘desire’, and with this understanding it has been taken that desires are to be 
extinguished completely in order to be free from this thirst which causes duųkha. 
A problem which might result from this is that if we have absolutely no desire 
then we have no desire for nirvāňa and no desire to be morally good. If one 
accepts this scenario then it seems that the Buddhist path involves a paradox and 
the enlightened cannot exhibit moral behaviour.61 Schmidt-Leukel (2006b) argues 
that the problem can be solved if we look more closely at the meaning of tŗşňā 
which, he explains, might be better described as a longing or striving for 
something in a misguided way rather than longing or striving per se. Striving is of 
two kinds: the noble and the ignoble where the former is a striving for nirvāňa 
and the latter is a striving for the things of this world (see Schmidt-Leukel, 2006b, 
pp. 33-6): 
 
Bhikkhus, there are these two kinds of search: the noble search and the 
ignoble search. And what is the ignoble search? Here someone…seeks 
what is…subject to birth…ageing…sickness…[and]…death…And what is 
the noble search? Here someone…seeks the unborn supreme security from 
bondage, Nibbāna… 
(MN 26: 5-12; Ñāňamoli and Bodhi, 2001, pp. 254-6, cf. Schmidt-Leukel, 
2006b, p. 33) 
 
Tŗşňā might be better interpreted as the ignoble striving for worldly things which, 
we mistakenly assume, will give us lasting satisfaction but they never do. In this 
sense tŗşňā is a misguided striving which lies at the root of duųkha and involves a 
form of delusion (one of the three defilements) which leads to attachment. 
Attachment can be interpreted as grasping or holding fast to whatever we 
deludedly expect can give us lasting satisfaction but it does not involve 
attachment to nirvāňa itself. Later, according to Mahāyāna Buddhism, our 
concept of nirvāňa can be an object of possession and grasping and in order to 
achieve true nirvāňa we should also get rid of our conceptual objects of grasping 
as well as material ones, however, this view is not found in Theravāda Buddhism. 
From this perspective greed and hatred are just modalities of attachment where 
greed is a deluded attitude to pleasurable things and hatred is a deluded attitude to 
unpleasurable things. No-one is attached to greed, hatred or delusion but 
attachment materialises itself as greed, hatred and delusion which are of course 
relevant in a moral sense since unwholesome or negative moral actions can spring 
from them. 
 
If we uproot the defilements then this removes the causes of non-moral behaviour. 
However, this is not easy to achieve since we are driven to attachment by craving 
or thirst (tŗşňā) – this proclivity is explained as the Second Noble Truth. The 
Third Noble Truth informs us that we can get rid of tŗşňā and the Fourth Noble 
Truth points us toward the Noble Eightfold Path where we might find a means of 
achieving this and eroding the defilements altogether. (See SN 56:11.) The person 
who achieves this, the enlightened person, will be a morally perfectly person – not 
                                                 
61 This precise objection is raised in the Pāli Canon itself (SN 5:51:15) and this latter view was 
shared by King and Spiro. 
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someone who has left morality behind and is beyond good and evil,62 but someone 
who has become good by nature. Not someone behaving morally because s/he is, 
say, following some dictum which may be productive of the best consequences or 
is obedient to what some take to be a moral law; the moral Buddhist is behaving 
morally because the root of evil has been eradicated. Ethics is therefore entirely 
integrated in the Buddhist path of salvation. Any notion that monks and nuns were 
beyond morality would mean that ethics is not integral to the Buddhist path of 
salvation nor to a perfect(ed) existence.  
 
Probably the most contentious part of King’s and Spiro’s account is that the so-
called nibbanic/kammatic distinction guides the ethical behaviour of monks and 
the laity, with the former immersed in an exclusive journey of self-liberation 
while the latter, ‘kammatic Buddhists’ adhere to prescribed behaviour in an 
attempt to gain the improved rebirth they supposedly seek. This view rests largely 
on confusion with regard to the Eightfold Path and the understanding of progress 
through the path. This can be illustrated by reference to the three structuring 
principles of the Eightfold Path which, as we have seen, divides it into: (1) 
Insight/Wisdom (prajña) which consists of the two elements: right view and right 
intention;63 (2) Morality/Ethics (śīla) which consists of the three elements: right 
speech, right livelihood and right action, and (3) Meditation/Concentration 
(samādhi) which consists of the three elements: right effort, right mindfulness and 
right concentration. The second path member (right intention, or thought) links 
Wisdom with Morality64 and the sixth path member (right effort) links Morality 
with Meditation.65
 
The three areas of the path, known as the Threefold Training, are inseparably 
linked in that the first two are concerned with good action (karma) - mentally as 
well as in deeds - which allows the conditions to arise whereby a correct 
understanding of reality (3) Wisdom can be achieved. Stages (1) and (2) should 
not be seen as passing an examination and leaving one level behind before going 
on to another – what is in the first stage is ongoing and is still needed for (2) as 
both (1) and (2) are for (3). The distinction between nibbanic and kammatic 
Buddhism rests partly on dividing the Eightfold Path into one level for those who 
seek a better rebirth (lay Buddhists) and another for those who seek complete 
escape from rebirth (monks and advanced practitioners).  
 
4.1.1 The Role of Buddhist Ethics in Relation to the Path of Liberation 
In a sense King and Spiro presented us with a compartmentalised way of looking 
at Buddhist soteriology which misses the overall picture and its holistic nature 
where it is not possible to isolate anything from the realisation of the Four Noble 
                                                 
62 Keown, for example, specifically rejects the claim that a state of nirvāňa necessitates or results 
in leaving ethics behind, as argued especially by Spiro and King and in countering this argument 
examines the Raft Parable which has been taken by many commentators to support the claim that 
not only ethics but much else which has been gathered on the path to nirvāňa can be discarded 
once the ‘other side’ has been reached. (See Keown, 1992, pp. 92-6.)  
63 Wisdom also encompasses ‘enlightenment’ and ‘liberation’. The Noble Eightfold Path starts 
with wisdom (right view) and since the whole path leads to enlightenment and liberation, we can 
say that it ends with it as well.  So liberation and enlightenment are sometimes enumerated as path 
members 9 and 10. 
64 Since ‘thought’ is the first of the three karmic activities: thought, word and deed. 
65 Morality requires effort as does meditating. 
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Truths or the Eightfold Path. The brahma-vihāras (divine dwellings/abidings)66 
are also treated in a compartmentalised way by King and Spiro and are dissected 
leaving the constituent parts discordant. The brahma-vihāras are four mental 
states which can be developed in meditational practice, and in early Buddhism 
they could be interpreted quite widely as a subject of meditative exercise where 
the four form a unity.67 These are the kinds of mental qualities that a Buddha 
displays and therefore one who strives for enlightenment should aim at 
developing and strengthening these mental qualities. Under meditative training 
you can train your moral motivation and in this respect meditation is connected to 
morality. This idea that you can educate and train yourself to morality can also be 
found in Ancient Greek philosophy but is a much more remote concept in the 
West nowadays. 
 
King and Spiro, in my view, both place too much emphasis on identifying what I 
suspect they see as the most ‘useful’ parts of Buddhist teachings if the aim is to 
reach nirvāňa, leaving the rest somewhat downgraded – with the implication, of 
course, that this ‘residue’ is followed by self-seeking lay Buddhists. The idea that 
those in search of nirvāňa are fundamentally distinct from those seeking simply a 
better rebirth and that they aim as an ethical goal to be emotionless and detached 
from others is not borne out by examination of even the general activities of 
Theravādin monastics, the activities of the Buddha (as Aronson has pointed out, 
1980, pp. 3-7, 14, 71-3) and would make no sense when it is recalled that the 
motivation for the monastic and part of her/his training requires compassion for 
other sentient beings. They may be initially motivated to attain self-enlightenment 
but part of the paradox of this in Buddhism is that enlightenment requires the 
wisdom to know that there is ultimately no self to be enlightened. In Theravāda 
Buddhism, striving for your own enlightenment is not regarded as selfish or 
egotistical – indeed it is your main priority – however in Mahāyāna Buddhism the 
monk, even though they may have been initially motivated by a wish for self-
enlightenment, understands by the last part of the Threefold Training that any 
wish for self-enlightenment can be seen as a form of attachment; attachment 
ensures rebirth, which is precisely what the practitioner is trying to avoid. 
However, the opinion that it is selfish to aim only for self-enlightenment is a 
particular Mahāyānin point of view and is not shared by Theravādin Buddhists. 
 
The debate initiated by King and Spiro has been important in Buddhist 
scholarship, however it has now largely been laid to rest and it is useful to 
examine whether or not Buddhist soteriological ethics can be assumed to be 
unique or if it has any real affinity with Western systems of ethics. 
 
4.1.2 Comparisons to Western Systems of Ethics 
The rationale for comparing Buddhist ethics to Western systems of ethics is for 
clarification and elucidation as well as finding where they are not similar and 
where areas of possible weakness lie. (And this works both ways.) It is possible to 
compare Buddhist ethics with, at least, three systems of ethics in the West: 
                                                 
66 Loving kindness (mettā), compassion (karuňā), empathetic joy (mudita) and equanimity 
(upekkhā). Collectively they are also known as the appamaññā ‘Immeasurables’ or ‘Unlimiteds’ as 
Conze has it, also see Harvey, 2000, pp. 203-5. 
67 King and Spiro regard equanimity as a climax rather than an equal constituent. 
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deontology, utilitarianism and Aristotelian virtue ethics.  
 
4.1.3 Buddhist Ethics as Deontological 
For Kant, a person’s moral actions must be in accordance with what he sees as 
their moral duty, and not in accordance with what may be seen as the best 
outcome, or productive of the best consequences. There is an a priori foundation 
for ethics, and a ‘moral’ human being uses reason to comprehend and act on that 
a priori foundation.  
 
For Kant, actions performed through a motive of duty have moral worth – others 
do not. Actions performed through a motive of self-interest have no moral worth 
because we are caused to act when we act that way and are therefore not free. A 
consequence of this thesis is that acts of compassion are also of no moral worth 
since they are likewise not freely chosen. Although Kant does not say we are not 
compassionate creatures, he does not think morality can be found in compassion 
on account of it being caused and also because nature is ‘step-motherly’ – she 
doles out compassion to her favourites (Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals §1:7, tr. Hill T.E. and Zweig, A. 2002, p. 196) and therefore some people 
have lots of compassion and others do not, so you cannot require compassion as a 
moral basis or you exclude large numbers of people from the possibility of acting 
‘rightly’. Since the motivation for compassion is caused it is not attended with a 
moral value judgement.  
 
In Buddhism compassion is regarded not only as of moral worth, but as a very 
important element of ethics in pre-Mahāyāna and as completely central to ethics 
in Mahāyāna Buddhism. The crossover from Buddhism to Kantian deontology is 
therefore very limited and suffers from important differences in intention and 
motivation and I do not take deontology to be the best comparison with Buddhist 
ethics. 
 
However, there are those who think, to a greater or lesser extent, that a 
comparison can be made: for example Dharmasiri argues that deontologically-
driven deeds give prominence to the other and place less emphasis on self (1989, 
p. 27) and that Buddhist ethics also contains these two characteristics. 
Furthermore, following the Eightfold Path, he claims, is motivated by a feeling of 
duty, which he takes to be evidence of a valid comparison with deontology. 
However, having made a comparison, Dharmasiri goes on to make a stronger case 
for incompatibility by undermining deontology altogether. In an attempt to do so 
he asserts that deontology has moral perfection as an aim, which, he thinks, 
renders it teleological (in order to tie it to consequentialism and ultimately 
utilitarianism – a comparison he favours) since moral perfection is an end goal: 
 
it is interesting to speculate whether there can ever be completely 
deontological actions, because a subtle teleology is necessarily 
presupposed in any deontological action, in the sense that one performs 
deontological imperatives because one needs to perfect oneself, and here 
one has ethical perfection as the goal. 
(Ibid., p. 28) 
 
I would argue that deontology of the Kantian variety (in the Groundwork) is not 
concerned with ethical perfection and is not teleological since all the Kantian 
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wants to do is conform to reason partly by testing maxims through the Categorical 
Imperative. There is no goal as such and no eye on consequences: all that is 
important is following the moral law as understood through reason motivated by 
duty.68  
 
Dharmasiri points out further contrasts between deontology and Buddhist ethics 
and the main thrust of his argument, which concerns only a Mahāyānin 
interpretation of Buddhism, is that Buddhist ethics has another, higher, level 
which is absent in deontological theories: ‘besides the deontological doctrine, it 
also has a separate doctrine about the nature of reality’ (ibid. p. 29). The 
Bodhisattva’s actions, he argues, have two stages: in the first ‘the worldly actions 
he does are clearly deontological because they are done for the sake of others’ 
(ibid. p. 30) and in the second there is a higher understanding needed whereby the 
Bodhisattva transcends the idea of self, other and objects of giving altogether. At 
this point we see the main area of contrast with deontology and Dharmasiri seems 
to me to be arguing a general and ultimately minor area of compatibility between 
a weak form of deontology (i.e. not an entirely Kantian one) and elements of 
Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics and that this compatibility is ultimately undone by the 
many contrasts. (Ibid., pp. 27-32.) 
 
Buddhist ethics as a deontological theory was rejected by Jayatilleke who I think 
argues rightly that deontological theories rely much more on duty than Buddhist 
ethics would allow and that Buddhists, although not unaffected by feelings of 
duty, place greater importance on motives and consequences and in that sense 
Buddhist ethics cannot be regarded as significantly deontological. (See 
Jayatilleke, 1970, pp. 194 and 196-7.) 
 
This is echoed by Harvey who argues that a person’s own good is important in 
Buddhist ethics but this is not always the case in Kant’s ethics.69 Furthermore, 
Buddhist ethics does not have duty as its backbone and as such the practitioner is 
engaged in a journey in which they themselves can develop morally rather than 
following the blind strictures of reason (see Harvey, 2000, pp. 50-1). 
 
Kant also considered anyone who is rational to be able to follow a deontological 
ethic and thinks that they ought to do so. In that sense there is a cold obedience70 
involved in Kant’s system which does not appear evident in Buddhist ethics. 
 
4.1.4 Buddhist Ethics as Utilitarian 
It is not difficult to demonstrate that utilitarianism is a sub-species of egoism (in 
that the common good can be seen as promoting individual well-being) and this is 
contrary to Buddhist ethics which denies egoism and strives for genuine 
                                                 
68 However, this is only one aspect of Kant. There is also the promise of the highest good in the 
Critique of Practical Reason where Kant argues that only if there is a god will there be a guarantee 
that those who have lived morally will arrive at ultimate happiness. In this, my striving for my 
own happiness and my obligation to live morally in the end go together. This is, of course, totally 
different to what is in the Groundwork and Kant has been criticised (by, for example, Mackie) for 
saying on the one hand that morality depends entirely on complying with your moral duty and then 
on the other hand that you will be rewarded by God if you adhere to your moral duty.  
69 Although this is exactly where the Critique of Practical Reason is different. (See the above 
note.)  
70 To duty, the ‘moral law’, the Categorical Imperative and to reason. 
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compassion (both in Theravāda and Mahāyāna although in a more pronounced 
way in the latter). The production of the best consequences is not the sole criterion 
for Buddhists – there must be correct motivation as well, and although this crosses 
over to deontology, we have seen that that model does not compare well with 
Buddhist ethics either. 
 
Initially utilitarianism does appear to have certain features in common with 
Buddhist ethics in that they are both teleological (they have a ‘goal’ in mind), they 
aim at the reduction of ‘pain’ (suffering/duųkha) and in Buddhism reaching 
nirvāňa is considered to be reaching ultimate bliss which begins to sound like 
something a utilitarian would be interested in. However the main difference is in 
the motivation for action which, in Buddhism, is informed at least partly by 
compassion: in Theravāda Buddhism compassion is just one motivating factor as 
a constituent part of the four brahma-vihāras, and in Mahāyāna Buddhism 
compassion is the central moral virtue. Utilitarian theory considers the 
consequences of an action to be of primary importance and in that respect is 
incompatible with either Theravāda or Mahāyāna ethics. This is not to say that 
utilitarians are uncompassionate (or that Buddhists are disinterested in 
consequences); just that compassion is not a motivating factor in utilitarian theory.  
 
One major Buddhist aim is to be free from unwholesome attachment and that 
includes attachment to pleasurable things – even ultimate bliss is something not to 
be clung to. This idea is not shared by utilitarians who seek to satisfy urges for 
pleasure and assume that happiness is defined by attainment of pleasure and the 
minimisation of pain: 
 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the 
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as 
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse 
of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; 
by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.  
(Mill Ch. II, 1986, p. 257) 
 
In Buddhism the aim is quite different: pleasure and satisfaction are regarded as 
temporary and the escape from pain (duųkha) is achieved by not being reborn. 
This is not an aim of utilitarianism. 
 
Harvey, whilst pointing out similarities such as the increase of happiness and/or 
decrease of unhappiness as a common goal, nevertheless takes the view that the 
comparison is limited since in Buddhism the production of good consequences 
alone does not dictate that the action is ‘right’: there are ‘right actions’ in 
Buddhism which can lead to ‘karmic fruits’ but the production of karmic fruits 
does not lead to the conclusion that an action was ‘right’ or even ‘good’. (See 
Harvey, 2000, pp. 49-50 and 1990a, p. 196 and cf. Keown, 1992, p. 177.) 
 
Harvey also comments on motivation and intention when drawing a distinction 
between Buddhist ethics and utilitarianism, and says that in utilitarianism the 
motivation is simple: the production of aggregate pleasure or reduction of 
aggregate pain (Act Utilitarianism) or adherence to moral rules which can be seen 
to produce a net ‘good’ (Rule Utilitarianism). Harvey points out that both forms of 
utilitarianism, especially the former, ‘tends to a perspective of ‘the end justifies 
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the means’’ (2000, p. 49) and that this might lead to something dangerous being 
passed off as being morally right. Theravāda (and possibly Mahāyāna71) 
Buddhism has a safeguard against this which is that a wholesome end can only be 
reached through wholesome acts, which debars the possibility of harming others 
on the way to some blissful end. On Harvey’s comparison, with which I concur, it 
is difficult to see how the individual’s pleasure and pain could be subordinated to 
that of the many in Buddhism but this could be the case in utilitarianism.72
 
Dharmasiri argues that Buddhist ethics is an ‘ideal’ rather than a ‘hedonistic’ 
utilitarianism and what he means by this is that it is not concerned with mere 
pleasures and pains but with ‘the utility of the act’ (op. cit, p. 27). His claim is that 
Buddhist morality ‘has a hypothetical nature’ since if what it is possible to do 
were to be altered then morality would be likewise altered. His argument focuses 
on the fact that following guidelines to the letter ‘was criticized as ‘clinging to 
precepts and vows’ (śīlabbta parāmāsa)’ (ibid., p. 26) and that we should not 
adhere to them without taking account of practicalities – i.e. whether or not we are 
actually capable of acting in certain ways. Moral values are not static, in this 
interpretation of Buddhist ethics,73 and are concerned primarily with what it is 
possible to achieve with the aim being spiritual rather than following prescriptive 
rules intended to reach a goal. He therefore takes Buddhist ethics to be a fluid 
form of non-hedonistic Act Utilitarianism (cf. Whitehill, 1994, n.21; Clayton, 
2006 p. 4).74 I think it is important to point out that he takes care to say that his 
comparison is based on an idea of utilitarianism as an ideal utilitarianism, which 
is not like the kind we are used to dealing with which is very practical, but 
unfortunately he does not, in my opinion, say enough about this new sub-species 
to convincingly demonstrate a strong and clear confluence between it and 
Buddhist ethics. 
 
Keown considers Buddhist ethics to be compatible to a certain degree with 
utilitarian ethics in that they both aim at the reduction of suffering (1992, pp. 175-
6) but ultimately rejects the comparison since utilitarianism does not share the 
concept of rebirth and this means that suffering, for the utilitarian, ends with the 
cessation of an individual life whereas it is a continuum for a Buddhist. Another 
reason he gives is that in Buddhism one cannot look at the end product and 
retrospectively decide whether the acts leading to it were right or wrong. But this 
is the case with utilitarian ethics: 
 
                                                 
71 See Harvey, 2000, Ch. 3, pp. 134-5. 
72 However, there are cases where harming in order to help is not proscribed. For example in early 
Buddhism there is an awareness that a doctor may have to cause pain in surgery in order to make a 
patient well. In Mahāyāna, compassionate killing is, in certain circumstances, allowed. For 
example Śāntideva, in the Śikşāsamuccaya, says that if the Bodhisattva, motivated by compassion, 
has to do something which will lead him to the hottest of all hells, then he must do it provided it 
ultimately helps others. Also see below, p. 75. 
73 Also see Jayatilleke, 1970, p. 195: ‘in the Aggañña Sutta…it is pointed out that society 
undergoes change from time to time and as a result “what is reckoned immoral at one time…may 
be reckoned to be moral at another time” (D[N]. III. 89)’. 
74 Whitehill remarks: “Dharmasiri, interestingly, argues that Buddhist ethics is best understood as 
a peculiar, non-hedonic form of act utilitarianism” and Clayton defines it as “non-hedonistic 
utilitarianism”. 
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Wrong (akusala) acts cannot turn out…to have been right by virtue of their 
proximate or remote effects; nor can right (kusala) acts turn out to have 
been wrong in view of their consequences. For a utilitarian theory of ethics, 
however, both of these are real possibilities since rightness and goodness 
are separately defined. 
(Keown, 1992, p. 177) 
 
In reaching the Buddhist goal of nirvāňa and freedom from duųkha, karma is 
crucial and utilitarianism does not share the Buddhist notion of karma. On further 
analysis Keown takes karma to be what he calls ‘internal and external 
consequences’ of moral action since the former concerns the person performing 
the act and the latter concerns ‘the world at large’ (ibid., p. 181). He argues that 
some Western commentators have mistakenly compared just the former with 
utilitarianism, which renders Buddhist ethics ‘a form of ethical 
egoism…[where]…moral action becomes a means to further the private interests 
of the individual.’75  
 
As we have seen earlier,76 it is incorrect to claim that the enlightened Arhat is 
beyond morality simply because s/he has transcended duųkha. However, if a 
utilitarian were in a similar position of experiencing ultimate bliss whilst at the 
same time being free from suffering, then morality would be of no further use 
since the teleological aim would have been achieved. In other words the 
enlightened Arhat is not beyond morality whereas the telos-achieving utilitarian 
is, or as Keown puts it: ‘why should he [the utilitarian] continue to follow rules 
which are fashioned on the basis of utility in which he no longer has any interest?’ 
(ibid, p. 181). Since the enlightened Buddhist is not beyond morality and the 
abstracted utilitarian is, it is at this point the comparison between Utilitarianism 
and pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism breaks down.  
 
Another reason for Keown’s rejection of the comparison is that, like other 
commentators, he sees motivation as a hindrance to an effective convergence 
between the two systems and, instead, favours a comparison between Buddhist 
ethics and Aristotelian virtue ethics.  
 
4.1.5 Buddhist Ethics as Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 
There are plainly parallels between Buddhist ethics and Aristotelian ethics (at 
least in the Nicomachean Ethics77) where an end (telos) is reached through the 
mental and practical (praxis) cultivation of new habits (hexes) until they become 
entrenched dispositions or norms of behaviour if enough time and effort are 
invested. The end in mind for Aristotle is eudaimonia and for Buddhism 
nirvāňa.78 It is also important for Aristotle that this path is not open to all: those 
whose seed has fallen on stony ground (for example those not born into an 
economically developed democracy, slaves, the simply unlucky and even the 
ugly) are not capable of reaching it: 
                                                 
75 He specifically mentions King and Spiro in this respect, ibid., p. 180. 
76 In the King and Spiro discussion above, pp. 58-61. 
77 Other main references for ethics in Aristotle’s writings are the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna 
Moralia. 
78 Both terms are notoriously problematic in meaning and translation and I do not think it would be 
fruitful to go into that discussion here. 
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a man is scarcely happy [eudaimon] if he is very ugly to look at, or of low 
birth, or solitary and childless…[s]o, as we said, happiness seems to 
require…[a]…sort of prosperity…  
(Nicomachean Ethics Bk1: viii, Thomson, 1953, p. 80) 
 
Likewise for non-human animals: 
 
we do not speak of an ox or a horse nor any other animal as being happy, 
because none of them can take part in…[virtuous]…activity. 
(Ibid.: ix, p. 81) 
 
There is a parallel in Buddhism in that it takes a certain rebirth, as a human, to be 
able to follow the path to enlightenment but even then there are some who are 
precluded from entering the path for various reasons: 
 
many carry [the] burden of a karma which lead[s] to immediate retribution 
in the hells, others have acquired unfortunate rebirths [which keep them 
away from the Buddha and his teachings], others are doomed to be killed, 
or they are enveloped in the net of false views, or fail to find the path, 
which others who had gained a fortunate rebirth have lost. 
(AP 22:403, tr. Conze, 1958 (1970), p. 161)  
 
There are general comparisons too whereby a person is cultivating or modifying 
their behaviour (thoughts, words and deeds - karma - in the case of Buddhists, and 
habits or dispositions - hexes - for Aristotle) in order to reach their telos. 
However, the centrality of compassion in Mahāyāna Buddhism or even its mere 
prominence in Theravāda Buddhism is totally lacking in Aristotle’s scheme. I 
would also interpret Aristotle as being quite far removed from the idea that the 
soteriology of ethics involves ultimate extinction of tŗşňā or thirst; Aristotle wants 
to tame this craving and make it appropriate to certain circumstances rather than 
eliminate it altogether.79
 
One scholar who takes the view that a favourable comparison can be made 
between Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics is Damien Keown, who argues that there 
are many analogous areas (1992, p. 193) and gives the examples that both have a 
form of happiness as a goal, reaching that goal requires moral self-development 
which consists of both intellectual and practical development and that the telos 
they seek arrives when the agent acts in fully virtuous ways which require an 
overcoming of unwholesome or unvirtuous acts. (Ibid., 1992, pp. 193-227.)  
 
Although Keown claims affinity between the two systems, he in no way claims 
they are the same or even nearly so: 
 
I am not suggesting that we will find anything approaching complete 
agreement between the Buddha and Aristotle…although there are many 
                                                 
79 Although I appreciate one can only be eudaimon when one is at the end of life, Aristotle 
nevertheless has a strong practical, empirical and political streak which seeks solutions for the 
practical problems of life whilst accommodating desire and attachment rather than transcending 
them altogether. I see his ethics as quite different to Buddhist ethics in that respect. 
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similarities and interesting points of contact. 
(Ibid., p. 196) 
 
I think he is right to be wary of claiming an overly strong comparison because 
comparisons always involve interpretation and interpretations change over time as 
the culture and perspective from which one makes the interpretation changes. This 
means interpretations cannot always be objective, if at all, especially when 
dealing with other cultures and texts which were written in historically distant 
times and were, in some cases, based on a previous oral tradition.80 That does not 
mean, though, that we should go to the opposite extreme and say that no useful 
comparisons can ever be made, but, rationally speaking, the conclusion is always 
going to be that there are some things which can be compared well, some things 
which can be compared with qualifications and some things which can only be 
contrasted unfavourably. That has to be the conclusion for anyone comparing 
anything but the same thing with two different names, and Keown follows this in 
his comparison between Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics. 
 
Harvey also draws a favourable but qualified comparison between Buddhist ethics 
and Aristotelian ethics where the similarities are illustrated by virtuous 
(wholesome) self-development with perfection as the aim. The goal of this 
perfection is eudaimonia/nirvāňa and is therefore teleological in both cases, with 
the Buddhist trying to remove both spiritual ignorance and craving ‘by cultivating 
intellectual, emotional and moral virtues sharing something of the qualities of the 
goal towards which they move’ (Harvey 2000, p. 50, cf. Keown, 1992, p. 194) 
and the Aristotelian trying to remove excess in whatever is not conducive to 
virtue; strictly speaking, an Aristotelian virtue consists of two opposed vices and 
the seeker of eudaimonia must find the mean between these two extremes wherein 
lies the correct virtue. 
 
Harvey goes on to say that, for both, the rightness of an action is not judged 
simply by its utility (nor, for that matter, its adherence to reason or duty) but that 
its rightness ‘embodies a virtue which conduces to and ‘participates’ in the goal of 
human perfection’ (2000, p. 50). There are, Harvey notes, features of Kantian, 
Aristotelian and Utilitarian ethics which can find some convergence in Buddhist 
ethics, but there are also areas where this is not the case and this renders 
comparisons less concrete than some commentators would take them to be (ibid., 
p. 51). 
 
4.1.6 Useful Comparisons? 
Harvey rightly cautions us against identifying Buddhist ethics too closely with 
Aristotelianism or other major systems of ethics in the West: 
 
Overall, the rich field of Buddhist ethics would be narrowed by wholly 
                                                 
80 In relation to understanding Ancient Greek ethics from the perspective of modernity, MacIntyre 
says: ‘What we possess…are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, part [of] which now lack 
those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we 
continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our 
comprehension, both theoretical and practical...’ (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 2). Also see MacIntyre 1988 
and c1990. I have broad sympathy for MacIntyre’s views here. 
 
Page 68 of 173 
collapsing it into any single one of the Kantian, Aristotelian or Utilitarian 
models, though Buddhism agrees with each in respectively acknowledging 
the importance of (1) a good motivating will, (2) cultivation of character, 
and (3) the reduction of suffering in others and oneself.81
(Ibid., p. 51) 
 
Harvey further suggests reasons why differences must remain yet how contrasts 
can still be drawn: 
 
A key aspect of Western ethical systems is that moral prescriptions should 
be universally applicable to all people who can understand them. 
Buddhism, though, is generally gradualist in approach, so while it has 
ethical norms which all should follow from a sense of sympathy with 
fellow beings (such as not killing living beings), others only apply to those 
who are ready for them, as their commitment to moral and spiritual training 
deepens. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Although Harvey is right to say that most major Western systems of ethics favour 
a universalised approach where everyone ought to behave in certain ways, this 
was not always the case. Philosophy and spiritual practice were closely connected 
in Ancient Greece, for example in Pythagoras and Plato as well as Aristotle, and 
although Pythagoras and Plato are not, in my view, good examples to compare 
with Buddhist ethics,82 the point is that in the West we seem to have largely lost 
the ‘gradualist approach’ Harvey identifies in Buddhism.83
 
There is no noteworthy literature at all on comparisons with Schopenhauer’s 
ethics. Schopenhauer is certainly not a utilitarian or a Kantian (in ethics at least, 
he is a Kantian in other areas of thought) and it is difficult to categorise this area 
of his philosophy. He does consider compassion to be the centrepiece of his 
ethical system and also claims that it cannot be untangled from the rest of his 
philosophy – which one can find at least superficially similar to Mahāyāna 
Buddhist ethics and I will expand on this later. However, Schopenhauer’s ethics 
can in no way be regarded as Aristotelian – most especially because of the 
Schopenhauerian view that our character is set and cannot be improved. This also 
seems to put him, on that issue at least, at odds with the whole notion of a 
                                                 
81 For further details and for comparisons of Buddhist ethics with Kantian deontology and with 
Utilitarianism, see Harvey “Comparisons with Western Ethical Systems”, Ch. 1, pp. 49-51 in An 
Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Also see Clayton, Moral Theory in Śāntideva’s Śikşāsamuccaya, 
Routledge, London, 2006, Ch. 6 for what she calls “a kind of utilitarian hybrid of virtue ethics”. 
82 Mainly since both Pythagoras and Plato believe in a permanent soul which transmigrates into 
new bodies (vegetables were included in Pythagoras’ case) and both elevated mathematics to a 
mystical if not religious level. The similarities come in forming a community – Pythagoras’ 
‘monastery’ at Croton and Plato’s Academy in Athens – dedicated to the realisation of Truth, 
which involved study and self development. 
83 Although, of course, some Western ethical systems introduce the distinction between ordinary 
moral requirements and supererogatory works (morally good works which go beyond that which 
can normally be expected). There is a debate in this area as to how much (if at all) deontology or 
utilitarianism would accommodate supererogation. For supererogation in deontology see Baron, 
1987, pp. 237-262, Guevara, 1999, pp. 593-624, Haydar, 2002, pp.445-454, Heyd, 1980, pp. 308-
24, Hill, 1971, pp. 55-76, Timmermann, 2005, pp. 9-27 and for supererogation in utilitarianism see 
New, 1974 pp. 179-89 and Portmore, 2003, pp. 303-332. 
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Bodhisattva Path.84 (I will explain this observation in more detail in Chapter 7.) 
 
Regardless of how it is categorised in the West, what is clear about Buddhist 
ethics is that to be a practitioner requires that you are somewhere on the path to its 
understanding, and I have alluded to differences in emphasis placed on 
compassion between Theravāda and Mahāyāna teachings. I would now like to 
examine the place of compassion in Buddhist ethics in more detail.  
 
 
4.2 The Place of Compassion in Buddhist Ethics 
Compassion features very prominently in Mahāyāna but less heavily in pre-
Mahāyāna Buddhism. However, that is not to suggest that it is of little relevance 
or importance in pre-Mahāyāna ethics, just that it is used differently. 
 
In pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism there is no one important motive in ethics but several, 
and this comes out most clearly when one looks at the brahma-vihāras. There is 
no one ‘super brahma-vihāra’ but, rather, the four are connected and have a 
function in meditative training which contributes to morality since one’s deeds 
spring from what is in one’s mind. It is therefore, in a sense, a training of the kind 
of mental virtues that we would need to perfect moral behaviour and we can see 
the ultimate expression of this in the actions of the Buddha after his 
enlightenment. The aim of the meditative practices is to bring into being a mind 
which is conducive to the production of wholesome thoughts and by extension 
wholesome deeds.  
 
The four brahma-vihāras already in existence in early Buddhism contain both 
compassion (karuňā) and empathetic joy (muditā)85 and the two have sometimes 
been taken as meaning the same thing, whilst muditā has also been taken at times 
to be the same as sympathy, but there are important differences between the three. 
Muditā is better expressed as empathetic or appreciative joy (after Harvey, 2000, 
p. 104) or as a kind of genuine delight in the good fortune of others rather than as 
‘sympathetic joy’ since this helps remove the possibility of its being confused 
with sympathy (anukampā). Anukampā and karuňā are both used to refer to the 
motivation of the Buddha and the monks to teach the Dharma.  
 
Karuňā (compassion) should not be confused with muditā (empathetic joy) since 
the former requires cultivation through meditation whereas the latter does not: 
‘Sympathy is the fraternal concern that is present in an individual and does not 
require cultivation or meditative development [unlike compassion]’ (Aronson, op. 
cit., p. 16). Furthermore, karuňā is of primary importance to Mahāyāna Buddhist 
ethics and using it interchangeably with empathetic joy (muditā) could give a 
distorted picture of its place as a brahma-vihāra. However, there are instances 
when it is acceptable to use it interchangeably with sympathy, as Aronson notes: 
 
The term “simple compassion” is so similar to the term “sympathy” in both 
meaning and usage that in two discourses [the Saķyutta Nikāya and the 
Aģguttara Nikāya] the two are used synonymously. 
(Ibid., p. 22) 
                                                 
84 Not to mention the paths which lead to becoming a Śravaka or a Pratyekabuddha. 
85 The other two are loving kindness (mettā) and equanimity (upekkhā).  
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The point is that compassion has a different emphasis in Theravāda Buddhism to 
that which it has in Mahāyāna Buddhism, and how and why it went from being an 
important brahma-vihāra to the central principle of Mahāyāna ethics needs 
explanation. 
 
According to both Theravāda and Mahāyāna the whole life of the Buddha is 
marked by compassion. The bridge from the pre-Mahāyāna to the Mahāyāna 
position is that when it comes to the Buddha, compassion is his sole motivation. 
This is borne out by the fact that once he had achieved nirvāňa he could have left 
saņsāra86but chose not to, and the only reason given as to why he did not leave 
saņsāra was that out of compassion he would remain in order to teach the 
Dharma. This becomes central for the Mahāyāna because the goal is to aim for 
complete Buddhahood and to lead a completely altruistic life. The Buddha, having 
reached enlightenment, had achieved everything he could for himself and his 
actions thereafter are associated with the liberation of others. From that point on 
everything he did was motivated by the purest altruism and this is why Mahāyāna 
Buddhists take compassion to be the pivotal element of ethics. 
 
4.2.1 Compassion as a Brahma-vihāra 
In early Buddhism it is important to cultivate compassion equally with the other 
three brahma-vihāras so that it becomes neutrally applied and therefore a non-
attached form of compassion. That requires cultivating upekkhā (equanimity) as 
well as compassion in order to get the unattached balance right (Vism 9:88, 
Ñāňamoli, p. 309). The equanimity in question ‘is characterized as promoting the 
aspect of neutrality towards beings. Its function is to see equality in beings’ (Vism 
9:96, Ñāňamoli, p. 311). Not only is it recommended that the practitioner 
maintains neutrality towards living beings and formations, but they should also 
avoid ‘persons who show favouritism towards beings and formations’ (Ibid., 4:62, 
p.132) - assuming this takes them away from bad influences - and they should 
cultivate the acquaintance of people who already display neutrality (Ibid., 9:47, p. 
301 and SN 5:45:49, Bodhi, 2000, p. 1543).  
 
Meditation is used as a way of cultivating these qualities so that the practitioner 
‘develops the tranquillity enlightenment factor, as well as the others. This is how 
he restrains the mind on occasion when it should be restrained’ (Vism 4:62, 
Ñāňamoli, p. 132). Meditation and mind-training are fundamentally important in 
creating the conditions for right behaviour to flourish and should not be seen (as 
has erroneously been supposed by some) solely as an exercise in mind-training 
since it is intended to have positive consequences in action whereby the 
practitioner will show genuine compassion to all sentient beings without 
demonstrating any form of favouritism. 
 
The neutrality required for this should not be confused with not caring or 
unconcernedness for others (see Harris 1997, Aronson op. cit., and the previous 
discussion on King and Spiro, above, pp. 58-61) or some kind of aloofness and 
should be seen as the groundwork for something more active. It has a direct 
connection to the Golden Rule of not causing suffering and of removing the 
                                                 
86 As Māra suggested (SN.i.111). 
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causes of suffering (see Vism 9:94, Ñāňamoli, p. 310 and SN 55:7) and this 
includes to oneself. Attachment to the sufferings of others can cause suffering to 
oneself and this is not what is intended in the meditation nor is it useful in the 
quest for enlightenment. 
 
Having compassion for, and practically helping, others is connected to helping 
yourself in that genuine compassion shows genuine wisdom (part of the Eightfold 
Path and its division into the Threefold Training) and acts of genuine compassion 
show that the practitioner is far along the path to enlightenment; so the 
practitioner helps themselves by getting nearer to enlightenment and this is 
achieved, partly, by being genuinely compassionate. This is beneficial to the 
practitioner in that they have a chance of escaping saņsāric rebirth and is 
obviously good for those who have been helped by the practitioner’s 
compassionate activities. Cultivating one’s mind is therefore helpful to oneself 
and to others (see SN 5:169 and AN 7:64). 
 
An important part of the meditative technique used to achieve neutrality is a form 
of mettā meditation (Vism 9:8-13) where the development of love requires that 
the practitioner can love those to whom s/he normally feels anger or dislike. The 
mechanism works by focusing on the fact that since there is ultimately no self 
then there is ultimately nothing to be angry at nor is there anything, ultimately, 
which is angry. This renders the meditative focus on the not-self teaching as 
assistive to the development of love for those whom one does not like rather than 
to be detached from them. (See Vism 9:1-2, Ñāňamoli, p. 288, Harvey, 2000, pp. 
107-9, Schmidt-Leukel 2006b pp. 53-4 and 68-9). Also the not-self teaching 
contributes to this in that you cannot hate someone who, ultimately, does not 
exist: 
 
in the ultimate sense…there is no being as a basis for the assumption ‘I am’ 
or ‘I’; in the ultimate sense there is only mentality-materiality. The vision 
of one who sees in this way is called correct vision. 
(Vism 18:28, Ñāňamoli, p. 612, also see Vism 9:38, p. 298)87
 
Compassion, then, is treated as equal (in Theravāda Buddhism) to the other three 
brahma-vihāras and is to be cultivated in an impartial way. Thus cultivated it 
helps in attaining liberation. 
 
4.2.2 The Soteriological Role of Compassion 
Compassion is inextricably linked with salvation (or liberation) from duųkha. The 
compassionate attitude cultivated initially in meditation promotes morally good 
thought processes or ‘right intention’. Since karma is constituted not just of deeds 
but also of speech and thought, good actions can only emanate from a good mind 
and a good mind comes as a result of right thinking: 
 
All that we are is the result of what we have thought : it is founded on our 
thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil 
thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that 
                                                 
87 What Buddhaghoassa says in Vism. Chapter 9 is that the not-self teaching fits into the 
development of love by not discriminating between self and others. That may well be a Mahāyāna 
influence because he writes this at a time when the Mahāyāna is already in existence. 
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draws the carriage…[i]f a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, 
happiness follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him. 
(Dhp 1-2, Müller, 1881) 
 
There is consequently a causal connection between right mindfulness and right 
intention to right action (with right speech between) and therefore there is a 
relationship between wisdom and morality in that morality is based on actions or 
deeds and good deeds can only come from a good or wise mind,88 or put another 
way, morality comes from wisdom. For the Mahāyāna, morality consists in 
compassion, and compassion and wisdom are bound together whereas for the 
Theravāda compassion is but one of the four brahma-vihāras and is to be 
cultivated together with loving kindness, empathetic joy and equanimity and 
correct cultivation is only possible with the right mind. For both the Mahāyāna 
and Theravāda then, compassion and wisdom are inextricably linked. As we have 
seen, it is not possible to have genuine compassion if one is egoistic,89 and 
genuine compassion requires an understanding of the not-self teaching which is, 
again, part of mind-training. The person who acts with genuine compassion has to 
have the various other parts of the Noble Eightfold Path in place and, this being 
so, is adhering to what is taught as the fourth Noble Truth which offers escape 
from what is communicated in the first Noble Truth. Correct compassion is 
therefore linked to escape from duųkha and thus has a soteriological role. 
 
4.2.3 Compassion and the Buddha 
We can expect that the Buddha, as ‘the enlightened one’ would not only have 
cultivated perfect wisdom but would also have practised acts of compassion. In 
fact compassion can be seen as a justification for his activity after his 
enlightenment. The Buddha, according to scripture, taught the Dharma for forty 
years after his enlightenment and he had had to accumulate virtue for many 
lifetimes without guidance until, through his own efforts, he was able to become 
awakened. During his own post-enlightened life he gave to those in need (he had 
no possessions to give, but gave the best thing he could, which was the Dharma) 
and was motivated by compassion for all sentient beings. 
 
The teaching of the Dharma to others90 was an act of compassion and the 
founding of the saģgha was one mechanism through which the Dharma was to be 
passed on in order that others may benefit from the Buddha’s awakening. 
Compassion is linked directly to wisdom in that through the Buddha’s compassion 
the Dharma was taught that others may become enlightened and through their 
compassion still others may become enlightened. If the Buddha had not been 
compassionate as well as enlightened then he could have kept his enlightenment 
to himself and the Dharma would never have been passed on. His compassion for 
other sentient beings is what led him to pass the Dharma on. The Buddha’s 
compassionate motivation to teaching the Dharma to those without it becomes the 
                                                 
88 Unless we suppose they occur accidentally or as a way of manipulating others but with a non-
compassionate intention. 
89 If one has not escaped attachment to the illusion of self and the pull of the defilements greed, 
anger and delusion. 
90 The Buddha taught after initially wishing to remain silent (and being encouraged to do so by 
Māra (SN.i.111) and discouraged from doing so by Brahmā Sahampati (MN 26)) since he believed 
the Dharma may be too difficult for the non-awakened to understand. See MN 26.  
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foundation for the Bodhisattva Ideal which the Mahāyānins take as an example to 
emulate. It is not enough for one to strive for enlightenment but instead they 
believe one should strive for complete Buddhahood through enlightenment and 
compassion. The Bodhisattva Ideal is where compassion becomes the central 
feature, which I will deal with in the next chapter. 
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4.3 Special Problems with Buddhist Ethics 
Buddhist ethics has been seen by some Western commentators as a kind of 
benign, unreactive doctrine which equips the practitioner with the means of 
putting up with problems rather than dealing with them. This is an unfair 
characterisation and it can be argued that Buddhist ethics is much more positive 
and engaged whilst still allowing for non-attachment. I will explain this position 
in what follows. Another charge against Buddhist ethics is that it is nothing but a 
form of self-interest since the primary goal is self-enlightenment. I will argue that 
this is not the case in Mahāyāna Buddhism and is a misrepresentation of the 
situation in Theravāda Buddhism where it is important to realise that attachment 
to self only precludes full enlightenment altogether. The whole notion of self and 
specifically the not-self (anātman) teaching in Buddhism has generated much 
discussion, especially in connection to the idea of rebirth; a general criticism 
which has been levelled at Buddhism is that if there is no self then there is nothing 
to be reborn. I intend to offer an answer to this alleged problem below. 
 
Finally, the Mādhyamaka school of Nāgārjuna and, later, Śāntideva argue that 
nothing has essence (svabhāva) and that all apparent things are consequently 
ultimately empty (śūnya). Since the school (as a major branch of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism) also teaches that the cultivation of compassion (karuňā) is central to 
morality and wisdom, it might seem that this is in conflict with the emptiness 
teaching; in other words why cultivate compassion if it is ultimately empty? 
Again I shall offer a possible solution to this apparent paradox. 
 
4.3.1 Buddhist Ethics as Passive, Quietist Avoidance 
It has been suggested by critics of Buddhist ethics that it is passive and seeks to 
avoid moral problems rather than address them.91 However there are instances in 
Buddhist texts where positive actions are advocated or encouraged, such as those 
contained in the Eightfold Path (for example right speech and action), engaging 
with community by initiating, carrying out or helping carry out public works, 
assisting the poor and protecting animals. Furthermore, there are clear guidelines 
on what is expected of lay Buddhists as well as what is expected of members of 
the saģgha. (See DN 5 and 26:5, SN 1:1:47 and the Vinaya Piţaka.) In Mahāyāna 
Buddhism there is also provision made for positively deciding to harm others and 
actually doing so in order to prevent greater wrong (such as killing a ‘bad’ ruler), 
provided the intention is moral.92 Harming another is more ambivalent in 
Theravāda Buddhism although it is allowable in the case of a king having to 
punish evil-doers (see Schmidt-Leukel, 2004, pp. 33-56). 
 
It is important to again mention detachment (or non-attachment) in the overall 
scheme of Buddhist ethics since this more than anything has been seen as a way in 
which Buddhists are supposedly disengaged from others and therefore passively 
avoiding moral problems. This view is countered by pointing out that non-
attachment still allows for active loving-kindness, empathetic joy and compassion: 
                                                 
91 For example King assumes that a typical Burmese Theravādin attitude is ‘Let the world go by; it 
is not worth saving’ (King, 1964, p. 271) and he also typifies Theravada Buddhism as ‘a world-
view that gives only negative approval or neutral consent to the promotion of social welfare…’ 
(King, 1964, p. 272.). Also see Weber, 1958 and Spiro, 1972, Ch. 18. 
92 This is not done lightly nor universally espoused in Mahāyāna texts, see Harvey, 2000, pp. 134-
6. Also see Mph 4:1:33 and Conze, 1968, p. 74 for an example of a monk killing a Tibetan king. 
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it is not some kind of aloof state and it does not have negative connotations; 
negative connotations do pertain to ‘clinging’, ‘grasping’ and ‘attachment’ 
(translations of the word upādāna). Theravāda Buddhism distinguishes between 
attached and detached forms of love and love is not always seen as a form of 
attachment. Love is only a form of attachment to the extent that you are seeking 
your own pleasure in the act of love. Attachment would only come if you sought 
the well-being of the other for some sort of selfish reason too. This creates another 
problem in whether or not it is possible to have an altruistic ethic within the 
overall goal of reaching your own salvation. In Theravāda Buddhism altruism is 
for yourself and others, not just others; excluding yourself would not be morally 
good because you yourself are as much a sentient being as others and you should 
not prioritise against yourself or others – the love must be neutral, non-partisan, 
non-discerning and non-attached. This is unlike Śāntideva’s later Mahāyāna 
argument that you need to exchange self and others, you need to see the other as 
yourself as a way of avoiding selfishness but this view would not be acceptable 
for a Theravādin where self and other should be considered equally. Śāntideva is 
more radical in the idea that in giving priority to others you will become happy 
(see BCA 8:129). This might seem to contain a contradiction in that if you start to 
work for the happiness of others in order to become happy yourself then your 
actions are really a form of egoism since the end product seems to be your own 
happiness. However, Śāntideva is quite clear that the normal idea of self is to be 
radically altered to the point where it is entirely exchanged with the idea of others 
and there is then no personal ego-self left. Working for the happiness of others 
and making no distinction between other and self overcomes the idea of acting in 
self-interest. So for Śāntideva the detached form of love involves realising that 
there is no distinction between self and other, and for Buddhaghoşa the more non-
differentiating it is then the closer you are to a non-selfishly motivated form of 
love which is a non-clinging commitment and is to be cultivated.  
 
Action in Buddhism is not just engaged action (or deeds) but also involves speech 
and thought. It is primarily connected to cultivating a state of mind which leads to 
beneficial karma and also an attempt to free oneself from the three defilements 
(kleśa) which keep the wheel of rebecoming turning: greed, hatred and delusion. 
These defilements have three opposites, which are often given as non-greed, non-
hatred and non-delusion and they can act as a kind of antidote to the kleśa. Seen in 
this way, it is clear that action motivated or influenced by greed, hatred and/or 
delusion can be changed by the cultivation of their opposites regardless of the fact 
that these opposites appear, at least superficially, to be passive; in reality they are 
positive and active and it is clear in this interpretation that their cultivation leads 
to positive action. Rather than giving them as purely the opposites of something 
negative, they might be better expressed more positively as giving, loving 
kindness and wisdom. (See Harvey, 2000, p. 47 and p. 60.) Another reason for 
doing this is that confusion has been caused by some interpreters who have been 
misled by the way that positive predicates are sometimes expressed by negating 
their opposites (a widespread feature in Sanskrit) and some have concluded that 
elements of action in Buddhism are driven by negative features. This would be 
redressed by expressing action in positive terms: the opposite of greed is 
generosity (dāna), the opposite of hatred is love (maitrī) and the opposite of non-
delusion is wisdom (prajñā). The important point is that Buddhist ethics is not 
only the avoidance of negative themes or states but also develops through a 
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positive state of mind and positive feelings. It is therefore incorrect to characterise 
Buddhism as practicing an ethic of avoidance. 
 
In terms of purely practical deeds, Buddhists practice giving and there are also 
examples of Buddhists being involved with helping the poor and needy93 as well 
as those with problems which often lead to anti-social behaviour such as drug 
addiction (ibid., p. 109).94 The cultivation of the four brahma-vihārās is also 
central to Buddhist ethics as we have seen before. 
 
In addition to this we have the life of the Buddha to draw from for examples of 
active involvement as we may also do from the life of King Aśoka. This can also 
be seen as an example of ‘active’ Buddhism which might assist in countering the 
view that Buddhism is passive, quietist or involves an ethic of avoidance. Aśoka 
promoted the well-being of sentient creatures through public works, the 
promotion of justice and animal welfare measures amongst other things.95
 
In Mahāyāna Buddhism the aim is complete Buddhahood. The path to this end 
begins with the cultivation of thoughts which are conducive to eventual 
enlightenment, and this is called the Awakening Mind or Enlightenment Mind 
(bodhicitta). Having adopted bodhicitta, the Bodhisattva works on cultivating the 
common six perfections, or pāramitās, (there are ten in total) as the major aspects 
of the path to the realisation of Buddhahood. The six pāramitās are another way 
of interpreting the Threefold Training which groups the constituent parts of the 
Noble Eightfold Path into (1) Wisdom (prajña), (2) Morality (śīla) and (3) 
Concentration (samādhi), where the Perfection of Wisdom corresponds to right 
view and right intention, the Perfection of Morality corresponds to right speech, 
right action and right livelihood and the Perfection of Concentration corresponds 
to right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. What is apparently 
added in Mahāyāna is giving/generosity (dāna), patience (kşānti) and vigour 
(vīrya). The Bodhisattva vow is to strive for the salvation of all other beings - 
which is a form of generosity - and infinite patience and infinite vigour will be 
needed in order to achieve this since it will take countless periods of time. (See 
Schmidt-Leukel 2006b, pp. 99-100.) I think we can assume that these six 
pāramitās are included in the idea of mahākaruňā (great compassion) and in the 
Śikşāsamuccaya Śāntideva says: 
                                                 
93 Harvey notes that ‘Engaged Buddhism’ has been promoted by some Buddhists in recent times 
and its aim is to be more active than Buddhism has been perceived to be in an attempt to ‘improve 
society’ – see Harvey 2000, p. 112. It must also be remembered that positive action in the form of 
practical assistance and protection is offered to other sentient creatures besides humans and their 
societies. 
94 For a contemporary example of Theravādins founding orphanages for the child victims of the 
2004 tsunami see Scotland’s Buddhist Vihara: URL: http://www.tsbv.org.uk/project.htm [04 May 
2008]. 
95 However, King, 1964, claims that Aśoka would not have seen his government as Buddhist but 
was acting ‘in the bounds of the general Indian pattern of social morality’, p. 207, and Spiro, 1971, 
regards ‘Aśokan Buddhism’ as delineable into nibbanic and kammatic forms and of Aśokan 
nibbanic Buddhism he says it is ‘impossible to defend the thesis that Aśokan [nibbanic] Buddhism 
is a bridge to the world’ (p. 431) although he seems to soften on kammatic Buddhism on the same 
page, he does not tie this specifically with Aśoka. I take it from the general context of both King 
and Spiro, as well as what they say more specifically on Aśoka, that they would not regard him as 
a model of an ‘active’ Buddhist or an exemplar of positive, engaged, affirmative Buddhism. I find 
this view, if my interpretation is accurate, difficult to comprehend. 
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the Bodhisattva should not be taught too many things. One virtue 
should be fully mastered and learnt, by him, in which are included all 
the virtues of the Buddha. And what is that ? It is great compassion.’ 
(SS 16:286; Bendall and Rouse, 1971, p. 261) 
 
Compassion is not one of the six pāramitās, but it seems clear that he is saying all 
the virtues of the Buddha are included in compassion. Since prajña (wisdom) is 
one of the pāramitās, this means that wisdom is connected to compassion. From 
this it is clear that wisdom cannot undermine compassion (as, for example, King 
and Spiro argued when they claimed that the enlightened are beyond morality) 
and the two cannot be seen as contradictory. The Bodhisattva understands that 
compassion, then, is central to the Mahāyānin moral life. This is not something 
passive since the Bodhisattva must strive to show compassion for all sentient 
beings.  
 
Compassion, of course, is not exclusive to the Mahāyāna, although it is more 
developed there, but it is still strong in earlier forms of Buddhism. Practical action 
in connection to compassion is found in the first, second and fourth of the Five 
Moral Precepts: refrain from harming living things, refrain from taking what is 
not given and refrain from false speech. Compassion is the motivation for these 
courses of action or, more accurately, fetters on courses of action (see Harris, 
1997) and bearing this in mind it would be difficult to make the claim that 
Buddhist ethics is not something active.  
 
In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Bodhisattva stays in saņsāra in order to help relieve 
sentient creatures from duųkha and this should be seen as something positive and 
active.96 For the Bodhisattva at least, this is a call to positive action and is neither 
passive, quietist or based on avoidance. The only avoidance sought is avoidance 
of duųkha in this life and the avoidance of rebirth. 
 
The assumption that Buddhist ethics avoids moral problems through being quietist 
and passive is based on a misunderstanding of what many Buddhists (including 
the Buddha and Aśoka as well as monks, nuns and lay Buddhists) actually do (as 
discussed above, p. 75); many of their activities have demonstrated that it is active 
and engaged. There is a further misunderstanding of the role of ‘mind training’ in 
Buddhism which does involve elements of the negative in terms of not thinking in 
certain ways but this is directed at making sure whatever is done (in thought, word 
and deed) is good and directed, ultimately, at escaping saņsāra altogether. In this 
one’s actions are extremely important and therefore the ‘negative’ training should 
be seen as an impediment to ‘bad’ or immoral behaviour rather than as an 
indication of passivity or avoidance. 
 
4.3.2 Compassion and Self-Interest 
It has been suggested that compassion is nothing but a form of indirect self-
interest (as we have seen earlier in the examination of Hobbes) and some regard 
this as applicable to Buddhist compassion. However this view is based on a 
misunderstanding of genuine compassion (see Schopenhauer, On the Basis of 
                                                 
96 As Dharmasiri notes, the question for the Bodhisattva is not “Why should I do anything at 
all?...but…Why am I not doing everything possible to help others?” (Dharmasiri, 1989, p. 23). 
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Morality, §13); in other words compassion with egoism at its root is not 
compassion proper and what Mahāyāna Buddhism takes to be compassion is 
devoid completely of egoism and exists in a pure form where the motivation for 
compassionate thoughts and acts is rooted in concern for others and not for self. It 
is a little more intricate in Theravāda Buddhism where compassion and love (two 
of the four brahma-vihāras) are to be directed not just exclusively to others but 
also to oneself. There is no preclusion of self-interest provided it is not directed at 
unwholesome states and it is better if it is directed at wholesome ones: 
 
such bodily conduct as causes unwholesome states to increase and 
wholesome states to diminish in one who cultivates it should not be 
cultivated. But such bodily conduct as causes unwholesome states to 
diminish and wholesome states to increase in one who cultivates it should 
be cultivated. 
(MN 114:5; Ñāňamoli and Bodhi, 2001, p. 914)97
 
The kind of bodily conduct which is regarded as unwholesome includes killing 
living beings or other forms of violence, stealing and sexual misconduct (see ibid., 
114:5, p. 914). The kind of verbal conduct which is regarded as unwholesome 
includes various forms of lying (ibid., 114:5, p. 915) and the kind of mental 
conduct which is regarded as unwholesome includes greed and hate (ibid., 114:5, 
p. 917). Cultivating compassion, empathetic joy and loving kindness means not 
just abstaining from unwholesome states but cultivating the opposite, wholesome 
ones, which is positive and active. 
 
A critic (especially a Western one) may argue that compassion in Buddhism is not 
objectively testable in order to check if the practitioner is acting truly 
compassionately. This may be so, however, a Buddhist who deliberately attempts 
to fool others that they are acting compassionately when they are not will not 
reach enlightenment in this lifetime and will be reborn in one of the saņsāric 
realms which we must assume, if they are a serious practitioner, they seek to 
avoid. Such a person would be clearly wasting their time and they themselves 
would know this, which means it is unlikely that such behaviour would be 
widespread. This leaves a dimension of morality in Buddhism as something 
personal and this is not without precedent in Western philosophy – Aristotelian 
ethics involves moral self-evaluation and a personal journey in cultivating moral 
behaviour.98
 
4.3.3 Compassion and Emptiness 
A specific problem for the Mahāyāna is the relationship of śūnyatā (emptiness) to 
karuňā (compassion). There has been an assumption that emptiness must be in 
                                                 
97 It is the same for verbal and mental conduct, see MN 114:3; Ñāňamoli and Bodhi, 2001, pp. 
913ff. 
98 The self-evaluation comes in deciding, through phronesis (practical wisdom which can only 
come through experience), where your behaviour lies on the line between the two vices which 
constitute a virtue (arête); Aristotle gives the example of the virtue of courage as the mean 
between the two opposed vices of cowardliness and rashness. It is important that all the virtues are 
cultivated and this means knowing how excessive or deficient you are in the practice (praxis) of 
the virtues which leads on to doing something to change your attitude and behaviour until the 
correct mean is struck and becomes an entrenched disposition (hexis). This will vary for everyone 
and in that respect is an objectively untestable personal journey. 
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conflict with the Bodhisattva’s attempt to develop universal compassion since at 
the heart of the teaching is the claim that nothing has essence; if nothing has 
essence then compassion has no essence and is ultimately empty. If that is the 
case then it seems strange that the Bodhisattva would want to cultivate something 
which is ultimately void. In examining this problem it is worth giving a brief 
outline of the background to the emptiness teaching. 
 
One aim of the Bodhisattva is to cultivate wisdom and compassion together. 
Wisdom is encountered as the sixth perfection, the prajñāpāramitā or perfection 
of wisdom in the Aşţasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra where the main teaching is 
that of emptiness. Emptiness is connected to wisdom which comes together with 
compassion, so a true understanding of emptiness, it is argued, is needed in order 
to be compassionate and enlightened. 
 
Emptiness existed as a concept in Buddhism before it was systemised by 
Nāgārjuna and became the defining concept of the Mādhyamaka school.99 
However one important distinction between the Mādhyamaka and pre-Mahāyāna 
schools is that in the earlier schools all apparent phenomena were considered as 
dharmas (constituent factors rather than the Dharma) apparently following one 
another and giving the impression of a flowing reality. Nāgārjuna, however, 
argued that even these dharmas were lacking in svabhāva or essence and therefore 
were not as they might seem. In fact Nāgārjuna goes much further than that and 
argues that every apparent thing is lacking in essence and he includes the assumed 
relations between these empty dharmas, so that what seem to be causal conditions 
(dependent origination) are void as are the supposed phenomena the relationships 
are supposed to link. This means that the causal chains of dependence which 
supposedly give rise to phenomena are empty: ‘Origination and disappearance 
does not obtain for that which is empty’ (MMK 21:9, Streng, 1967, p. 208) and 
the supposed phenomena themselves are ultimately empty: ‘Since there is no 
dharma whatever originating independently, No dharma whatever exists which is 
not empty’ (ibid., 24:19, p. 213). Nāgārjuna thinks the chains and the phenomena 
are empty, which makes the concept of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent 
origination) empty. That is not to say that Nagarjuna does not accept the theory of 
dependent origination – quite the contrary - but, rather, it is useful as a means of 
explanation although it is ultimately empty. In this way the theory of dependent 
origination carries out a task before it is discarded and the task is to explain 
emptiness.100 However Nāgārjuna cautions against holding on to emptiness as an 
explanation and says: ‘emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. [But] For 
whomever emptiness is a view, That one will accomplish nothing.’ (MMK 13:8, 
Garfield, p. 36.)101  
 
In seeing the ultimate voidness of all things, the Bodhisattva breaks the bonds of 
attachment to the world and no longer sees him or herself or others as distinct 
entities or as flows of discernable dharmas. What they are is unexplainable but 
                                                 
99 For example in Sn 1119, SN 22:95; Bodhi, 2000, pp. 951f, MN 121 and 122 cited in Schmidt-
Leukel 2006 p. 116. 
100 Also see Schmidt-Leukel, 2006a, p. 173 and n.137. 
101 Compare Streng’s more ambiguous: “Emptiness is proclaimed …as the refutation of all view-
points; But those who hold “emptiness” as a viewpoint…have called those “incurable” (asādhya).” 
(MKK 13:8, Streng, p. 198.) 
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what they are not is concrete entities constituted by many smaller dharmas 
existing even incredibly briefly. Nevertheless, others continue to see themselves 
as existing individual entities and are attached to this view and therefore 
experience duųkha. The Bodhisattva has taken a vow to help relieve all sentient 
creatures of duųkha and must consequently stay in this world to help those still 
experiencing the painful illusion. 
 
On account of the destruction of the pains (kleśa) of action there is release; 
For pains of action exist for him who constructs them. These pains result 
from phenomenal extension (prapañca); but this phenomenal extension 
comes to a stop by emptiness. 
(MMK 18:5; tr. Streng, 1967, p. 204) 
 
Alternatively: 
 
Action and misery having ceased, there is nirvāňa. 
Action and misery come from conceptual thought. 
This comes from mental fabrication. 
Fabrication ceases through emptiness. 
(MMK 18:5, tr. Garfield, 1995, p. 48) 
 
The Bodhisattva has to operate at two levels of understanding: one where s/he 
wants to save all sentient beings and another where s/he is clear that there are no 
sentient beings to save or be saved. The idea that ultimately there are no beings is 
an expression of śūnyatā and therefore a form of wisdom (the perfection of 
wisdom) and the idea that the multitudes of beings need to be saved is an 
expression of compassion. The task of the Bodhisattva is to hold these two ideas 
together. Śūnyatā, wisdom and compassion are thus inseparably linked. The 
connection to the not-self teaching is easy to see in the light of the emptiness 
teaching: if everything is empty then ultimately so is the idea of self and of others 
– although conventionally they seem real enough. 
 
4.3.4 Compassion and the Not-self Teaching 
In Mahāyāna ethics by the time of Śāntideva there is a striving to recognise that 
not only is there no difference between self and others (BCA 8:136) but there is 
an exchange between the two to the point where they become indistinguishable. If 
the insight of the interchangeability of self and others (ibid., 8:120) is achieved 
then the idea of self-interest motivated by egoism becomes impossible. Egoism is, 
then, transcended completely as a result of the teaching that an individual self is 
illusory and as such is not to be clung to but to be let go of in the light of the 
greater truth of the inseparability of ‘self’ and others. 
 
However, it is difficult to give a convincing explanation of the not-self teaching 
whilst at the same time believing in rebirth, if the assumption is that not-self is 
equal to some kind of non-existence which would result in there being nothing to 
be reborn. There are some who take this view and argue that a belief in rebirth is 
not necessary in order to consider oneself a Buddhist (see Schmidt-Leukel 2006a, 
p. 150 and n.25). However, there is only a point to their objection if we take the 
term ‘self’ as referring to any sort of individual continuity and this is not what the 
not-self teaching says. It says we should not consider anything as our possession 
nor identify ourselves with the eternal ātman of the Brahmanists. (See MN 22 – 
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especially 22:15 and 22:22-29.) The Buddha explains that nothing is permanent, 
whether it be possessions or the possessor, and in that sense it is only those who 
are misled or do not understand the Buddha’s teachings who identify with 
concepts such as ‘mine’, ‘my’, ‘I’ and to ‘their’ possessions. The concept ‘I’ or 
‘me’ refers to a collection of five aggregates (skandhas)102 and he explains that 
even they are not to be clung to if one wishes to be enlightened: 
 
a well-taught noble disciple becomes disenchanted with material form, 
disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with 
formations, disenchanted with consciousness…Being disenchanted, he 
becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion [his mind103] is liberated. When 
it is liberated…He understands: ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been 
lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any 
state of being.’ 
(MN 22:29, Ñāňamoli and Bodhi, pp. 232-3) 
 
Elsewhere, when directly asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta if there was a self, 
the Buddha was silent and remained so when directly asked if there was no self. 
He says he did this since he did not want to give the impression that he agreed 
with either eternalists or nihilists (SN 44:10). His refusal to give an answer either 
way is confirmed by Nāgārjuna: ‘neither ‘individual self’ nor ‘non-individual self’ 
whatever has been taught by the Buddhas.’ (MMK 18:6; Streng, 1967, p. 204).  
 
The Buddha was not only silent about the concept of self, but also about the 
concept of existence after enlightenment which refers to the ‘selfhood’ of a 
Tathāgata104 (MN 63). This (and his silence on the im/permanence of the world) is 
revisited by King Milinda in his conversation with the monk Nāgasena.105 In this 
conversation Nāgasena explains that the reason the Buddha did not answer the 
question was because ‘there is no reason or object for answering such questions’ 
(Mhp 4:2:4-5, Rhys Davids vol. I, pp. 204-6) and that such questions should be 
‘laid to one side’ – i.e. not answered: an idea Wittgenstein was later to employ. 
Earlier in the discussion he had explained that ‘Nāgasena’ was nothing but a label 
or ‘designation in common use’ which stood for the five skandhas but that no 
permanent core of his being could be found (ibid., 2:1:1, pp. 40-5). However, the 
Buddha appears to have been less forthcoming about the nature of self. 
 
As we have seen, in Theravāda Buddhism what appears as phenomena (and what 
we might then take to be a ‘self’) is nothing but consecutive dharmas. However, 
this is precisely where the Mādhyamika radicalises not-self into śūnyatā 
(emptiness or voidness) by arguing that a dharma cannot be analysed since it 
cannot be reduced or dissected into any final essence. In fact, they argue, even if it 
had an identifiable beginning middle and end and we took one section of it to 
examine, we would find yet another beginning middle and end to examine ad 
infinitum. The Mādhyamaka conclusion is that there is no way of explaining 
continuity if all we find in ever smaller moments are more sub-moments which 
never lead us to the shortest moment. This renders the so-called shortest moment 
                                                 
102 Which are (1) material form (rūpa), (2) feeling (vedanā), (3) perception (sañña), (4) mental 
volitions or formations, (saģkhāra) and (5) consciousness (viññaňa). 
103 Translator’s square brackets. 
104 A fully liberated or enlightened one. 
105 Although not originally a Mahāyāna text it is accepted by the Mahāyāna. 
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empty; there is no origination or decay, no object and in fact nothing describably 
concrete whatever. Not only is there no stable self in this example but nothing has 
a stable self, not a single dharma exists with svabhāva (essence), as a mental or 
bodily dharma according to this theory. Śūnyatā, therefore, is the radicalisation of 
the not-self doctrine into the theory that no dharma whatsoever has any sort of 
self-nature and if that is the case then there are no processes, since they cannot 
exist, and there is nothing to be processed. 
 
This leaves us with a kind of answer to the question of anātman and rebirth, which 
is that the Buddha was not talking about self as complete non-existence, and for 
the Mādhyamaka he was not talking about it as existence either, nor as both nor 
neither. The problem only arises if the assumption is that the Buddha had taught 
that not-self means nothing (which he expressly refused to say) and it is not at all 
clear that this is what is meant by the anātman doctrine. 
 
There is more to be said on Śāntideva’s specific treatment of the not-self teaching 
in relation to the śūnyatā teaching and this will be covered in the next chapter. 
 
Page 83 of 173 
  
 
Chapter 5: Śāntideva’s Account of the Bodhisattva Ideal 
Introduction 
In this chapter I would like to look at the structure of Śāntideva’s works (the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra and the Śikşāsamuccaya), and to examine the way he deals 
with egoism and self-interest as well as how self-interest becomes interest in 
others then the exchange of self with others. Following on from the previous 
chapter, I also intend to examine how he reconciles emptiness (śūnyatā) with 
compassion (karuňā) as the aims of the Bodhisattva. In quoting from translations 
of the Bodhicaryāvatāra I have specifically cited those which seemed to me to 
offer the greatest clarity and contextual consistency.  
 
Before beginning an examination of what Śāntideva thought, it would be useful to 
describe a little about his background to help locate him in the broader Mahāyāna 
philosophy. To that end it would be helpful to, firstly, give a brief outline of 
Mahāyāna Buddhism and the particular school Śāntideva followed. 
 
5.1 Mahāyāna Buddhism  
Before what we now call Mahāyāna Buddhism could be identified, there were 
several schools of Buddhism in existence, only one of which now remains: 
Theravāda or the ‘Old Wisdom’ School, sometimes known as ‘Southern 
Buddhism’. The pre-Mahāyāna schools came to be considered by the Mahāyāna 
as inferior vehicles to enlightenment (needless to say this view was not shared by 
the schools in question) and inevitably contrasts between them and the Mahāyāna 
need to be drawn to illustrate the important differences. Before doing so, it should 
be noted that all forms of Buddhism do share certain features – otherwise they 
would be unclassifiable collectively as ‘Buddhist’. Shared features include the 
Four Noble Truths, The Eightfold Path as a means to escape from duųkha, the 
Five Moral Precepts and the not-self or anātman doctrine are all generally agreed 
upon, perhaps with different emphases, by all Buddhists. (See Conze, 1974, p. 
122.) 
 
Despite these shared concepts, differences do exist and I hope to bring some of 
the more important ones out in what follows. This is not an exact science, 
however, and there are areas where some ideas and doctrines which we normally 
associate with Mahāyāna Buddhism have their roots elsewhere.106 This makes 
exact lines of demarcation between Mahāyāna and other forms of Buddhism 
impossible, and rather than seeing this as a hindrance to having a coherent 
overview of Mahāyāna Buddhism, it is, I feel, more in keeping with what I 
understand the Buddha to have taught: the teaching of the Dharma is not set in 
stone and should not result in any kind of inflexible viewpoint. There will always 
be a certain level of personal interpretation involved in understanding Buddhism, 
and there is no clear delineation between the various strands of thought which 
constitute Buddhism on the whole. Be this as it may, there are several kinds of 
Buddhism which share enough collectively to be described as ‘pre-Mahāyāna’ and 
those who would share the description ‘Mahāyāna’ and I would like to briefly 
outline what I think is salient for our discussion, beginning with the Mahāyāna’s 
                                                 
106 For example in the Mahāsāņghika. 
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unclear origins. 
 
It is difficult to find solid evidence of the genesis of the Mahāyāna: when it began, 
exactly at what point Buddhists regarded themselves as adherents of its doctrines 
and, in fact, when those doctrines first appeared. (See Williams, 1989, pp. 1-40 
and in Crosby and Skilton, 1998, p. xiii as well as Harvey, 2000, p. 123.) It seems 
that there was no revolution or division in pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism leading to the 
birth of the Mahāyāna. It appears more likely that its evolution was gradual, 
coming from strands of thought already in existence amongst some pre-Mahāyāna 
Buddhists.  
 
It is possible, to a limited extent, to trace its development through scriptural texts 
but this is highly problematic in terms of chronology since the original Sanskrit 
texts are undated, some have been translated back into Sanskrit from other 
languages at a later time, some originals are lost and many texts are still 
untranslated. It would not be appropriate here to go into that discussion since I am 
less concerned with its overall historical development than with what it seems to 
have embodied specifically for one particular Mahāyāna thinker: Śāntideva. 
 
The Mahāyāna believe that one crucial difference between themselves and pre-
Mahāyāna Buddhists is that the latter aim for Arhatship whilst the Mahāyāna aim 
for complete Buddhahood through following the Bodhisattva path. The Arhat 
seeks self-enlightenment while the Bodhisattva seeks the emancipation of all 
beings from duųkha and saņsāra. They aim to become enlightened themselves 
simply as a stepping-stone to alleviating the duųkha of others (AP 15:2, Conze, 
1970, p. 108 and 1974, p. 128). The Arhat and Pratyekabuddha107 are seen by the 
Mahāyāna as less able to assist in alleviating the sufferings of others than the 
Bodhisattva, who regards the self-liberation of the Arhat as limited and that of the 
Pratyekabuddha as lacking in compassion since he does not pass it on. In fact, 
even in early Buddhism the Bodhisattva, although not yet treating compassion and 
wisdom as equal, was regarded as more refined than the Arhat (see Harvey, 2000, 
p. 123.) 
 
This interpretation of the Bodhisattva is, however, a Mahāyānin one. Some pre-
Mahāyānins differ as to the nature of the Bodhisattva, and their view of him is 
based around the idea that he is an historical incarnation of the Buddha, is more of 
an idealisation than a real person and that there is only one Buddha per world 
system (AN 1:15).108 A Mahāyāna interpretation sees the Bodhisattva as one 
amongst countless numbers of wise and compassionate beings motivated by a 
wish to benefit all sentient creatures and that everyone has it in them to be a 
Buddha.  
 
Another feature of what we now call the Mahāyāna is that they accept(ed) the 
existing scriptures of the pre-Mahāyāna Pāli Canon, but felt that their own 
writings would supplement this. 
 
                                                 
107 One who reaches enlightenment alone, without teachers, and does so for the benefit of 
him/herself. 
108 See AN 1:15:10, DN 19:13-14 , Mhp II, IV:6:4-9, pp. 47-51. Not all pre-Mahāyāna schools 
accepted this though – for example the Mahāsāņghikas disputed this idea. 
Page 85 of 173 
5.1.1 Mādhyamaka 
As mentioned earlier (p. 82) the Buddha, when questioned, had sometimes 
remained silent since he did not want to appear to side with either eternalists or 
nihilists (SN 44:10 and Mhp 4:2:4-5). This refusal influenced a later Indian 
Mahāyāna development, somewhere around the second century CE, which also 
avoided extremes by taking the ‘Middle Way’ between them. This middle way, or 
Mādhyamaka,109 lent its name to a school within Mahāyāna Buddhism which 
Śāntideva followed. This school utilised literature which can be described as 
specifically Mahāyānin (in that it does not belong to the Pāli Canon), primarily 
those early sūtras concerned with prajñāpāramitā (the Perfection of Wisdom), 
one of the oldest probably being the Aşţasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra or 
‘Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines (or Verses)’. 
 
The first Mādhyamika philosopher of profound importance was the school’s co-
founder110 Nāgārjuna, who has become probably the most significant Mahāyānin 
philosopher and whose work was of great influence on Śāntideva.111 In the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way) Nāgārjuna 
adopts a style of argument which aims at refuting the opponent’s position through 
logical inference, which at times causes an infinite regression and renders the 
interlocutor’s argument absurd or meaningless. Whilst doing so he is careful to 
maintain a non-position himself (although this interpretation is not universally 
accepted, see Williams, 1989, p. 63).112 Śāntideva later adopts this style as well as 
the other central tenets of Mādhyamaka philosophy, which I will explain shortly 
and offer an analysis of how they fit into Śāntideva’s overall scheme of thought. 
 
5.1.2 Yogācāra 
Besides the Mādhyamaka there have been several other schools within Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, and the main alternative which emerged was the Yogācāra School.113 I 
do not intend to give an outline of the central philosophies of this school since it 
would be surplus to our central enquiry, however, it should not be seen as a static 
entity which comes chronologically after a static and easily definable 
Mādhyamaka school. Although the Mādhyamaka existed prior to the Yogācāra 
they both developed over time, side by side and sometimes as a result of 
opposition and perhaps even confluence. Within the Mādhyamaka there 
developed different methods of philosophical engagement such as the Prāsaģgika 
and Svātantrika. 
 
5.1.3 Prāsaģgika and Svātantrika 
Śāntideva’s philosophical method follows that of what later Tibetan Buddhists 
referred to as the Prāsaģgika Mādhyamaka school in that he uses the same 
                                                 
109 Also known as the Śunyavada (‘Emptiness’ or ‘Voidness’) School. Conze (1974) depicts the 
School as adopting the middle way between ‘affirming and denying’, p. 124. 
110 Tradition has it that the school was founded by Nagarjuna and one of his students, Aryadeva. 
111 Nāgārjuna as an historical person is defined usually by his authorship of the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.  
112 There is also a method of expressing śūnyatā which is positive. See Ratnagotravibhāga 
Mahāyānaottaratantra Śāstra. 
113 Also known as Cittamātra or Vijñānavāda since it saw reality as ‘Mind (citta)’ or as 
‘Consciousness (vijna)’ and has been linked to some of the much later German Idealist 
philosophies in the West. 
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reductio ad absurdum method as the earlier Nāgārjuna.114 When it comes to 
philosophical discussion, the reductio is favoured since we cannot demonstrate 
anything positively. The Svātantrika might be seen as slightly more moderate: 
they did not reject the reductio - it was an important tool for them - but they 
allowed for some more positive intermediary stages.115 However, these terms 
were not used until later, when Mahāyāna Buddhism made its way into Tibet. 
 
5.1.4 Following the Bodhisattva Path 
Mahāyāna thinkers and practitioners tried to explain, in some detail, how to 
become a Bodhisattva and these ‘instructions’ developed as did the philosophy. If 
we can regard compassion in early Buddhism as merely one of the four brahma-
vihāras, by the time of the Mādhyamaka (at least in Śāntideva) compassion plays 
a much more significant role.116  
 
With the Bodhisattva rather than the Arhat becoming the role model for early 
Mahāyāna Buddhists, it is clear that the training and understanding required to be 
a Bodhisattva would have to supplement that already in existence. The training 
follows what becomes known as the Bodhisattva path.  
 
The Bodhisattva concept was in existence from early times and should not be seen 
as coming about only with the rise of the Mahāyāna. The Bodhisattva path 
becomes, for the Mahāyāna, a crucial means to eventual complete Buddhahood 
and going well beyond the aims of the Arhat. It should also be remembered that 
compassion, which later becomes the central feature of Mahāyāna Buddhism, was 
not unimportant for early Buddhists – recall its place as a brahma-vihāra in pre-
Mahāyāna Buddhism and the fact that it does feature in numerous important ways 
in pre-Mahāyāna texts (see, for example, SN (as karuňā) 6:1:1:560, p. 233, 16:3, 
p. 665, 46:54:4 p. 1610; (as anukampā) 4:11:471, pp. 203-4, 16:3, pp. 665-6; MN 
4:21, p. 104, 4:34, p. 107, 12:63, p. 177 and 31:22, pp. 305-6).  
 
Even within the Mahāyāna, the idea of compassion is not that developed early on, 
but out of the Bodhisattva ideal it develops to become the central, one, principal 
virtue which the Bodhisattva needs in order to also have wisdom. But in the 
classical list of the six perfections (pāramitās), compassion is not there.117 An 
explanation is needed as to how and why compassion came to occupy such a 
prominent place in the thinking of the Mahāyāna and I intend to explain this 
through the works of the Prāsaģgika Mādhyamika poet, monk and philosopher 
Śāntideva. 
 
5.1.5 Historical Background to Śāntideva 
Little of Śāntideva’s life is known with certainty, and there is a lack of concrete 
evidence as to exactly where he was born or the dates he lived. The general 
                                                 
114 Although Nāgārjuna is not credited with identifying that method as distinct. The later 
Buddhapalita, in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna, is normally given this status and the still later 
Candrakīrti’s support of him (against Bhavaviveka’s criticisms) is seen as a source of the 
delineation between the Prāsaģgika and Svatrantika. 
115 See Conze, 1974, pp. 124-5 and for a more detailed treatment see Lopez, 1987, pp. 55-81. 
116 Conze (p. 100) regards the brahma-vihāras  as ‘one of the seeds of the early Mahayana’. 
117 The Lotus Sutra (Saddharmapundarika), lists the Six Perfections as dāna (generosity), śīla 
(morality), kşānti (patience), vīrya (vigour), dhyāna (concentration) and prajñā (wisdom). 
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consensus at the moment is that he was born with a different name somewhere in 
what we now call Northern India,118 and died in the 8th century CE.119 Legend has 
it that he was the son of a king and renounced the life of a prince (a recurring 
feature in Buddhist hagiographies), to become a student of the teacher 
Mañjuvajra. After a vision of the Tathāgata Mañjuśrī (who embodies wisdom 
(prajña) – the other major element of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics besides 
compassion), he went to work for a king in Madhyadeśa, taking the name 
Acalasena. After some unverifiable adventures he became a monk at the Nālandā 
monastery120 and assumed the name ‘Śāntideva’. (See, Obermiller, 1986, from 
which this historical account largely comes. Also see Clayton, 2006, pp. 33-44 for 
other sources.)  
 
How long Śāntideva spent in Nālandā as a monk is not known, and the story goes 
that he was always deep in meditation which caused some of the other monks to 
suspect that he might be lazy and inattentive to his studies. They decided to test 
his knowledge and asked him for a recitation whereupon he offered them three of 
his own compositions from which to choose: the Sūtrasamuccaya the 
Śikşāsamuccaya and the Bodhicaryāvatāra.121 They chose, on his 
recommendation, the Bodhicaryāvatāra, and when he reached Chapter 9 (The 
Perfection of Wisdom or Understanding), he disappeared122 and no-one is sure 
what happened to him next or when he died – again, accounts vary.123
 
There are, however, some features of Śāntideva’s life which find broad agreement 
amongst scholars. For example, there is agreement that he was a monk and 
philosopher of the Mādhyamaka school, although this is not entirely without 
dispute (see Clayton, op. cit., p. 33 for suggestions of Tantrism) and that he was a 
follower of the Prāsaģgika method used in debate to refute opposed views through 
a process of reductio ad absurdum previously employed by both Nāgārjuna and 
Candrakīrti – two other major names of the Mādhyamaka school.124
 
Even if there is dispute surrounding the authorship of the Sūtrasamuccaya, there 
appears to be none of any note with regard to Śāntideva’s composition of the 
Śikşāsamuccaya and his authorship of the Bodhicaryāvatāra although the 
authenticity of parts of the latter have been questioned. (See Crosby and Skilton, 
1995, pp. xxx-xxxiv.) 
                                                 
118 Clayton (op. cit., p. 34 n.5, after Obermiller, 1996) has it at Gujarat in North West India. 
119 There are various possibilities of his birth being anywhere from c.650 to c.725 CE. See 
Clayton, ibid., p. 32. 
120 This university/monastery was situated in today’s Indian state of Bihar, south east of its capital 
city Patna. 
121 For a discussion on Śāntideva or Nāgārjuna as possible authors of the Sūtrasamuccaya see 
Clayton, 2006, pp. 36-7. Some, for example Ruegg, 1981, p. 84 are quite unequivocal that 
Śāntideva was not the author of the Sūtrasamuccaya, which, in any case, has not survived. It has 
also been suggested (by Williams, Clayton amongst others) that the Bodhicaryāvatāra might have 
been known as the Bodhissattvacaryāvatāra and see Clayton, 2006, pp. 38 and Crosby and 
Skilton, 1995, p. xxxii for a discussion on the chronology of these compositions. 
122 Williams has it at BCA 9:34 and Clayton at BCA 9:3. 
123 For example, Batchelor believes he was tracked down and asked to return to Nālandā but 
refused, renounced his monastic vows and continued his life as a lay person. 
124 Although Aryadeva is considered co-founder with Nagarjuna of the Mādhyamaka school and 
Buddhapālita has been mooted as a possible founder of the Prāsaģgika method. (See Williams, 
1989, pp. 57-8.) 
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5.2 The Bodhicaryāvatāra in Translation 
Before making any claims about the structure of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, it must be 
noted that recent scholarship has raised doubts about the work originally existing 
in its present form. If this is the case then the current structure may not be what 
Śāntideva had intended: ‘we can…look at the present Sanskrit text with the 
understanding that its original structure may well have been obscured by later 
editorial activity.’ (Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. xxxiii.)125
 
Despite this, the Bodhicaryāvatāra does have a certain structure whether 
Śāntideva intended it in its current form or whether it has been made that way by 
subsequent editing. What can be said with certainty about the structure is that it is 
arranged in chapters which are intended to help the practitioner develop the 
‘Awakening Mind’ (bodhicitta),126 and that it closely follows the six Bodhisattva 
perfections or pāramitās which are covered in five of the ten chapters of the 
book.127 The first two pāramitās, giving (dāna) and morality (śīla) are covered in 
Chapter 5 ‘The Guarding of Awareness’; the third pāramitā, patience or 
forbearance (kşānti) is covered in Chapter 6 ‘The Perfection of Forbearance’; 
vigour (virya) is covered in Chapter 8 ‘The Perfection of Vigour’; concentration 
(dhyāna) is found in Chapter 8 ‘The Perfection of Meditative Absorption,’ and the 
last pāramitā, wisdom (prajña) is covered in Chapter 9 ‘The Perfection of 
Understanding’. The other five chapters can be outlined as covering: (Chapter 1) 
‘Praise of the Awakening Mind’, (Chapter 2) ‘Confession of Evil’, (Chapter 3) 
‘Adopting the Awakening Mind’, (Chapter 4) ‘Vigilance Regarding the 
Awakening Mind’ and (Chapter 10) ‘Dedication’. 
 
In Appendix 1 (p. 162) I have provided a table with various translations of the 
chapter titles, which give an overview of the modern structure which I intend to 
use in what follows. 
 
5.2.1 Structural Outline of the Bodhicaryāvatāra  
The Bodhicaryāvatāra is a guide to the path of awakening for a Bodhisattva. The 
journey to Bodhisattvahood has to begin somewhere and the starting point could 
be seen as just an embryonic wish to be enlightened out of compassion for other 
creatures (BCA 1:6-8, 11, 18, 22). Having such a wish can be seen as the very 
beginnings of the conditions which are necessary to develop a full and proper 
attitude which will end, ultimately in complete Buddhahood. Having the kind of 
attitude which is conducive to becoming a Bodhisattva is bodhicitta and the first 
chapter is concerned with adopting the awakening mind (bodhicitta-parigraha). 
Bodhicitta comes in two forms: firstly as an initial intention to work for the 
welfare of others (all the way to complete Buddhahood) and secondly to actually 
do so (ibid., 1:15, 24, 26-7, 29, 35). Awakening bodhicitta is the birth of altruism, 
and in explaining this, Śāntideva asks the question (at the beginning of the 
                                                 
125 Crosby and Skilton also point out that the work we have ended up with is symmetrical in 
having ten chapters but asymmetrical in not allocating one chapter to each pāramitā since the first 
two pāramitās have to share a chapter. (See Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. xxxiv.) 
126 Crosby and Skilton caution the reader against over-reliance on this literal translation and 
suggest in some cases s/he should consider ‘Enlightenment Thought’, ‘Enlightenment Attitude’ or 
‘the will to attain Awakening’ (1995, p. xxxvi). Batchelor, 1979, renders bodhicitta ‘the 
Awakening Mind’ and both Kelsang, 2002, and Berzin, 2004, leave it untranslated. 
127 The Tun-huang recension has nine chapters. 
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Bodhicaryāvatāra) how do people become altruistic?  
 
Such a being, unprecedented, an excellent jewel, in whom there is 
born a concern for the welfare of others such as others have not even 
for themselves, how is he born? 
(BCA 1:25, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 7) 
 
The person he is talking about is the Bodhisattva who is on her/his way to 
becoming a Buddha. This person, in whom there is a primary concern for the 
welfare of others rather than for themselves, comes about with the realisation that 
concern only for their own liberation from suffering produces only more suffering 
(ibid., 1:28) and if such a person realises that their own liberation is tied up with 
that of others, then they will want to become truly concerned with the welfare of 
others. This is connected to what he says later in Chapter 8:129: 
 
All those who suffer in the world do so because of their desire for 
their own happiness. All those happy in the world are so because of 
their desire for the happiness of others. 
 
Why say more? Observe this distinction: between the fool who longs 
for his own advantage and the sage who acts for the advantage of 
others. 
 
For one who fails to exchange his own happiness for the suffering of 
others, Buddhahood is certainly impossible – how could there even be 
happiness in cyclic existence? 
(BCA 8:129-31, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, pp. 7-8) 
 
So the Bodhisattva is one who, at some point, recognises that attempts to find 
happiness for oneself only will result in more suffering. This occurrence is the 
generation of the seed of bodhicitta. Generating bodhicitta is fundamental to the 
path of the Bodhisattva, and Śāntideva talks about the discovery of bodhicitta 
(ibid., 1:5, 6) reflecting on how, previous to its discovery, his life had been 
attended with unwholesome behaviour (ibid., 2:28) which he now renounces. The 
Bodhisattva determines to leave negative or unwholesome thoughts and deeds 
behind (ibid., 2:29-31, 34, 37, 38, 42, 47, 49, 53, 63-5) and vows to devote all his 
energy to the protection and assistance of all sentient beings as others have before 
him (ibid., 2:49, 54). He then explains what this practice will entail (ibid., 3:7-15, 
17-24), how to become a Bodhisattva through generating bodhicitta (ibid., 3: 23-
28) and then how to begin doing so (ibid., 4:1-6, 12, 17, 23, 38-44, 47, 48). 
 
In Chapter 5 he briefly outlines the perfections (pāramitās) of generosity (ibid., 
5:9-10, 42, 83, 85) and morality (ibid., 5:11, 42, 47),128 and their importance to the 
Bodhisattva training (ibid., 5:1-8) before turning to the actual Guarding of 
Awareness (samprajanya-rakşaňa) where he reminds himself of the vow taken 
earlier (ibid., 5:84, 97, 102) and warns that the clarity of mind needed to be a 
Bodhisattva is under threat principally from anything which causes distraction 
(ibid., 5:16). In fact any distracting thoughts at all are to be guarded against if the 
                                                 
128 Although it does not seem apparent in v. 47 in Crosby and Skilton (1995, p. 38) it seems clear 
that this is connected to morality in other translations, viz Berzin, 2004, Kelsang, 2002 and 
Batchelor 1979.  
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Bodhisattva is to maintain the resolve needed to act in the right way (BCA 5:16, 
35). Propelled by a resolve to fulfil the Bodhisattva vows while maintaining 
mindfulness (smŗti) and constant vigilance, is conducive to perfecting giving 
(dāna) and morality (śīla). 
 
He says that we should consider ourselves as a block of wood (ibid., 5:34, 48, 50-
3) when confronted with anything which might distract us, and in this way we can 
avoid responding to such distractions. This has to result in practical behaviour 
which will help oneself and others; there is little point in just reading words (ibid., 
5:109). 
 
Everything which has been thus far achieved in the Bodhicaryāvatāra can be 
easily undone by the defilement of hatred or anger. Śāntideva thinks that the way 
to avoid the damage anger can do is to cultivate its opposite, which he takes to be 
patience (kşānti). Chapter 6, then, deals mostly with anger (dosa) and its 
avoidance through the cultivation of patience or forbearance (kşānti). The 
defilements are not the only trap lying in wait for the trainee Bodhisattva; there is 
also the possibility that he might find the path so challenging that it becomes 
unenjoyable and that leads to a kind of deflation or disheartenment which would 
obviously be detrimental to the practice of bodhicitta (Chapter 7). A remedy for 
this is for the practitioner to remember they should try to enjoy the path and to try 
to keep sight of the kinds of things which often follow disheartenment or 
weariness such as the self-loathing that comes with making less progress than you 
had intended and general feelings of laziness and defeatism. Chapter 7 can be seen 
as dealing with maintaining your morale, which might dip through losing sight of 
why you undertook the Bodhisattva vow and/or the drudgery of repeatedly 
striving. Śāntideva suggests you counter this by remembering your vow, by 
inspiring confidence in yourself, by enjoying working for the benefit of others and 
by knowing when to back off and relax rather than pushing yourself so hard that 
you undermine your efforts through exhaustion. 
 
Śāntideva returns to bodhicitta in Chapter 8 which is primarily concerned with 
meditation or getting the mind right for the activities of the Bodhisattva. I will 
deal in some detail with this chapter below but, in brief, the first half of the 
chapter is concerned with the rejection of habits of thinking which lock one into 
identification with a personal ‘self’ and with ‘others’ as separate and substantially 
existing entities (ibid., 8:1-89). Most of the second half is concerned with 
cultivating bodhicitta through meditating on the equality of self and others, then 
through exchanging self and others (ibid., 8:90-173). This has a connection to 
Chapter 9 in that not only is there no substantially existing ‘self’, there is no 
substantiality at all in anything. This is the śūnyatā or emptiness teaching which is 
the pinnacle of the prajñāpāramitā or perfection of wisdom which aims at 
permanent liberation through the understanding of emptiness tied to the 
cultivation of full and genuine compassion. This is the vision of the Bodhisattva 
and the aim of the path which begins with bodhicitta. 
 
Finally, Chapter 10 comes in the form of a dedication, which might be interpreted 
as a form of giving or generosity (dāna) since the Bodhisattva hands over his 
learning to others free of charge and for their benefit as well as for the benefit of 
all sentient beings.  
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Chapters 8 and 9 are most important to my enquiry since the former deals with the 
reasons for the cultivation of compassion and the latter deals with the cultivation 
of wisdom – the two central virtues of the Bodhisattva. 
 
5.2.2 The Route to Compassion in the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
There are many ways in which one could analyse the structure of the main chapter 
dealing with meditation (Chapter 8) in the Bodhicaryāvatāra depending on what 
you are looking for in the Chapter. For example one might be trying to find the 
structure which Śāntideva intended,129 one might be looking for a clear 
delineation of Mahāyāna and pre-Mahāyāna meditation techniques, one might be 
searching for examples of skilful poetry or any number of other reasons. For my 
purposes I see it as consisting of six distinct stages: (1) vv. 1-8 set the scene by 
advising us that both body and mind will be distracted if they are not prepared 
properly for meditation; (2) vv. 9-38 concentrate mostly on preparing the body for 
effective meditation; (3) vv. 39-89 concentrate mostly on preparing the mind for 
effective meditation; (4) vv. 90- 119 deal with the first part of the actual 
meditation, which consists of considering the equality of oneself and others; (5) 
vv. 120-73 deal with the second part of the meditation which consists of reflecting 
on the exchange of self and others and (6) vv. 174-86 is a recap on the need to 
overcome distracting desires and make the effort required to focus on the 
appropriate meditation. 
 
It seems to me that there are two main points to the meditations: the first is aimed 
at seeing the equality between oneself and others and the second at exchanging 
self and others. The most important part, therefore, for my enquiry concerns BCA 
8:90-119 and 120-173, since it is at these two points that Śāntideva tries to explain 
why we should develop compassion to the extent that we work solely for others, 
and how we should do so. The purpose of meditating on the sameness of yourself 
and others is to show that other sentient beings are just like you when it comes to 
their wish to avoid duųkha and to experience happiness.  
 
5.2.3 Equality of Self and Others (BCA 8:90- 119) 
As we have seen (above, p. 62) compassion is something which does not come 
naturally to everyone and also varies in intensity from person to person. It is 
something which, if it is considered important, has to be cultivated and, since it 
plays such an important part in Mahāyāna Buddhism, it is given special attention. 
Two major reasons as to why it occupies this position of importance for 
Śāntideva, is that it is done in emulation of the Buddha, who was the purest 
expression of compassion, and that it is not possible to be a fully enlightened 
Bodhisattva without developing and understanding compassion proper. With 
regard to the second point, it is possible to be enlightened but not compassionate 
enough to teach others the Dharma as in the example of the Pratyekabuddha (cf. 
Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 86) who has achieved a form of solitary 
enlightenment. This is unlike Śākyamuni Buddha who was enlightened and 
compassionate in that he taught the Dharma instead of keeping it to himself and it 
is this that the Bodhisattva wants to follow. There is a third reason we need to 
                                                 
129 Which is probably pointless since this chapter, above all others, appears to have been modified 
through subsequent editing - see Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 77. 
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cultivate compassion and that is because, for the Mādhyamaka, the realisation of 
true compassion does not occur automatically when one realises that there is no 
metaphysical difference between self and other.130 Since it does not occur 
automatically on this realisation it has to be cultivated and its cultivation is central 
to Chapter 8. 
 
The guidance on training oneself in true compassion comes in the form of 
techniques for, firstly, calming the mind and, secondly, developing bodhicitta 
which makes the mind conducive to the aims of the meditation. The calming of 
the mind is a very important preparation for what is to come and the first part of 
Chapter 8 is devoted to achieving this. To begin the process which will hopefully 
lead to generating bodhicitta, Śāntideva exhorts the reader to find solitude in order 
to be able to concentrate properly without the distractions of other people. If you 
are distracted then you will be unable to develop meditative concentration 
properly and will not achieve your goal (BCA 8:1-4). Association with others 
causes more than simple distraction, it can cause thoughts of comparison and 
competition which lead to feelings of superiority and inferiority, which strengthen 
attachment to unwholesome and useless things and take one far away from the 
behaviour sought (ibid., 8:9-24). Śāntideva continues his advice on achieving 
bodily solitude (up to BCA 8:38) then turns his attention to the solitude of the 
mind (ibid., 8:38-89) in preparation for the meditations to come. 
 
Evidently there are external and internal distractions: the physical presence of 
other people who might make noise, for example, is an external distraction and 
the desire for the opposite sex is an example of an internal distraction.131 Going to 
an isolated place such as a forest cures the former but the latter requires 
meditation.  
 
To give a brief summary of this section, Śāntideva concentrates on our strong 
attachment to the physical form in various ways and in an attempt to break this 
form of attachment, he focuses on how disgusting this object of desire can be; 
whether as a dead and rotting corpse (ibid., 8:30) or in some of the natural bodily 
functions which are commonly held to be repellent: 
 
If you do not want to touch something such as soil because it is 
smeared with excrement, how can you long to touch the body which 
excreted it? 
(BCA 8:58, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 93) 
 
If you have no attachment for what is foul, Why do you 
sexually embrace another (body): 
The seed of which grew from a field (full) of excrement 
And was nourished by it. 
(BCA 8:59, Berzin, 2004) 
 
He does not focus solely on the others, but turns the focus inward to show that all 
the disgusting things which he has just identified also apply to our own bodies. 
                                                 
130 This is not the case for the other major branch of mainstream Mahāyāna – the Yogācārins.  
131 Śāntideva talks explicitly about a man’s desire for a woman but we could equally regard this as 
‘bodily desire’ of any kind. 
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This is one point where a comparison of equality is made with others and he 
wants us to see that there is no difference between ourselves and another creature 
which, like us, is temporal (BCA 8:30, 31, 45, 63, 70, 82), comes from ‘filth’ 
(ibid., 8:56, 57, 59, 60, 63), generates excreta (ibid., 8:49, 58), and is essentially 
an animated bag of skin-covered bones (ibid., 8:30, 31, 32, 43, 48, 51, 52, 57, 63, 
70), only briefly separated from death and the various stages of decomposition 
and which is nothing but putrefying meat on its way to being turned into more 
excrement by vultures! (ibid., 8:45, 47, 53, 54, 56). 
 
When shall I go to the local charnel ground and compare my own 
rotting body with other corpses? 
 
For this body of mine will also turn putrid in that way, its stench so 
vile even the jackals will not slink near. 
 
Even the bits of bone born together in this single body will be 
scattered apart; how much more so other people one holds dear? 
 
You have plenty of filth of your own… 
 
That you do not understand your own body to be formed from filth is 
astonishing! 
(BCA 8:30, 31, 32, 53, 56; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, pp. 90-2) 
 
The comparisons between self and others are not only in terms of how much 
living people share a wish to experience happiness and avoid suffering – we also 
share the fact that we decay and rot and that we come from ‘filth’ and will return 
to it.  
 
The deconstruction of the desired one into a temporal body and a mind which 
cannot be properly apprehended (BCA 8:55), serves to illustrate that the strong 
carnal desires most humans experience are really for something idealised rather 
than ultimately real. The object of our desire is a temporary physical form which, 
when analysed, turns out to be disgusting when alive, repulsive when dead and 
not substantially existing. Meditating on this is intended to turn our thoughts away 
from this strong urge and remove this distraction in order to allow the mind to 
concentrate with greater purity. 
 
One more way Śāntideva tries to neutralise desire is by showing that a man (the 
perceived audience is male) is prepared to put himself in danger (ibid., 8:40, 42, 
77, 78), risk appearing foolish (ibid., 8:77), waste money (ibid., 8:71, 72, 79) and 
effort (ibid., 8:72, 73, 74, 80, 82) in order to satisfy this desire for what turns out 
to be something at best temporary132 and at worst disguised foulness. In fact, even 
if the man manages to satisfy these desires, he will be disappointed to find that the 
enjoyment is nothing but a small moment in his life which itself is temporary: 
 
                                                 
132 Pausanias’ speech from Plato’s Symposium comes to mind here when he explains that there is a 
basic and coarse kind of love which is for the body only. Plato’s intention here was to show that 
this is a temporary love since one guarantee is that the body will decay and good looks will be lost. 
For Plato, attachment to anything physical is ultimately pointless since it will decay. (Symposium, 
180e-182a.) 
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For those prey to passion such misery is abundant, whereas enjoyment 
is paltry, like snatches at bits of grass made by a beast as it draws a 
cart. 
(BCA 8:80; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 95) 
 
For the sake of that paltry taste of pleasure… 
This hard-to-find splendor of respites and endowments  
Is destroyed by those who waste their (good) karma.133
(BCA 8:81; Berzin 2004) 
 
In the end, following such desires is simply not worth the effort as far as 
Śāntideva is concerned and it would make more sense to concentrate on 
something more productive:  
 
This exhausting effort is made for all time for the sake of a puny body 
which inevitably dies, which falls into hells and other low realms. 
 
With a fraction even one hundredth of a billionth of that effort one attains 
Buddhahood. For those who follow their passions the suffering involved is 
greater than the suffering on the Path, and there is no Awakening. 
(BCA 8:82-3; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 95) 
 
Schopenhauer is of a very similar opinion when he says that men134 are prepared 
to undergo all manner of avoidable dangers simply in order to follow their 
animalistic urges, thus satisfying the will of Nature and burdening their own 
existence with even more problems than they had previously and all for temporary 
pleasure. (PP2, §153, Payne, 1974, pp. 293-5.)135
 
After this intensely emotionally charged passage, Śāntideva returns to the 
tranquillity and calmness of the forest, where the trainee Bodhisattva can be alone 
and unvexed by internal or external considerations and can begin the meditation 
‘proper’ on equality of self and others (BCA 8:89-119). 
 
He begins this meditation by asking the now calm and undistracted practitioner to 
consider the fact that suffering and happiness are experienced by all (and we can 
include animals as well as humans) and that others should be looked after as you 
would look after yourself (ibid., 8:90). He explains that if part of your own body 
is in pain then you will automatically, and without thinking, cover it and protect it 
with your hand. If we consider all sentient creatures collectively to be one vast 
organism then it would seem strange if the ‘hand’ did not protect another part of 
                                                 
133 Compare Crosby’s and Skilton’s, I think, slightly less clear ‘For the sake of that snatch of 
enjoyment…this momentary good fortune which is extremely hard to find [being reborn as a 
human] is lost by one lost to their destiny.’ (BCA 8:81; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 95.) 
134 This passage is wrongly taken by some to be misogynistic – Schopenhauer blames nature not 
women. 
135 Schopenhauer considers our will to continue through sexual intercourse as the strongest primal 
drive in us. What essentially happens is that the will dupes the intellect which gives rise to a man 
being prepared to undergo all manner of avoidable problems to satisfy the sexual impulse which 
they would hardly do were they to think rationally. According to Plato, Sophocles, in old age and 
no longer having sexual desire, said ‘To my great delight, I have broken free of that, like a slave 
who has got away from a rabid and savage master.’ (Republic 329c, tr. Waterfield, 1994, p. 5). 
Plato puts this into the mouth of Cephalus. 
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the organism which was suffering. The reason this does not happen, of course, is 
that we tend to individualise rather than collectivise our bodies and mental 
activities. But Śāntideva wants to say that another’s suffering is just like yours and 
you should help them as you would yourself (BCA 8:93-96). At this point it 
seems that an imaginary objection is made in that others are in fact not you so 
their suffering does not need to affect you therefore there is no need to care about 
their suffering (ibid., 8:97-8). Śāntideva responds that the hand protects the foot 
even though the hand is not in pain (ibid., 8:99), and if we remember his previous 
analogy of all beings as one organism (ibid., 8:91) then it would seem strange if 
one part did not protect another part from suffering and the only reason not to see 
it this way is because of the mistaken idea of an existent self. Furthermore, 
suffering should be removed simply because it is there regardless of who it affects 
(ibid., 8:102) and no one would question its removal and applicability to every 
sentient being: ‘If one asks why suffering should be prevented, no one disputes 
that! If it must be prevented, then all of it must be.’ (BCA 8:103, Crosby and 
Skilton, 1995, p. 97). 
 
There then follows the argument that if one person’s suffering can hamper the 
suffering of the many then they should take that suffering on (BCA 8:104-5). He 
gives the example of Supuşpacandra who was tortured and killed by King 
Śūradatta but accepted this fate, leaving the King so full of remorse that he 
completely stopped such behaviour and worked towards a better life which 
eventually saw him reborn as the historical Buddha Siddhartha Gautama (ibid., 
8:106).136 In the long term Supuşpacandra’s suffering was one of the catalysts 
which resulted in the spreading of the Dharma through the activities of 
Śākyamuni Buddha. Such people as Supuşpacandra who are prepared to suffer 
agonies that others may not, even to the point of having to endure existence in the 
lowest realm of rebirth, are happy to take on the misery of others since they do not 
see them as any different to themselves: 
 
Those who have developed the continuum of their mind in this way, to 
whom the suffering of others is as important as the things they 
themselves hold dear, plunge down into the Avīci hell as geese into a 
cluster of lotus blossoms. 
 
Those who become oceans of sympathetic joy when living beings are 
released, surely it is they who achieve fulfilment. What would be the 
point in a liberation without sweetness? 
(BCA 8:107-8; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 97) 
 
Śāntideva warns that people like Supuşpacandra should be neither smug about 
contributing to the liberation of others nor sad about their suffering. They should 
not be looking for a personal reward either and their actions should be driven 
purely by concern for the welfare of others (BCA 8:109, 116). The point here is 
that it would miss the point to think that ‘I’ liberated ‘them’ or ‘I’ am deserved of 
praise, since the focus is not on ‘I’ or even ‘they’ since all are an equal collective 
whole. He has not got to the point, yet, of saying that self and other are 
exchangeable, only that they are equal and one should not be motivated by a self-
                                                 
136 The story of Supuşpacandra is taken from the 35th chapter of the Samādhirāja Sūtra.See. See 
Crosby and Skilton, 1995, n.8.106, p. 177. 
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interest which ignores the plight of others or which assists them in order to attain 
glory or to cynically generate good karma for oneself. In fact he is moved to 
remind us at this point that others should be as accepted as self (BCA 8:110-15).  
 
Finally, he explains that if you accept the equality of self and others then you 
should extend your wish for your own freedom from duųkha to others and that 
‘compassion should be practised towards the world’ (ibid., 8:117; Crosby and 
Skilton, 1995, p. 98). One can cultivate the disposition to think in this way 
through practice until it becomes a normal way to think rather than something 
strange or to be feared (BCA 8:119). 
 
5.2.4 Exchanging Self and Others (BCA 8:120-173) 
Now Śāntideva moves from equalising self and others to exchanging self and 
others. Near the start of this section he explains that some people are so obsessed 
with themselves and their own welfare that they use other beings for their own 
selfish ends by killing them (animals, 8:122, close relatives, 8:123), robbing them 
(8:122) and/or stealing from the saģgha.137 Such people, he says, are destined to 
burn in the lowest realm of saņsāra and it would be unwise to cultivate such a 
personality, never mind protect and guard it. At this point he moves from 
considerations of the short-sightedness of selfishness to the rewards138 of working 
for the welfare of others (BCA 8:125) regardless of the consequences: 
 
By oppressing another for one’s own sake, one is roasted in hells, but 
by oppressing oneself for the sake of another, one meets with success 
in everything. 
 
A bad rebirth, inferiority, and stupidity result from the mere desire for 
self-advancement. By transferring that same desire to others, one 
achieves a good rebirth, honour, and intelligence. 
(BCA 8:126-7; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 99) 
 
Transposing oneself in place of another guarantees personal success; failure to do 
so guarantees failure (BCA 8:128). Success and happiness come through working 
for the benefit of others; failure, servitude (BCA 8:128) and unhappiness come 
from working only for your own happiness: 
 
All whosoever who are happy in the world 
Are (so) through the wish for the happiness of others;  
While all whosoever who are miserable in the world  
Are (so) through the wish for the happiness of themselves. 
(BCA 8:129, Berzin, 2004) 
 
Although we are not to be motivated by rewards when acting in an altruistic 
fashion, it seems there are many rewards to come for so doing!  
 
So far it has been nothing but assertion on Śāntideva’s part and he moves to the 
                                                 
137 And more figuratively, from the Buddha or the Dharma – Batchelor’s translation is the ‘Triple 
Gem’, BCA 8:123, p. 119, Crosby’s and Skilton’s is the ‘Three Jewels’, p. 99, and Kelsang’s is ‘a 
spiritual community’, p. 133. 
138 Although rewards should not be the motivation for selfless acts: see BCA 8:109. 
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level of argument now139 where he considers this ‘self’ that the selfish person is so 
attached to. He sees a strong identification with the idea of self as the source of 
the recurring duųkha of the world and it is not difficult to see that the person who 
kills animals140 causes duųkha for animals; the person who kills humans causes 
duųkha for humans; the person who steals and lies for self advancement causes 
duųkha for those he has stolen from and lied to. All such suffering is caused 
because the selfish person clings strongly to the idea of their own separate self 
and the separate selves of others. If they did not think this way then they would 
not act in ways which cause the kinds of duųkha Śāntideva identifies. 
 
The calamities which happen in the world, the sufferings and fears, 
many as they are, they all result from clinging onto the notion of self, 
so what good is this clinging of mine? 
 
If one does not let go of self one cannot let go of suffering, as one who 
does not let go of fire cannot let go of burning. 
(BCA 8:134-5; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 100) 
 
It is at precisely this point that Śāntideva takes his position a step further and says 
that the way to relieve all suffering - that of myself and of other sentient beings – 
is to recognise that there is no difference between the two: 
 
Therefore, in order to allay my own suffering and to allay the 
suffering of others, I devote myself to others and accept them as 
myself. 
(Ibid., 8:136, p. 100) 
 
Returning to the theme of the Bodhisattva vow (see p. 77) he declares that since 
the relationship to others is so strong and unbreakable, from now on he will only 
be concerned with the welfare of others (BCA 8:137).141
 
We are then invited to meditate on the way the world appears to someone who has 
a strong identification with a ‘self’ which they pit against ‘others’ (ibid., 8:138-9). 
There are several perspectives from which to do this and Śāntideva suggests we 
start from that of an ‘inferior’ person (ibid., 8:140) who is inferior because of their 
lack of virtue (ibid., 8:42-6), their lower rebirth, their social standing or material 
wealth (ibid., 8:147). The imagined person is consumed with jealousy as he 
compares himself to a ‘superior’, and dreams of the superior’s downfall and 
mockery (ibid., 8:148-50). He even goes as far as thinking that after such a 
                                                 
139 After some further descriptions of the difficulties in store for the selfish person, BCA 8:130-3. 
140 Including using them for food or medicine, v. 122. This is clearest in Kelsang’s translation, p. 
133 and Batchelor’s translation, p. 119. 
141 At least this is the sense I make of the various translations of this verse and I take Crosby’s and 
Skilton’s translation to be the most appropriate since the link to the Bodhisattva vow seems 
clearest there. Compare Crosby’s and Skilton’s ‘Hey Mind, make the resolve, ‘I am bound to 
others’! From now on you must have no other concern than the welfare of all beings’, (BCA 
8:137, 1995, p. 100) to Berzin’s ‘O mind, decide for sure, “I'm under the governance of others.” 
Except for the welfare of all limited beings, You're not going to have other intentions now.’ (BCA 
8:137, 2004). I take the last half of Kelsang’s to be in the same spirit as Crosby’s and Skilton’s: 
‘From now on, mind, you must understand this clearly And not think of anything Other than 
benefitting all living beings.’ (BCA 8:137, 2002, p. 136.) Similarly Batchelor’s is in the same vein: 
‘Now, except for benefitting every creature, You must not think of anything else.’ 1979, p. 122. 
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person’s comeuppance, any food he is given (we may assume he is comparing 
himself to another monk) should be stolen, leaving him with just enough to 
survive (BCA 8:153). The superior person obviously has a strong sense of self 
identity since he seems to enjoy being fêted (ibid., 8:141-2) and feeling superior 
to others (ibid., 8:145-6) but he is castigated for this self-identification, an attitude 
which is at the root of suffering for all:  
 
O mind, because you wish to benefit yourself, 
All the hard work you have done 
For countless aeons in samsara 
Has resulted only in suffering. 
(BCA 8:155; Kelsang, 2002, p. 138) 
 
Comparing oneself to others, as either an inferior, superior or both, is a result of 
self-thinking and self-striving, which leads to duųkha and rebirth. It is short-
sighted and ultimately pointless. If the imaginary person had understood in a 
previous life that self and other should be exchanged so that there were no longer 
feelings of ‘self’ and ‘others’, then the current suffering he imagines would not 
exist. (BCA 8:157). When someone is attached strongly to a notion of self, they 
forget that they did not spontaneously appear in this world but came into being as 
a product of the union of their parents. There is no independent origination and to 
imagine you are an autonomous self is illusory and goes against the facts. To be 
more in tune with reality, you might want to acknowledge, as a first step, that you 
are born of two others and are not entirely and independently distinct from them. 
Just one more leap of the imagination could lead you to accept that you have a 
connection to other beings too. Śāntideva puts this in a slightly different way 
(although the outcome is the same) when he says (ibid., 8:158) that you have no 
problem identifying with yourself despite the fact that it took the semen and 
blood142 of others to create you, so you should not find it too difficult to imagine 
that others are you. It follows that if others are you then anything you do should 
be for others and not this imaginary isolated ‘self’ (ibid., 8:159): 
 
Therefore, just as you’ve placed the sense of a “me”  
Onto drops of the semen and blood of others,  
Likewise, make it a habit (of placing it)  
Onto those of others as well. 
(BCA 8:158; Berzin, 2004) 
 
Acting as the other person, take away from this body every useful 
thing you see in it, and use that to benefit others. 
(BCA 8:159; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 102) 
 
If it seems that others are unhappy but that I am happy, then I should pass my 
happiness to them and take on their unhappiness. In this way I can show that I am 
prepared to exchange myself with others (BCA 8:161). If other people make 
mistakes or transgress in some way then exchanging self for others means I 
should take the blame for what they have done, whereas if I have done something 
praiseworthy I should pass the credit to others and by such actions show that I 
have no attachment to self (ibid., 8:162-4). I would also want the negative 
consequences of any of my previously selfish acts to be applicable only to me and 
                                                 
142 Blood refers to the mother. 
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in that way reroute the pain I caused back to myself and away from others (ibid., 
8:165). Recognising others as oneself is possible because the idea of ‘self’ is itself 
a construct. Śāntideva explains that a construct which is restricted to self has no 
more foundation than one which includes others as oneself.  
 
The next phase of the meditation involves an undertaking to keep the mind in 
check lest it return to its old habit of assuming there is a self, which we have 
already seen is the cause of all duųkha (ibid., 8:167-173). There then follows a 
reminder or summary (BCA 8:174-86 in Crosby and Skilton, vv. 174-87 in 
Batchelor, Kelsang and in Berzin) that bodily desires are an ultimately 
disappointing distraction (BCA 8:174), that the ‘self-cherishing mind’ is always 
dissatisfied (BCA 8:176), that being non-attached is fruitful (ibid., 8:177), that 
there is good reason to be non-attached since the body is disgusting (ibid., 8:178) 
and temporary (ibid., 8:179) and ultimately the cause of personal suffering (ibid., 
8:180) and that those who want to look after the interests of their bodies because 
they are attached to them ought to realise that they are also attached to others and 
so we should look after their interests: 
 
Those who are fond of this body are said to be my friends. Why are 
those who are fond of their own body not also dear to me? 
(BCA 8:183; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 104) 
 
The unattached person has no compunction about giving their body away (in 
terms of its use) to others since it will be used to work for their well-being (BCA 
8:184). 
 
Finally there is a revisiting of the Bodhisattva vow to work tirelessly for the well-
being of other sentient creatures and never to give in to distractions or weakness 
of any kind (BCA 8:185-6) and to meditate on what will give the highest level of 
clarity (ibid., 8: 186/7).143
 
A very simplified encapsulation of this chapter is that we start with physical and 
mental preparation for the meditation, we meditate on the transitory and 
unappealing nature of our bodies and the distracting desires of our minds, then we 
realise that we are equal to, not better than, others and that attachment to self is 
the cause of all the problems in the world. Non-attachment to self means not 
despising self but exchanging anything good about it for the sufferings of others 
and in that way making the best contribution we can to the ending of existing 
duųkha and ensuring that you do not contribute to the creation of duųkha in the 
future.  
 
5.2.5 The Route to Wisdom in the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
Śāntideva’s most concentrated treatment of prajña (wisdom, understanding or 
insight) is found in Chapter 9 of the Bodhicaryāvatāra. It would not be possible to 
definitively explain this complicated and much debated chapter, and I merely 
offer an outline of the route Śāntideva takes to explain the perfection of wisdom 
and the place of compassion. He explains that prajña is concerned with reality as 
                                                 
143 Kelsang has this as ‘the correct view of emptiness’ (p. 144) while Crosby and Skilton have it as 
‘the proper object’ p. 104 and both Berzin and Batchelor have it as ‘the perfect object’ ( p. 130. in 
Batchelor). 
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it actually is rather than the way it superficially appears to us. The former is 
described as Ultimate Truth and the latter Conventional Truth. Śāntideva thinks 
that many people suffer because they mistake conventional truth for reality and 
are therefore misguided. If they are misguided then their aims and efforts are 
mistaken and this produces duųkha. The properties of a misguided notion of 
reality contain the idea that there are substantially existing entities which do not 
depend on other entities or factors for the conditions of their apparent existence 
(thus giving them a form of permanence). Śāntideva wants to refute this idea and 
his reason for doing so is that he believes any kind of identification with 
substantial entities or permanence constitutes a falsity which might be the object 
of unwholesome grasping. Unwholesome grasping causes duųkha and the person 
who grasps will experience duųkha. The Bodhisattva, then, if he is to fulfil his 
vow to work for the welfare of all sentient beings, must lead people to ultimate 
truth. Ultimate truth for the Mādhyamaka consists of the fullest expression of 
emptiness (śūnyatā). In order to be truly compassionate, then, the Bodhisattva 
must teach that all things are void of essence and ultimately empty. Compassion 
itself is empty of essence (svabhāva), as are nirvāňa, saņsāra, duųkha and 
anything else taught in Buddhism. This is not to say that such things do not exist, 
but, rather, that they exist at the level of conventional truth only. The perfect 
understanding of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) illuminates the emptiness of these 
things, and compassion for the suffering of others motivates the Bodhisattva to 
explain emptiness to them in order that they be free from duųkha. Wisdom and 
compassion coalesce in the Bodhisattva who is the insightful and compassionate 
bridge between the worlds of conventional and ultimate truth. In this way the 
Bodhisattva embodies prajña and karuňā. 
 
As for the structure of this chapter, it seems that, after a brief mention of the topic 
of prajña (BCA 9:1), Śāntideva wants to explain the two truths (ibid., 9:2-8, 106-
11) then to refute possible objections on the way to telling the story of perfecting 
prajña (ibid., 9:9-105). He counters non-Buddhist objections (ibid., 9:60-9, 126-
37)144 and objections from alternative Buddhist schools (ibid., 9:11-59, 102-5)145 
on the way to explaining the prajñāpāramitā. This chapter is marbled with 
arguments which reject any positive point of view and instead lead to the 
conclusion that all things are devoid of essence and are therefore śūnya (ibid., 
9:31-2, 40, 48, 52-55, 138, 151, 167). He concludes by imploring everyone to 
understand the meaning of śūnyatā (ibid., 9:154-65) and, motivated by 
compassion, undertakes to teach it to all living beings (ibid., 9:166-7). 
 
5.2.6 The Perfection of Wisdom: An Outline of Prajña 
Śāntideva begins by saying that everything he has written in the preceding 
chapters is in accordance with the teachings of the Buddha, and that it has been 
necessary to cover the areas concerned in order that the reader be receptive to the 
perfection of wisdom. The areas covered in preparation for Chapter 9 follow five 
of the six pāramitās: dāna (generosity), śīla (morality), kşānti (patience), vīrya 
(vigour), dhyāna (concentration). Chapter 9 itself concerns the sixth pāramitā of 
prajñā (wisdom). Anyone who wishes duųkha to cease entirely should try to gain 
                                                 
144 The identifiable ones being the Brahmanic schools of Sāņkhya (BCA 9:60-7, 126-37) and 
Nyāya-Vaiśeşika (BCA 9:68-9). 
145 The identifiable ones being Yogācāra (BCA 9:11-34, 102-5) and unspecified pre-Mahāyāna 
(BCA 9:9-10, 38-59). 
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this last perfection (BCA 9:1) having attained the preceding five which pave the 
way for prajña. 
 
In any attempt to attain wisdom it must be noted that it comes in two forms: one 
conventional (or relative) and the other ultimate. Most people are already 
acquainted with conventional truth since it is the most common kind of truth and 
informs us of every day things. Every day things include objects which are 
commonly held to be perceived by a subject, and in this sense the conventional 
world is dualistic. A dualistic world is one where perceiver and perceived are 
divided and where it is therefore easy to distinguish between self and others. 
Strongly distinguishing in this way is more conducive to egoism than altruism and 
is not in keeping with what has been taught in Chapter 8. Śāntideva here wants to 
explain that most people have no idea of ultimate truth and are locked into a habit 
of thinking which is conventional and sees others as relative to, and sometimes in 
conflict with, oneself. 
 
Breaking away from this habit of thinking is difficult to do and Chapter 8 
demonstrated meditational foci which can assist us in overcoming it. Part of the 
reason it is difficult to overcome this way of thinking is that the alternative, 
ultimate truth, is impossible to explain and may be impossible to comprehend 
(BCA 9:2). To stay in the conventional way of thinking is to do nothing to end 
suffering both for oneself and for others, and to break out of it means not 
accepting things as they appear but using critical analysis of the conventional 
world to show its falsity. If it can be shown to be false in some areas then 
attachment to it can be weakened and once so, the subject will be more amenable 
to an alternative explanation. This explanation cannot be comprehensive since the 
śūnya nature of ultimate truth renders it unexplainable. If we can understand the 
emptiness teaching then we can see that accepting conventional truth is an 
erroneous way of thinking and will leave the subject (thinker) always at the mercy 
of suffering; the product of differentiation and ignorance.146 Śāntideva says that 
those who do not follow the emptiness teaching but hold alternative views can be 
refuted (ibid., 9:3). He sets out to do this in later verses by challenging selected 
alternative views. I do not intend to give a point by point account of every 
argument in this chapter, however, I would like to examine how Śāntideva argues 
for śūnyatā and how he reconciles śūnyatā with karuňā. 
 
5.2.7 The Arguments for Śūnyatā 
Śāntideva says that, on conventional examination, things appear to have certain 
properties such as permanence and independent existence. These properties exist 
only as a result of the way we commonly think, and if we thought differently then 
things would appear differently: 
 
Even the objects of direct perception, such as visible form, are only 
established by popular consensus and not by a valid means of knowledge. 
That consensus is wrong… 
(BCA 9:6, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 115) 
 
Thinking differently begins by examining the things we commonly take to be true 
                                                 
146 Differentiation can be associated with both greed and anger/hatred and ignorance with delusion: 
the three defilements. 
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and finding that they are not the way we had assumed. On close inspection it turns 
out that they are devoid of essence and that we had imposed properties on them 
through attachment. It is difficult to let go of attachment to things, especially to 
the notion of a self, but Śāntideva argues that the self is not real and is essenceless 
like everything else. Once the self and other things can be let go of and the strong 
impulse to unwholesome attachment is broken, we can see the voidness of all 
phenomena and concepts. 
 
Both the Buddha and Śāntideva used conventional means when teaching (indeed, 
there is no other way) and this afforded unenlightened people a starting point, or 
something to go on, as they entered the path which leads from rebirth and duųkha 
towards enlightenment (BCA 9:7-8). There is no contradiction in using 
conventional language to explain that conventional truth is false and, in fact, using 
conventional language is the only option available. This becomes an important 
feature of the Prāsaģgika Mādhyamika dialectic, which, at times, takes the 
opponent’s own argument to a logical extreme which fatally challenges the 
argument, thus showing the emptiness of an opponent’s position. Using 
conventional means is therefore crucial to convincing others that they are in error 
(and helping to save them from duųkha) as long as they also understand that there 
is a superior truth to the conventional one (ibid., 9:8). 
 
Having explained the two truths, Śāntideva now embarks on a discussion with 
opponents which is intended to lead to the conclusion that the prajñāpāramitā, the 
perfection of wisdom, is emptiness. I have omitted details of the discussion 
between Śāntideva and the Nyāya-Vaiśeşika (ibid., 9:68-9) and also with the 
Sāņkhya school (ibid., 9:60-7, 126-37). I have included details of the supposed 
rebuttals of the pre-Mahāyāna and Yogācāra schools, but what I offer is not a 
comprehensive analysis of that debate. What I have included is strictly relevant to 
śūnyatā and karuňā only. 
 
5.2.8 Debate with the Pre-Mahāyāna 
A question is asked by a pre-Mahāyānin Buddhist who wants to know how a 
person can be reborn if they are only an illusion (ibid., 9:9). Śāntideva’s reply is: 
 
Even an illusion persists for as long as the concurrence of its causes. 
How does a being truly exist simply because there is a continuum of 
states that last a long time? 
(BCA 9:9, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 116) 
 
Śāntideva’s answer, then, is twofold: firstly he means that as long as illusions are 
produced and believed to be real then they will be seen to be reborn. The second 
part of his argument is more complex and seems to be an attempt to undermine 
the position traditionally attributed to the pre-Mahāyānin questioner. This position 
that ‘a person is a continuum of states that lasts a long time’ is a reference to the 
idea that a ‘person’ is a series of consecutive dharmas (see above p. 80) and 
Śāntideva wants to point out that this has no foundation. All things are empty and 
in transition for the Mādhyamaka and that includes any idea of a ‘self’ constructed 
from consecutive dharmas. In connection to this he had earlier referred indirectly 
(ibid., 8:98) to a passage in the pre-Mahāyāna Milindapañha, where Nāgasena 
talks about whether or not the grown man is the same as he was as a child, and it 
Page 103 of 173 
turns out that he is neither the same nor different. (See Mhp 2:40-41, Rhys 
Davids, 1925, pp. 63-5). Śāntideva focuses on the idea that they are not different 
and says: 
 
The notion ‘it is the same me…’ is a false construction, since it is one 
person who dies, quite another who is born. 
(BCA 8:98, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 96) 
 
In other words any idea that I am a series of consecutive dharmas might lead me 
to act in ways which are intended to help the future (not yet born) ‘me’ but I do 
not realise that this idea is mistaken. The future me is a projection in the mind of a 
being with no essence and in that sense is doubly unreal. In the meantime there 
are sentient creatures which suffer (since they do not realise that self is empty) 
and the pre-Mahāyānin should be helping them rather than helping a future self 
which is as yet unborn. He says:  
 
If I give them [others] no protection because their suffering does not 
afflict me, why do I protect my [future] body against future suffering 
when it does not afflict me?  
(Ibid., 8:97, p. 96) 
 
He is saying that the suffering of the imaginary future ‘me’ does not affect the 
‘me’ of now so why should I be so discriminating in making provision for ‘him’ 
instead of helping others who suffer at the moment. There is no difference 
between yourself and other persons, and it is just a matter of habit that people 
think there is. In this way rebirth is connected to altruism.  
 
Later (ibid., 9:35-9) Śāntideva and the pre-Mahāyānin continue with a different 
discussion which initially centres on the fact that the Mādhyamika do not accept 
even the consciousness of the Buddha as ever having had essence. The pre-
Mahāyānin asks what good it does to try to emulate something which has no 
consciousness be it a Bodhisattva or a Buddha. The reply is that it is the act which 
is important, whether or not there is a consciously existing Bodhisattva or 
Buddha. Some of our actions are the result of things which were initiated long 
ago, perhaps before we were born, and by other people. The reason for the action 
does not therefore have to be connected to a mind or consciousness existing or 
non-existing now or in the past; as long as a Buddha or Bodhisattva seems to have 
existed, the idea will have influence and serve a purpose.147
 
Both the pre-Mahāyāna and the Mādhyamaka agree on the salvific power of 
understanding and acting on the Four Noble Truths. The former wants to know 
what the point of the emptiness teaching is if one can become enlightened without 
                                                 
147 This is the best sense I can make of vv. 35-39. Perhaps an alternative example may help. It is 
generally accepted that the god Thor is no longer worshipped since the Nordic religions have died 
out. No one now would seriously believe in Thor and pray to him. Nevertheless, at the time when 
he was thought to exist, people prayed to him and assumed their prayers were being answered or 
denied. This influenced their behaviour notwithstanding the fact that there was no Thor all along. 
They were praying to nothing in reality but they were still praying to something even if it was just 
an idea of Thor. It does not make much difference if they were moved to act by an ‘empty’ idea or 
a real god since the result would be the same. Although, of course, no Bodhisattva is a god and 
neither was the Buddha. 
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it, i.e. liberation can be achieved through the Four Noble Truths alone and in that 
respect the emptiness teaching is superfluous (BCA 9:40). Śāntideva responds by 
saying that it is written in (Mahāyāna) scripture that we need to understand 
emptiness as well as the Four Noble Truths (ibid., 9:40). The pre-Mahāyānin 
questions the credibility of the Mahāyāna scriptures by pointing out that since 
they are new (relative to the pre-Mahāyāna scriptures), they are not firmly 
established; furthermore, since the pre-Mahāyāna scriptures are accepted by the 
Mahāyāna they might as well do for both schools! (ibid., 9:41). Śāntideva replies 
that at one time pre-Mahāyāna scripture was also new and not firmly established 
but that did not stop people accepting it as true! 
 
A discussion on scripture, tradition and established and non-established 
viewpoints ensues (ibid., 9:41-4) but need not detain us here. However, near the 
end of v. 44, Śāntideva says that anyone who considers themselves to be 
enlightened but who still shows signs of attachment, cannot be as enlightened as 
one who shows no such signs: ‘Even the Enlightenment of those whose minds 
grasp onto entities is imperfectly established’ (BCA 9:44, Crosby and Skilton, 
1995, p. 119). ‘Those whose minds grasp onto entities’ is a reference to the 
Arhat148 and Śāntideva’s position is that following the Four Noble Truths does 
result in a form of enlightenment, but that form is not as developed as that of one 
who understands the ultimate emptiness of everything including the Four Noble 
Truths. That person is, of course, the Mādhyamika Bodhisattva. Śāntideva thinks 
if the Arhat meditates on anything less than emptiness then he will not be 
completely letting go. Not completely letting go is a sign of attachment and 
attachment is manifested in all or some of the defilements, which ensures 
rebirth.149  
 
Without emptiness a mind is fettered and arises again, as in the 
meditative attainment of non-perception. Therefore one should 
meditate on emptiness. 
(BCA 9:48, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 120) 
 
The Mādhyamaka seek a permanent abandonment of ‘manifest illusions’, and pre-
Mahāyāna ideas of ‘self’, even at the level of concurrent dharmas, is seen as an 
example of a manifest illusion which the pre-Mahāyāna still hold on to. (Also see 
BCA 9:51.) 
 
In vv. 56-9, Śāntideva uses the familiar pre-Mahāyāna argument that no self can 
be found in an examination of any part of the body in order to explain the 
Mādhyamaka idea that the self is empty.150 With no self, no being exists because, 
                                                 
148 It could also include the Yogācāra who believe ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ exists permanently. 
149 For example, being attached to any notion of permanency might be seen as self-interested and 
therefore linked to the defilement of greed. Any notion of permanency is, as far as Śāntideva is 
concerned, a sign of delusion – another of the three defilements. 
150 For example, in the pre-Mahāyāna Milindapañha, the monk Nāgasena is asked ‘Do you mean 
to say that the hair is Nāgasena…Or is it the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the 
bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the spleen, the lungs, the larger 
intestines, the lower intestines, the stomach, the faeces, the bile, the phlegm…[etc.]…the brain, or 
any or all of these, that is Nāgasena?...Is it the outward form…the sensations…the ideas…the 
confections…or the consciousness that is Nāgasena? And to each of these also he answered no.’ 
(Rhys Davids, T.W., (tr.) 1925, London: Oxford University Press, Book II:26, p. 42.) 
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having analysed the various constituent parts of a person (BCA 9:56-9, 74, 78-
82), no changeless thing is discovered.151 I think the general thrust of this is that 
since the pre-Mahāyāna do not fear the consequences of meditating on not-self, 
why should they fear the consequences of meditating on empty-self and empty 
phenomena? Their ‘failure’ to do so is the reason Śāntideva thinks they are not 
entirely letting go of attachment. 
 
5.2.9 Debate with the Yogācāra 
The Yogācārins agree to a certain extent with the Mādhyamaka regarding 
emptiness, but one important difference between the two is that the Yogācārins do 
not agree that everything is empty, and say that emptiness cannot be applied 
successfully to the idea of a mind (citta) or consciousness (vijñā). If a mind is 
essenceless, and therefore void, then there is no point to morality since no 
immoral actions really happen except at the level of illusion: ‘If consciousness 
does not exist, then there is no evil in, for example, murdering an illusory man.’ 
(BCA 9:11, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 116.). Śāntideva counters this with: 
‘good and evil arise when one is endowed with the illusion of consciousness.’ 
(ibid.) In other words, you will still be ‘killing’ an illusion and it is here that 
morality is seen. Morality exists in the conventional world and the conventional 
world is real to people who are deluded enough to think it is and that means 
killing is still an immoral act.152
 
The Yogācārin believes that for the illusions to even appear, they must be the 
objects of a cognising mind therefore that mind cannot be non-existent. If all 
supposed phenomena are not in reality existent then the Buddha and his 
enlightenment are non-existent and present themselves only at the level of illusion 
(BCA 9:13-14).153  
 
[Cittamātra] If one liberated according to ultimate truth remains subject to 
cyclic existence according to conventional truth, then, in that case, even a 
Buddha would be subject to cyclic existence. So what is the point of the 
path of conduct leading to Awakening? 
(BCA 9:13-14, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 116) 
 
Śāntideva’s reaction is that anything still in cyclic existence is there because the 
conditions which make it so are still existent. These conditions are a result of the 
                                                 
151 ‘Teeth, hair, or nails are not a “me”; Nor am “I” bones or blood…neither mucous nor phlegm; 
And nor am “I” lymph or pus…“I” am not fat or sweat; Nor am “I” even lungs or a liver. “I’m” 
not any of the other inner organs; Nor am “I” feces or urine…Flesh or skin is not a “me”; Nor am 
“I” temperature or energy-wind. In no way am “I” ever a bodily hole, Nor are the six types of 
consciousness a “me.”…A body is neither the feet nor the calves; Nor is a body the thighs or the 
hips. The belly or the back is not a body; Neither is a body the chest or the arms…The sides of the 
torso or the hands are not a body; Nor is a body the armpits or the shoulders. The inner organs as 
well are not it; And neither is a body the head or also the neck. So what (alternative) could a body 
be here?’ (BCA 9:57-9, 78-9, Berzin, 2004.) 
152 If John was asleep and dreaming that he was being murdered, then DreamJohn would be 
terrified. Luckily for DreamJohn, John wakes up. Understanding emptiness, according to 
Śāntideva, is the only way to wake up from the conventional world dream we are all in now, and 
right now our suffering can seem real enough. This is why morality is crucial even in a world 
which is illusory. 
153 I think we can assume that the Yogācārin would also include the teachings of the Buddha as 
illusory under the Mādhyamaka scheme.  
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illusions caused by attachment to conventional truth and the saņsāric world. If 
these attachments were cut completely then there would be proper enlightenment. 
The Buddha had cut off any delusional beliefs and therefore attained proper 
enlightenment: 
 
Even an illusion does not cease if the continuum of its causes is not cut, 
But once the continuum of samsara’s causes, delusions, is severed, 
Samsara will not occur, even conventionally. 
Since Buddhas have done this, they have attained nirvana. 
(BCA 9:14-15, tr. Keksang, 2002, p. 150) 
 
Again Śāntideva’s target is what he sees as the failure of the opponent to meditate 
on emptiness, which he sees as the only way to be utterly non-attached since there 
is ultimately nothing to be attached to. Anything less than this is seen by the 
Mādhyamaka as a form of attachment, and no matter how slight, still causes 
cyclic rebirth and duųkha. 
 
The Yogācārin view is that external objects are illusory but the mind is not. The 
illusory external objects are really projections of the mind and in that way are part 
of the mind-experience. The problem with this is that if we say that everything 
depends on mind, then it seems that mind must be self-existent – which does not 
fit with the concept of pratītyasamutpāda. This is avoided if the Yogācārin 
introduces something else into the equation, (i.e. illusion) but the Mādhyamaka 
view then would be that this means we can define knowledge only in 
contradistinction to illusion.154 This does not lead us to reality if knowledge is in 
any way dependent on illusion and Śāntideva tries to show that the Yogācārin 
position here does not make sense and reduces it ad absurdum. 
 
If the external objects are illusory, as the Yogācārins claim, then they should not 
be perceivable: ‘[Mādhyamaka] When, according to you, illusion itself does not 
exist, what is perceived?’ (BCA 9:16, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 116). 
Furthermore, if illusions are a product of the mind then the mind is perceiving 
itself and this is not possible:  
 
[Mādhyamaka] If the mind itself and the illusion-like objects are one 
substance, then, since there would be no beholder and no beheld, what 
(object) would be beheld by what (mind)?...Just as the blade of a sword 
cannot cut itself, likewise the mind cannot behold itself.155
(BCA 9:17-18, tr. Batchelor, 1979, p. 135) 
 
The Yogācārin view is that a mind can exist in its own right, perceiving both itself 
and other objects just as a lamp illuminates both itself and other objects. (BCA 
9:18-19). An alternative example the Yogācārin gives is that if we looked at a 
piece of clear glass and a blue stone, the clear glass can only be made blue if it is 
held near a blue object, but the blue stone is self-reliantly blue – it is blue in itself 
and does not need any input from elsewhere.  
 
                                                 
154 And we can find illusion only in contradistinction to knowledge. 
155 Cf. Laģkāvatāra Sūtra LXXXVIII:10:2:568 ‘As a sword cannot cut itself, or as a finger cannot 
touch its own tip, Mind cannot see itself.’ (tr. Suzuki, 1931) http://lirs.ru/do/lanka_eng/lanka-
nondiacritical.htm Last Accessed 20 July 2008. 
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Chittamatrin: Take for example two kinds of blueness: blueness that 
appears in dependence upon another blue coloured object, like the blue 
reflected in a clear piece of glass, and blueness that does not appear in 
dependence of something else, like the natural colour of blue in lapis lazuli. 
(BCA 9:19, Batchelor, 1979, p. 136) 
 
Similarly, some awarenesses are related to objects other than 
themselves,[156] 
Whereas others, such as self-cognizers, are not. 
(BCA 9:20, Keksang, 2002, p. 151) 
 
The mind is the blue stone and the blue is a property projected by the mind. I 
think we could also imagine any other properties of the blue stone to be self-
reliantly existing and not dependent on anything external, for example, shade, 
shape and texture. 
 
The Mādhyamaka response is that this example is of no use since it is not a true 
analogy. The reason given is that a blue stone is ‘born’ with its properties already 
existent whereas a mind, or consciousness, must be more flexible than that: 
‘When something is not blue it cannot make itself blue by itself.’ (BCA 9:20, 
Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 117). In other words, we can make the clear glass 
blue by holding it up to the sky, but that means its blueness is dependent on 
surrogate colour and in that sense it is not self-existing like the blue stone. 
However the blue stone would not be capable of being green or red and we may 
suppose that if a mind were like that then it would only be able to think the same 
thing all the time. This is why Śāntideva does not accept this as a good analogy. 
 
The Yogācārin asks, if there is no independently existing mind at all, as the 
Mādhyamaka believe, then how do they account for the fact that there are such 
things as subjective memories; there must be some kind of mental self-sufficiency 
otherwise nothing could be recalled, remembered or recognised (BCA 9:23). 
Śāntideva says that the consciousness is ‘remembered’ when an experience 
associated with it is recalled: 
 
When we remember the object experienced, we remember the 
consciousness related to it, 
Just as we would recall being poisoned by an animal bite when we 
experienced the pain that subsequently occurred. 
(BCA 9:23, Kelsang, 2002, p. 152) 
 
So Śāntideva’s counter argument is that memory comes from a connection with 
another experience (the animal bite), and what we remember is not the mind but 
our former impression of the object. He does not want to concede any idea of self-
perception (such as the Yogācārin thinks exists in a memory) since the 
Mādhyamaka view is that nothing is self-existent and everything is totally reliant 
on other things. The actual argument is in v. 9:26: 
 
If illusion is the same as the mind it is false to claim that it is also 
different. If it exists as a thing in its own right, how is it the same? If it 
is the same [as the mind] it does not exist in its own right. 
                                                 
156 Which raises the problem of solipsism for the Yogācāra. 
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(BCA 9:26, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 117) 
 
If illusion is the same as mind then the distinction between knowledge and 
illusion collapses. If it is different then the Yogācārin is wrong. As long as the 
Yogācārin admits that there are illusions – things of a mind nature – then ‘if 
illusion is the same as the mind it is false to claim that it is also different’.  
 
For the Yogācārin the mind must exist since were that not the case then the 
objects of perception would go unperceived. But that is not our experience, so 
there must be some focus for the perceptions and this is the mind (BCA 9:24). 
Śāntideva has said in the previous chapter that we need to meditate on exchanging 
self with others, and perhaps it is this that prompts the Yogācārin to say that doing 
this requires a connection to the mind of another and if this can be done then it 
must be easier to connect with your own mind: 
 
If people who have attained states such as tranquil abiding can see the 
minds of others far away, 
Surely one can see one’s own mind, which is very close. 
(BCA 9:24, Kelsang, 2002, p. 152) 
 
Śāntideva dismisses this in two ways: firstly by saying that the Bionic Man can 
see clearly very far away but cannot see his own bionic eye which is right in front 
of him! (Obviously I am taking liberties with Śāntideva’s explanation): 
 
A jar seen by applying sight-restoring lotion would still not be the lotion 
itself. 
(BCA 9:24, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 117) 
 
Alternatively: 
 
…a (buried treasure) vase that’s seen from applying actualized magic eye 
lotion 
Still wouldn’t be the eye lotion itself. 
(BCA 9:24, Berzin, 2004) 
 
The second way he dismisses it is by returning to the general overview that he 
denies substantial existence as an ultimate truth. As an ultimate truth it is empty 
so things like consciousness, memory and experience only arise at the level of 
conventional truth, which means they can only be defined in relation to something 
else since nothing can self-exist. Any argument in their favour can only be 
undertaken using conventional language which is biased towards this 
interpretation. He seems to again take the view that his opponents have not 
entirely progressed beyond the level of conventional truth and therefore 
experience a lesser form of enlightenment than those who understand the truth of 
emptiness. 
 
How something is seen, heard or cognized is not what is contested here, but 
it is refuted here that projection is real, as that is the cause of suffering. 
(BCA 9:25, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 117) 
 
Alternatively: 
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We have no intention of refuting the existence of Eye awareness, ear 
awareness, or any other awareness. 
What needs to be abandoned is the awareness that grasps at truly existent 
forms and so forth, 
Which is the fundamental cause of all suffering. 
(BCA 9:25, Kelsang, 2002, p. 152) 
 
The next exchange (vv. 30-4) is still with the Yogācārin idea that a mind or stream 
of consciousness must exist and cannot be essenceless, which, of course, 
Śāntideva wants to disprove. Śāntideva wants to say that when we become aware 
that all things are empty, we also see the cure for attachment. We can only be 
attached to things which we assume are (conventionally) real, so with the 
realisation that they are not, attachment ceases. The Yogācārin objects as follows: 
 
 [Cittamātra] Even if the similarity to illusion is recognized, how does 
defilement cease, when lust for a woman who is an illusion still arises 
in the one who created her? 
(BCA 9:30, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 118) 
 
The objection here is that even if we recognise that things are more like an 
illusion, the defilement (greed or attachment for example) does not cease. The 
example the Yogācārin uses is that you can even lust for a woman who is nothing 
but a product of your own imagination and you know ‘her’ to be so; you are aware 
she is not real yet you still have attachment to her. Śāntideva replies: 
 
[Mādhyamaka] That happens because the influence of the defilements 
and what is cognized has not been destroyed in her creator, so at the 
time of seeing her the influence of emptiness is weak. 
(Ibid., 9:31, p. 118) 
 
In other words, the person who creates this illusory woman feels lust for her 
because he still sees her as real at one level. When he feels lust for her he is no 
longer aware of her illusory nature and the influence of emptiness on him is weak 
at that particular moment. The influence of phenomena (the illusory woman) is 
removed by knowledge at all times that they are empty. Even that knowledge is 
later overcome with the realisation ‘nothing really exists’. 
 
The influence of phenomena is removed by employing the influence 
of emptiness, and even that is later eradicated by inculcating the 
realization, ‘nothing really exists’. 
(Ibid., 9:32, p. 118) 
 
If you think that things are empty then you do not think they are (conventionally) 
real. The emptiness doctrine itself is only useful to a certain extent; it only makes 
sense when you imagine the world is real, but with greater understanding, you 
realise that it is not real and at that point (having served its purpose) you no longer 
need the emptiness teaching, which itself is a relative concept. The Yogācārin 
responds by asking what is being perceived if nothing exists: 
 
[Cittamātra] If it is concluded that the entity which does not really 
exist cannot be perceived, then how does a non-entity which is 
without basis remain before the mind? 
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(Ibid., 9:33, p. 118) 
 
Śāntideva’s reply is: 
 
[Mādhyamaka] When neither entity nor non-entity remains before the 
mind, since there is no other mode of operation, grasping no objects, it 
becomes tranquil. 
(Ibid., 9:34, p. 118) 
 
When there is nothing before the mind we have gone beyond the state of entity 
and non-entity and beyond all grasping or attachment and the mind is then 
tranquil. This is a state in which the Yogācārin question is transcended. 
 
In summary, what Śāntideva seems to want to achieve in these five verses is that 
the argument for emptiness can overcome the concept of realism, but emptiness 
itself should not be taken as something concrete and, having done its job, has to 
be left behind as well. When there is no more idea of being or non-being there are 
no conditions in which grasping can exist and the mind is at ease.  
 
Śāntideva later returns to the idea of a mind (BCA 9:102-5) and, basically, his 
previous position is repeated: that any suggestion of mind-permanence is 
misguided and a symptom of grasping, unwholesome attachment, which is the 
cause of suffering: 
 
The mind is not positioned in the sense faculties, nor in form or the 
other aggregates [feeling (vedanā), perception (sañña), mental 
volitions (saģkhāra) and consciousness (viññaňa)], nor in the space in 
between. The mind is found neither internally nor externally, nor 
anywhere else either. 
(BCA 9:102, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 125) 
 
If nothing can be found then the object of the search is empty (BCA 9:103). Since 
the opponent’s idea of ‘consciousness’ is as a perceiver, then it relies on objects 
of perception in order to validate itself. Objects are perceived by the five senses 
and processed by the mind,157 and if the mind existed first then it would have 
nothing to process and therefore be empty. (Ibid., 9:104). If consciousness appears 
at the same time as the objects of perception then how does this mechanism work 
– what produces what or what relies on what? (ibid., 9:104). If consciousness 
comes into being as a response to perceivable objects then it has no self-existence 
since it relies on the objects and we could assume that if we took the objects away 
then there would be no consciousness (ibid., 9:105).  
 
If a sense awareness exists prior to its object, 
What is it aware of? 
If it arises simultaneously with its object, 
In dependence on what object does it arise? 
 
And if a sense awareness is truly existent, 
How can it arise subsequently in dependence upon an object 
condition? 
                                                 
157 Which is a sixth sense in Buddhism. 
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In this way, we can understand 
That all six consciousnesses [158] lack true existence. 
(BCA 9:104-5, tr. Kelsang, 2002, p. 169) 
 
The discussion with the Yogācāra draws to a close here and Śāntideva thinks he 
has defeated their objections and established emptiness as the ultimate 
encapsulation of wisdom. He wants everyone to understand the emptiness 
teaching (BCA 9:154-65) and undertakes to be one of the teachers, in keeping 
with his earlier Bodhisattva vow (BCA 9:166-7). 
 
5.2.10 Reconciling Śūnyatā with Karuňā 
Any attachment to self, even if it is only a residual attachment to a stream of 
consciousness (Yogācāra), is still seen as a form of clutching to the Mādhyamaka. 
Any such residue of ‘self-thinking’ means the practitioner has not entirely let go 
and therefore cannot have full, deep and genuine compassion since his self-
attachment does not allow him to completely exchange self with others. Śāntideva 
sees anything less than a full understanding of śūnyatā as an obstacle to full 
compassion and in that way rejects the Yogācārin idea of a mind or consciousness 
self-existing. 
 
The understanding of emptiness has a crucial role in ethics for the Mādhyamaka. 
Realising the emptiness of all phenomena can assist in breaking down egoism 
since egoism seems false when we understand that self is an illusion which is 
ultimately void. Thinking this way leaves you less prone to thinking in a self-
centred way and less likely to act in a self-interested way. Having established 
such mind habits, it is then easier to take the next step of considering the equality 
of others with yourself, then exchanging them for yourself. The Bodhisattva is not 
attached to self nor fearful of the consequences of considering self to be empty.159 
Neither are they attached to nirvāňa (since it is empty) nor fearful of saņsāra 
(since it too is empty).  
 
Remaining in cyclic existence for the benefit of those suffering 
through delusion is achieved through freedom from the two extremes, 
attachment and fear. This is the fruit of emptiness. 
(BCA 9:52, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 120) 
 
Not being attached to nirvāňa (or their own personal enlightenment) frees the 
Bodhisattva to stay in saņsāra. He is not fearful of saņsāra but stays there as a 
result of his compassion-motivated wish to help others. The Bodhisattva can 
therefore be both enlightened and in saņsāra at the same time. All of this is only 
possible because of his understanding of emptiness, and understanding emptiness 
creates the conditions under which duųkha cannot exist.160
 
When all things are empty in this way… 
From what can there be happiness or misery, what can be liked and 
what loathed? What craving can there be? For what is that craving, 
                                                 
158 The five senses plus mind, or consciousness. 
159 A consequence being that their supposed individuality evaporates. We can assume that most 
unenlightened people would be quite uncomfortable with this conclusion. 
160 Nor can happiness since it too is ultimately empty and only seems to exist, at times, in saņsāra. 
(See BCA 9:152, 154, 155.) 
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when examined as to its true nature? 
(Ibid., 9:151-2, p. 131) 
 
It has become clear during his earlier debates with his opponents that Śāntideva 
regards the understanding of emptiness as essential to the practice of compassion. 
His arguments have been philosophical but now he moves away completely from 
that style of presentation and adopts a direct approach where he implores us, 
whoever we are, to understand that if we continue without the perfection of 
wisdom (the prajñāpāramitā), which is understanding emptiness, then there will 
be no escape from constantly experiencing duųkha: 
 
I beseech you, O reader, who are just like me, 
Please strive to realize that all phenomena are empty, like space. 
Consider that although all people wish for happiness, 
They swing between being troubled by suffering 
 
And being overjoyed by meaningless pleasure. 
Not finding happiness, they suffer; in striving to fulfil their 
wishes 
They quarrel, fight and hurt each other with weapons. 
Thus, they consume their lives in the commission of non-virtue 
 
From time to time, they take a fortunate rebirth 
And briefly enjoy some temporary happiness, 
But soon they die and fall into the lower realms, 
Where they experience unbearable suffering for a very long time. 
(BCA 9:154-6, Kelsang, 2002, p. 180) 
 
If we do not embrace the understanding of emptiness then we are condemned to 
remain in cyclic existence until we do (BCA 9:157). If we manage to secure 
another good rebirth (as a human) and we submit to the temptation to regard 
ourselves as substantially existing entities with all the attendant wants and desires, 
then our lives will pass quickly as we pointlessly strive to find an impossible and 
elusive fulfilment. All that wasted effort keeps us away from taking the time to 
reflect on this and realise that everything we are attached to is void (ibid., 9:157-
162). Carrying on without this realisation means that attached thoughts continue 
(ibid., 9:162), and attached thoughts lead to duųkha.161 There is therefore a direct 
link between duųkha and failure to understand emptiness. Emptiness should 
therefore be taught from the motive of purest compassion in the hope that 
suffering beings can be rescued from their duųkha-creating thoughts. 
 
May I be able to extinguish the fires of suffering 
That torments all these beings, 
With a vast rain of happiness 
Descending from the clouds of my merit 
 
And, through sincerely accumulating a collection of merit, 
While endowed with the wisdom realizing non-true existence, 
May I [use conventional means to] teach emptiness to all living 
                                                 
161 For example if I am attached to myself then I am deluded and might become greedy and 
disliking of others. In this way not understanding emptiness allows the defilements (delusion, 
greed and hatred) to flourish. This guarantees suffering as he has explained in Chapter 8. 
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beings 
Who suffer because of their self-grasping. 
(BCA 9:166-7, Kelsang, 2002, p. 182) 
 
The Bodhisattva knows that there are two levels of understanding: one where he 
tries to compassionately help sentient beings and one where there are no existent 
beings. The former shows his perfection of compassion and the latter his 
perfection of wisdom. 
 
 
5.3 The Śikşāsamuccaya  
There is no clear evidence as to the chronology of the Śikşāsamuccaya and the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra (see Williams who, like others, likes to imagine the 
Śikşāsamuccaya was first)162 but for my purposes it makes most sense to see the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra as the main work of Śāntideva since it consists of his own 
thoughts, with the Śikşāsamuccaya as a supplement (coming before or after) since 
it is a compendium of works by other authors.  
 
Since I treat the Śikşāsamuccaya as a work which compliments Śāntideva’s 
central ideas in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, I do not intend to give a comprehensive 
commentary of it. There is a certain amount of overlap with the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
(especially with regard to the contents of BCA Chs. 8 and 9) and a number of 
verses are the same. The Śikşāsamuccaya is structurally different to the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra and contains 27 karikas compiled from a range of Mahāyāna 
texts, many of which are no longer extant. It does not, therefore, contain 
Śāntideva’s original writings except for the various introductory comments before 
and after citations, but his efforts were in choosing the various texts and 
compiling them for this book.  
 
 
5.3.1 Structural Outline of the Śikşāsamuccaya 
The work concerns the six perfections, or pāramitās: giving/generosity (dāna), 
morality (śīla), patience (kşānti), vigour (virya), concentration (dhyāna) and 
wisdom (prajña)163 and early on uses the same lines as in the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
where Śāntideva professes to have composed the book for himself (SS 1:1).164 
Although the pāramitās appear to be less obvious in the Śikşāsamuccaya than in 
the Bodhicaryāvatāra they are nevertheless identifiable in the overall scheme of 
training for the Bodhisattva.  
 
Early on, Śāntideva begins to think about the Awakening Mind (bodhicitta) and 
                                                 
162 ‘Although it is the traditional view, there is no compelling evidence that the Śikşā Samuccaya 
was written before the Bodhicaryāvatāra. Nevertheless those early writers who considered it was 
had their reasons and we have no reasons for thinking that it was not. I prefer it on aesthetic 
grounds. I like to think of Śāntideva composing his Bodhicaryāvatāra while trying to practise the 
life he found in the scriptures through constructing the Śikşā Samuccaya.’ (Williams’ introduction 
to the Bodhicaryāvatāra , Crosby and Skilton, 1998, p. x, n.4.) 
163 It may be remembered that the six pāramitās are another way of interpreting the Threefold 
Training which structures the constituent elements of the Noble Eightfold Path. 
164 Compare the final line of the Śikşāsamuccaya where he says it was done ‘for the 
discipline of Bodhisattvas.’ (SS 19:365, Bendall and Rouse, 1922, p. 320). 
 
Page 114 of 173 
how such a mind would realise that all beings experience duųkha and do not like 
it, therefore they have an equality of sorts, and the Bodhisattva should not 
discriminate between his own duųkha and that of other creatures. This is an 
example of equalising self and others and of the stirrings of bodhicitta (SS 1:2). 
Bodhicitta only comes about when certain factors are in place, for example, an 
appropriate level of accumulated ‘good’ or fruitful karma which results in rebirth 
as a human with the added luck of living at a time and place where it is possible to 
come into contact with the Buddha’s teachings. 
 
As in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the next step after arousing bodhicitta is to take the 
Bodhisattva vow (ibid., 1:29) to work for the benefit of all sentient beings no 
matter how long it takes or how many rebirths have to be endured. 
 
If the Bodhisattva is going to put himself to good use (i.e. the service of others), 
he must take care to look after and improve himself, and this is done in a threefold 
way, to: (1) Protect oneself (2) Purify oneself and (3) Develop what one is and 
has. (Partly after Clayton, 2006 p. 42.) The sum of this can be used in selfless 
ways to the benefit of others. Since this is a form of giving or generosity, it 
follows the first pāramitā of dāna. 
 
5.3.2 Protecting 
Protecting the self is covered in chapters 3 to 7,165 where the pāramitā of self-
discipline, patience or forbearance (kşānti) is needed in order to weed out and 
avoid whatever might hinder self-protection such as useless, pointless or 
dangerous things. Failure to do so might mean that you will be of limited benefit 
to others since you could be wasting your effort on useless things, distracted by 
pointless things and endangered to the detriment of passing on any good that you 
can: 
 
Thus we must duly preserve the self and its belongings, though they 
are sacrificed to others [eventually]. How so? Because it is “for the 
enjoyment of living beings that one’s frame and all besides is given.” 
(SS 2:34, Bendall and Rouse, 1922, p. 37) 
 
Śāntideva continues to outline how we can protect the self (Chs. 3-6) and what 
from (Chs. 3, 4 and 5). A kind of Guarding of Awareness is needed in order to 
ensure that we identify such things and avoid them, then, having achieved this, we 
would not want to regress and would therefore want to protect this achievement: 
 
The avoidance of fruitless waste has been described ; the writer now 
proceeds to describe how this is to be secured ; “this aye complete by 
mindfulness.” 
(Ibid., p. 117) 
 
Having explained how to protect oneself, Śāntideva moves on to explaining how 
to protect objects of enjoyment (Ch. 7) before moving on to the next section on 
purifying. 
 
                                                 
165 3 to 6 concern the self and 7 concerns whatever external things might give the self pleasure. 
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5.3.3 Purifying 
A ‘pure’ Bodhisattva (i.e. one who has completely broken the bonds of 
unwholesome attachment) would be better placed to fulfil his vows than one who 
still has elements of attachment to overcome. In this sense some Bodhisattvas 
might need to ‘purify’ themselves in two ways: (i) by doing away with pāpa 
(actions which create negative karma),166 which is covered in Chapter 8 and (ii) 
by breaking the bonds of influence found in the defilements (kleśas) which come 
as a result of unwholesome tŗşňā, which is covered in Chapters 9 to 14. Obviously 
it takes the pāramitā of effort (virya) to carry out this task and in order to achieve 
the right thinking which such a task needs, the perfection of concentration 
(dhyāna) must be cultivated.  
 
This is most prominent in Chapter 12 where the defilements of greed, hatred and 
delusion are treated one at a time. Greed is countered in much the same way as in 
the Bodhicaryāvatāra: by meditating on the unpleasantness of the body in an 
attempt to destroy lust for the bodies of others and attachment to one’s own body. 
Hatred is tackled by employing mettā meditation (again like the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra) where the equalisation of self and other precludes the kind of 
distinctions which hatred relies on. Delusion (in this case believing that permanent 
projected entities exist) is remedied by coming to the right understanding of the 
fact that nothing is self-existing and therefore nothing is permanent. This is 
expanded in Chapter 13 where consciousness (vijñāna) or mind (citta) is seen as 
ultimately illusory: ‘Thought is like illusion, such is the nature of thought’ (SS 
13:236, Bendall and Rouse, 1922, p. 221). He also argues for emptiness in this 
chapter and in Chapter 14 where he reiterates that a true understanding of 
emptiness neutralises the defilements so strongly that they do not even arise. 
Quoting the Tathāgata-gūhya Sūtra Śāntideva says: 
 
Just as when a tree is cut at the root, Śāntamati, all the twigs and 
leaves wither away ; so, Śāntamati, all passions are extinguished by 
destroying the heresy of individual existence. 
(SS 14:242, Bendall and Rouse, 1922, p. 225) 
 
The final chapter of this section (Chapter 15) addresses thinking which is useful 
for the production of good conduct, which is mostly meditations on being 
unattached and therefore not jealous, scheming, devious or tainted with feelings of 
inferiority, superiority or differentiation of others. Understanding the underlying 
emptiness of all apparent phenomena is useful in this kind of meditation as is 
compassion: ‘Purification of…action comes from behaviour pervaded by the 
Void167 and by Pity.’ (Ibid., p. 247.) 
 
5.3.4 Developing 
The final section (Chs. 16-19) concerns cultivating karmic fruitfulness, which can 
be seen in the development of (conventional) self, objects of enjoyment and 
welfare (cf. Clayton p. 60).168 Before this cultivation begins, it seems that the 
                                                 
166 Pāpa has also been translated as ‘evil’ and ‘sin’, but perhaps these definitions are too strong 
and judgemental for what, I think, is intended here. 
167 ‘That is, emptiness of lust, hate, and delusion’ – Bendall’s and Rouse’s footnote. 
168 Clayton sometimes prefers ‘Welfare’ to ‘Karmic Fruitfulness’ and identifies Śāntideva’s 
interchangeable use of the two terms śubha and puňya respectively. 
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practitioner will already have achieved the six pāramitās, so we may wonder what 
the point of the following section is.169 It seems to me to repeat some pāramitās 
(for example vigour (vīrya) and forbearance (kşānti)), as well as reiterate that 
morality (śīla), in the form of compassion, engenders the right kind of motivation 
to produce the right kind of effort (the sixth constituent of the Eightfold Path) 
needed to secure the cultivation of karmic fruitfulness (SS 16:273-17:315). 
 
There is a view that accomplishment of the six pāramitās can be achieved by the 
Arhat (Clayton, 2006, p.59) and are not enough by themselves to attain 
Buddhahood.170 It is suggested that this is the reason the ‘extra’ stage (in chapters 
16-19) is needed to achieve the end which begins with bodhicitta i.e Budhahood. 
If this view is correct, then this is a major difference to the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
where the six pāramitās appear to be enough for the Bodhisattva and elements of 
the prajñāpāramitā require something which is beyond the understanding 
expected of the Arhat, i.e. the understanding of śūnyatā. Furthermore, the 
dhyānapāramitā (perfection of meditative absorption, BCA 8) in the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra also explicitly states (as we have seen) that part of perfecting 
dhyāna requires that the practitioner meditate on ‘the perfect object’ which has 
been taken by at least one translator to mean śūnyatā. (See BCA 8: 187, Kelsang, 
2002, p. 144.)171 It also seems strange when the pre-Mahāyāna voice at BCA 9:40 
argues that liberation can be achieved through the Four Noble Truths alone and 
the emptiness teaching is not needed, which means s/he would have no interest in 
achieving the sixth perfection prajña, at least in the way Śāntideva would 
interpret prajña. (See earlier p. 105. Also see SS 16:273, p. 251 where the purity 
of the disciple is not enough for Buddhahood). 
 
Even though that particular point is open to debate, I think it would be odd for 
Śāntideva to make such an effort in BCA 9 to explain that the ultimate object of 
wisdom is śūnyatā and that BCA 8 (as well as the preceding chapters) were a 
preparation for this truth172 then to say that this is achievable by the Arhat who, 
according to their tradition, has no need for the śūnyatā teaching at all.  
 
Be that as it may, in this ‘extra’ section we find the main area of similarity with 
the Bodhicaryāvatāra173 where comparable (or sometimes the same) arguments 
are made to those in BCA Chapter 8 with regard to the equality of self and others.  
 
One must exercise oneself in making no difference between others and 
self, if the thought of becoming a Buddha is to become strong. Self 
                                                 
169 Śāntideva does not appear to expand on the common six pāramitās to the ten outlined in the 
Daśabhūmika-sūtra – see Clayton, 2006, pp. 58-9 and n.47. 
170 ‘Since the accomplishment of the perfections is associated with the process of purification, this 
would suggest that for Śāntideva, the fully developed Śravaka (i.e Arhat) has realized the six 
perfections, but that this is not enough, and that the Bodhisattva must take the additional step of 
developing or cultivating himself, his objects of enjoyment, and most importantly, his karmic 
fruitfulness.’ Clayton, 2006, p. 59. 
171 This verse is BCA 8:186 for Crosby and Skilton, but v. 187 for Kelsang, Batchelor and Berzin. 
172 ‘Buddha taught all the method practices explained above To enable us to complete the training 
in wisdom realizing emptiness.’ (BCA 9:1, Kelsang, 2002, p. 147); ‘It is for the sake of 
understanding [i.e. prajña which is in its highest expression śūnyatā] that the Sage taught this 
entire collection of preparations.’ (BCA 9:1, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 114.) 
173 Which supports the idea that there is repetition and reiteration of the pāramitās in chapters 16-
19 in the Śikşāsamuccaya. 
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and not-self exist only relatively, just as the hither and further banks 
of a river, and therefore this is false. 
(SS 19:357, Bendall and Rouse, 1922, p. 315) 
 
Through protecting himself (and his wealth), purifying himself so that he is no 
longer attached to personhood, and having developed himself so that he has 
something worth passing on, the Bodhisattva is useful and beneficial to other 
creatures: 
 
Thus having abandoned self [through the understanding of emptiness] 
let him follow the good of all creatures…not thinking of worldly 
things. Let him apply his own knowledge to the service of all 
creatures ; having duly guarded his wealth…let him use it for all 
creatures. 
(Ibid., 19:362, p. 318) 
 
Śāntideva seeks to establish emptiness as the ultimate truth. A consequence of this 
is that the attachments we feel to ourselves and others would be seen as void and 
should therefore be severed, resulting in our being unable to distinguish between 
ourselves and others. In that way compassion becomes a direct result of the 
understanding of emptiness. This realisation is a reinforcing reminder for the 
Bodhisattva of his vow to help all sentient beings escape duųkha as he would like 
to himself. 
 
In the Śikşāsamuccaya as in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva has attempted to 
establish both emptiness and compassion through the Bodhisattva Ideal using the 
Bodhisattva path. However, Śāntideva is not without his modern critics and a 
recent discussion was initiated by Paul Williams who claims that Śāntideva’s 
views have actually destroyed the Bodhisattva path. It is to this criticism I now 
turn. 
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Chapter 6: Criticisms of Śāntideva 
Introduction 
In this chapter I intend to address five things. To: (1) give an outline of Paul 
Williams’ initial criticisms of Śāntideva’s compassion-centred ethics in his book 
Altruism and Reality, (2) offer a defence, (3) suggest support for Williams’ view, 
(4) explain what is pertinent to this argument in Williams’ later The Unexpected 
Way and (5) examine what appears to be a concession from Williams.  
 
The Unexpected Way concerns a personal story of conversion from Buddhism to 
Roman Catholicism and I think it would be fair to try to see Williams’ comments 
here as musings or thinking out loud rather than a scholarly work as his other 
books have been. Having said that, he does make comments which I take to be 
supportive of his earlier thesis (in Altruism and Reality) that there is no room in 
Buddhism for real compassion (‘love’ in the case of The Unexpected Way) and it 
is this view that I wish to counter. My arguments are in no way personal 
comments on Paul Williams or a judgement on his conversion; Williams’ 
conclusions need to be addressed simply because they have been brought up. 
 
 
6.1 Paul Williams’ Initial Criticisms of Śāntideva 
Williams (1998) challenges Śāntideva’s explanation of developing compassion as 
expressed in BCA 8:101-3 and believes that Śāntideva’s argument is logically 
flawed and ultimately destroys the Bodhisattva path. If Williams is right then 
there is a serious danger that Buddhist ethics as expressed in Śāntideva becomes 
vacuous. I intend to offer a defence of Śāntideva since I believe Williams’ account 
is mistaken. I intend to set out and analyse what I take to be Williams’ argument 
and to explain where and why I think it is incorrect. Before looking at the 
argument itself, it would be useful to look at his translation of the three verses at 
the centre of it.  
 
A continuant and a collective - such as a (caste) row (paģkti) or an 
army - are fictions (mŗşā) 
The one of whom there is a pain (duųkha) does not exist. Therefore 
of whom will there be ownership of that? 
 
Pains without an owner are all indeed without distinction 
Because of its quality as pain indeed it is to be prevented. What 
limitation can be made there? 
 
If one asks why pain is to be prevented (Tib. “the pain of all is to be 
Prevented”), it is (accepted) (Skt. “by all”) without dispute 
If it is to be prevented, all is also thus. If not oneself also is like 
(other) beings.174
(BCA 8:101-3, Williams, 1998, pp. 105-6) 
 
Williams’ argument, as I understand it, is as follows: Śāntideva wants to remove 
pain and also claims that self and others are not truly existent. If self and others 
are not truly existent then there is nothing which experiences pain. If nothing 
experiences pain then there is no pain to remove. If there is no pain to remove 
                                                 
174 See Appendix 2, p. 163 for alternative translations. 
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then the Bodhisattva path is redundant. But we know that pain does exist and that 
means there must be identifiable individual persons. If there are identifiable 
individual persons then Śāntideva is wrong to claim that self and others are not 
truly existent. Furthermore the Bodhisattva’s solution to the removal of pain, 
seeing others as yourself, is pointless since others need to be distinct from you in 
order to locate their pain, again making the Bodhisattva path redundant. Thus 
Śāntideva has destroyed the Bodhisattva path.  
 
Williams’ argument broadens to include various consequences of this 
conclusion,175 but these consequences obviously do not follow if we can find fault 
with Williams’ interpretation of the three verses in question. As I see it we can, 
and I therefore do not intend to dwell on consequences which, to my mind, do not 
arise. I think Williams’ interpretation of Śāntideva fails for three main reasons: (i) 
there are alternative interpretations of these three verses which do not result in the 
conclusions Williams reaches, (ii) the verses are taken out of context in the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra and can be countered with other parts of the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
(and Śikşāsamuccaya), and (iii) Williams ignores the precise point of the verses in 
question, which is to assist in meditation. 
6.1.1 Alternative Interpretations 
The three verses are, of course, open to interpretation and have been analysed, I 
am sure, since they were first read by Śāntideva’s contemporaries in the 8th 
century CE. I find Williams’ interpretation to be quite different to what I imagine 
Śāntideva to be explaining. I like to think that my interpretation is informed by 
what I take to be the broader Indian (not Tibetan) Mādhyamaka perspective in 
which some central themes of that school’s philosophy were in Śāntideva’s mind 
when he wrote the verses in question. In saying that, I cannot claim (or hope) to 
understand the verses as Śāntideva intended but only as I see them making sense 
in that general tradition. There are as many interpretations of the verses as there 
are interpreters, which must leave every one of them inadequate in some way and 
this obviously applies to mine. Be that as it may, I think mine is more in keeping 
with what (I think) Śāntideva was generally trying to achieve and also with the 
central philosophy of Indian Mādhyamaka than with the abstracted logic-based 
one Williams posits. In what immediately follows I have deliberately omitted 
Williams’ use of the word ‘pain’ (an interpretation which suits his argument) and 
have instead used duųkha which has a different meaning. This is important for 
understanding that Śāntideva does not aim to relieve a bad back or suchlike but, 
rather, the conditions which cause us any form of anguish.176 At other times, later, 
I have used the word ‘pain’ where I thought it more appropriate to the discussion. 
                                                 
175 For example conclusions i-vii in Williams, 1998, pp. 165-74. 
176 Streng, 1967, in the context of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā has it as ‘sorrow’, which 
is obviously very different to what Williams has in mind. Williams talks later about physical pain 
(headaches and stepping on a drawing pin) but this would not fit with Streng’s more mental 
duųkha. In fairness to Williams, it is conceivable that physical pain might be considered part of 
duųkha and Streng says that ‘duųkha is always found as “sorrow” in the translations, while it is 
rendered as “pain” or “turmoil” as well in the interpretation” (1967, p. 12). It seems to me that 
‘pain’ in this context suggests something mental rather than physical. As far as I can see, ‘pain’ is 
(a) not really what is meant overall in the term duųkha, and (b) duųkha is not reducible to physical 
pain alone. Williams, I think, implies that it is. If I am right then Williams and Śāntideva may be 
talking about different things. Abelson (1993) translates it as ‘unrest’, which I would not consider 
to be an allusion to physical pain (p. 255). 
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My reading of the verses is as follows: 
 
BCA 8:101. The ‘individual’ is like a ‘group’ (of, for example, skandhas or 
Humean bundles177) and as such does not exist as a permanently projected entity. 
This means that since this entity does not exist substantially, there is nowhere to 
genuinely locate duųkha in that entity. This is not to say that the entity does not 
experience duųkha, just that the entity is not concrete so duųkha cannot belong to 
‘it’ concretely.178
 
BCA 8:102. If duųkha cannot be specifically located, then we should not attempt 
to differentiate as to ‘whose’ duųkha it is, and should, instead, concentrate on 
dispelling all duųkha.179
 
BCA 8:103. Having meditated on the equality of self and others at this particular 
(and not isolated or self-contained) part of the meditation,180 it is reasonable to 
think that if ‘I’ do not like to experience duųkha then neither do ‘others’. 
Therefore the best of all possible worlds would be where none of us experienced 
duųkha. Śāntideva’s point here is that because suffering is to be removed as such, 
the suffering of all is to be removed. If suffering is something that you do not like 
then in general it is to be removed without any distinction as to whose suffering it 
is. If suffering is not something that should be generally removed, then there 
would be no justification in remove my suffering only. 
 
Although Śāntideva does not express this here (BCA 8:103) I believe that the 
outcome of Śāntideva’s elimination of the subject is that there will be no duųkha. 
In other words, if everyone were able to fully understand the emptiness of self 
then they would all be completely unattached and enlightened and if that were the 
case then there would be no more duųkha. What Paul Williams’ argument above 
(unintentionally I think) means is that if I had let go of attachment at the level of a 
Bodhisattva then pain would be removed, but if I then became reattached and 
made distinctions between myself and others then duųkha would arise again. I do 
not believe Śāntideva would have any problem with that argument neither does it 
do Śāntideva’s position any harm. 
 
It is simply not true that Śāntideva’s elimination of the subject, the 
person, or whatever, is occurring only on the level of the ultimate 
truth…Śāntideva intends his elimination of the person to issue in 
                                                 
177 What we regard as a ‘self’ is ‘a bundle or collection of different perceptions’, (Hume, 2000, p. 
180). 
178 A survey has suggested that the Danes are the happiest people in Europe. ‘The Danes’ as a 
group are not static since Danes are born and Danes die. The happiness they supposedly 
experience relative to other national groups might not even be experienced by all Danes. In fact it 
is highly doubtful it would be since it is reasonable to assume that at the time of the survey some 
Danes were depressed. What this establishes is that the ‘happiness’ is only attributable to an 
abstract entity ‘the Danes’ and therefore does not belong to anyone in concreto in much the same 
way that in BCA 8:101 suffering is in a sense not real. (See What can the Danes teach us about 
happiness?: URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6563639.stm [25 July 2008].)  
179 This is not to say that no individual ever thinks they experience duųkha, it simply means that 
duųkha should be stopped because it is duųkha. 
180 Which goes on for another sixteen verses on the equality of self and others before moving to 
another fifty-three verses on exchanging self and others. 
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altruistic actions. But it is within the everyday transactional 
conventional realm that actions – and therefore the salvific actions of 
the bodhisattvas and Buddhas – take place. 
(Williams, 1998, p. 164) 
 
I think we need to identify exactly who is carrying out the altruistic actions and 
for whom. It seems to me that there are four possibilities: 
 
1) Altruistic actions from the enlightened to the unenlightened. 
2) Altruistic actions from the unenlightened to the unenlightened. 
3) Altruistic actions from the unenlightened to the enlightened. 
4) Altruistic actions from the enlightened to the enlightened. 
 
In (1) above, this is broadly the position Śāntideva takes: that those who 
understand that self is empty help those who do not. In (2) this happens since 
people have compassion to different degrees, but no matter what level of altruism 
they show, they do not have the full prajñāpāramitā which is knowledge that the 
self is empty. In (3) this is not needed by the enlightened and is not something 
Śāntideva argues for. In (4) this is not necessary since the enlightened do not 
experience duųkha since they are unattached to self. Which means that (1) and (2) 
are the only positions Śāntideva might put forward. The only way that (1) can 
happen is if the Bodhisattva (the enlightened) stays in the conventional realm 
where there are distinctions between subjects. The point of relieving their duųkha 
is to relieve beings (who are capable of understanding the Buddha’s teachings, i.e. 
humans) of the false notion that they are substantially existing entities. As long as 
they think otherwise they will be tied to saņsāra and will experience duųkha. If 
they realise the emptiness of self and others then the conventional realm, as it was, 
no longer exists: perhaps in the same way a person awakes from a nightmare. 
Williams is quite right to point out that it is ‘within the everyday transactional 
conventional realm that actions – and therefore the salvific actions of the 
bodhisattvas and Buddhas – take place’ but what he does not mention is that as 
the conventional beings are relieved of their suffering by understanding śūnyatā, 
they no longer recognise the conventional realm.181 The conventional realm is the 
abode of those who see differentiation. The only way to relieve them of duųkha is 
to teach them in the conventional realm (an example of skilful means) that they 
are in reality182 indistinct from one another. This cannot take place in the 
enlightened realm since the problem does not exist there. 
 
I think Williams sees a contradiction which is not really there, any more than it is 
a contradiction for a non-smoker to go into the smoking room (thus inhaling 
smoke) in order to try to pass on the health benefits to the smokers of 
extinguishing their cigarettes and leaving the room. The room is where the harm is 
done, if no-one is in the room then no-one is smoking and no harm is being done, 
but it took someone who knows this to go into the room and explain in the first 
place. 
 
Williams says he could accept his non existence as an ‘isolated monadic 
                                                 
181 Except as a place to voluntarily inhabit using skilful means to help those still stuck in ignorance 
and therefore duųkha. 
182 i.e. in terms of Absolute Truth. 
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[Cartesian] True Self’ but could nevertheless still act selfishly (ibid., p. 164). 
Again I do not see a problem for Śāntideva here since I think he would argue that 
although he is pleased that Williams understands that there is no self, he would 
prefer that Williams understood it thoroughly enough to let go of it completely 
(see BCA 9:30f). In other words there is still a vestige of attachment and it is this 
which makes Williams continue to act selfishly. Were he to completely understand 
that self is empty then his selfish behaviour would stop as would his ‘delusional’ 
thinking which discriminates against ‘others’ and in favour of ‘himself’.  
 
Much of what follows in Williams’ account is based on the conclusion that 
Śāntideva’s explanations above lead to an inability to distinguish between persons 
and therefore results in an inability to remove their pains. This leads, he argues, to 
the compassion of the Bodhisattva being impossible. 
 
Williams later reiterates his position that ‘Śāntideva has indeed completely 
destroyed the path to full Buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings’ 
(Williams, 1998, p. 174) and the claim here is twofold: 
 
(1) That: 
i) Without conventional persons there are no conventional pains. 
ii) Without pain there is no removal of pain. 
iii) Without removal of pain there is no Buddhahood. 
 
(2) That: 
i) If pain exists then conventional persons must exist. 
ii) If conventional persons exist then there must be differences between 
them. 
iii) If we recognise differences between persons then (since compassion 
requires that we do not) we cannot argue that we should show 
compassion for them. 
iv) If we do not remove pain then we do not remove duųkha completely. 
v) If we do not remove duųkha completely then the Bodhisattva path is 
not followable to its end. 
vi) Śāntideva’s argument has therefore destroyed the Bodhisattva path and 
Mahāyāna Buddhism. 
 
Williams also claims that, the above (supposedly) being the case, the only way to 
remove pain is by targeting its removal and that means identifying an individual 
and their particular pain rather than denying the individual and seeing pain as 
general and not belonging to anyone, or ‘free floating’ as Williams terms it (op. 
cit., pp. 174-5). 
 
This requires a very vivid awareness of the other as an 
individual…The pain which we seek to remove is intrinsically 
embedded in the actual individual in front of us, who is different from 
other individuals and, of course, different to us. 
(ibid., p. 175) 
 
I would like to respond to the points above and that last quotation as follows: 
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(1)  
i) Agreed. 
ii) Agreed. 
iii) Without removal of pain there is no need for Buddhahood - which 
might or might not destroy the Bodhisattva path. But since there is 
pain, there must be those who mistakenly think they are conventional 
persons and such persons need to be relieved of pain. Therefore there 
is a need for Buddhahood. (See BCA 9:75ff: the error of persons is 
accepted for the sake of liberation. We are free to distinguish between 
useful illusions and non-useful illusions and Śāntideva says that for the 
sake of compassion we accept that there are other ‘persons’. We work 
with these illusions and concepts as long as they serve our purpose, 
which is compassion, provided we are prepared to go beyond them in 
the end.) 
 
(2)  
i) Agreed. 
ii) If conventional persons exist then those who do not understand 
emptiness would imagine there must be differences between them. 
iii) If we recognise differences between persons then we do not understand 
emptiness, which means we do not have the prajñāpāramitā and 
cannot therefore fully understand compassion or how to show it to the 
degree of an advanced Bodhisattva. This is not a problem for 
Śāntideva; it is only a problem for someone who wants to be 
compassionate but does not understand the two truths. Śāntideva does. 
iv) Agreed. 
v) Agreed, but the Bodhisattva does understand emptiness, has the 
prajñāpāramitā, can remove duųkha completely, meaning the 
Bodhisattva path is followable to its end. 
vi) Williams has misunderstood Śāntideva’s argument and both the 
Bodhisattva path and Mahāyāna Buddhism have sustained no damage. 
 
Williams believes that when it comes to relieving actual physical pain, we need to 
focus on and recognise the individual as a distinct entity and Śāntideva must 
therefore be able to distinguish between persons in order to compassionately 
remove the pain. However, this does not necessarily result from what Śāntideva 
teaches. Perhaps the following example will illustrate this. Let us suppose there 
was a willing volunteer for a pain experiment: we will call him Archibald (after 
Williams’ example, 2000, p. 438). In the first part of a two-part experiment, 
Archibald sits in a chair and his hand is taken by a scientist then placed over a 
naked flame. Archibald winces, draws his hand away and cries out. The scientist 
then asks Archibald if he experienced pain, to which Archibald replies in the 
affirmative. In the second part of the experiment Archibald’s brain is temporarily 
removed then his hand is placed over the naked flame again. This time there is no 
reaction. When Archibald’s brain is returned, the scientist asks him if he had 
experienced pain. Archibald replies that he had not. What this established is that 
pain exists in the mind or consciousness,183 and were we able to understand that 
                                                 
183 We need not go so far as a hypothetical example: anyone who has had an operation under 
general anaesthetic knows that it is possible for the body to undergo massive trauma (say, in a hip 
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mind or consciousness is empty then we can assume that there would be no 
further physical (or mental) pains. Although Śāntideva is not offering to relieve us 
from the pain of electric shocks, headaches or stepping on a drawing pin 
(Williams, 1998, pp. 166, 172-3 and 1999, pp. 145-6 respectively) these pains 
would be removed by an understanding of emptiness.  
 
When one notices that one’s own mind is attracted or repelled [by 
pain], one should neither act nor speak, but remain like a block of 
wood. 
 
Noticing in this way that his mind is defiled [attached to self and 
therefore pain] or engaged in a fruitless activity, the hero should 
always firmly curb it with the antidote to that condition. 
 
Why, mind, do you protect this carcass, identifying with it? If it is 
really separate from you, then what loss is its decay to you? 
 
Searching hard like this, you have found no essence here. Now 
explain why it is that you continue to guard the body [now explain 
why it is that you feel pain]. 
(BCA 5:48, 54, 60 and 64, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, pp. 38-9) 
 
In other words, Śāntideva is offering to remove duųkha by removing the 
conditions which cause it. He does not need to be able to differentiate between me 
and others in order to help; he can help through passing on the specifically 
Mādhyamaka version of the Dharma and therefore avoid the personalisation that 
Williams finds importance in. 
 
Williams seems to think that Śāntideva claims there is no differentiation in the 
conventional world (therefore how can I help someone if I cannot identify them?). 
But Śāntideva cannot be arguing this for if there is no differentiation at all then 
there is no conventional world and the world exists only at the level of ultimate 
truth. We know that (at this period in time) this is not the case because we 
experience duųkha. Śāntideva is merely saying that our perception of projected 
permanent entities in the conventional world is false. 
 
6.1.2 The Wider Context: The Śikşāsamuccaya 
Barbara Clayton claims to have found evidence in the Śikşāsamuccaya which 
supports Śāntideva against Williams’ interpretation of BCA 8:101-3 which 
concerns meditation (dhyāna): 
 
Dhyāna refers to the higher levels of consciousness attained through 
the ‘calming’ meditative practices, or śamathā. More specifically, the 
argument at 101-103 is part of a meditation practice concerned with 
the cultivation of bodhicitta, the ‘awakening mind’ or the aspiration to 
become a buddha (8:89, 90). Similarly, the parallel argument in the ŚS 
[Śikşāsamuccaya] is also part of the cultivation of bodhicitta, 
which…is considered the highest virtue and is key to becoming the 
                                                                                                                                     
replacement) but for there to be no pain during the operation. This is simply because the patient is 
not-conscious of pain. 
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Mahāyāna ideal, the bodhisattva (ŚS 9; BR 10). In order to develop 
bodhicitta, one must understand and practice the “equality of self and 
others” (parātma-samatā). “From the practice of the equality 
(sameness) of self and other, the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) 
becomes strong” (ŚS Vaidya 191. 25). The idea of this practice is to 
overcome the tendency to differentiate between one’s own suffering 
and happiness and that of others. ‘Practising the sameness of self and 
other’ is based on a recognition of emptiness: that self and other exist 
only relatively, so any absolute difference between self and other is 
false. Seeing another’s pain as the same as one’s own is part of this 
practice, and as we have seen at 101-103, Śantideva tries to give us a 
reason to do this, but overall, this is not strictly a rational process.  
(Clayton, 2001, pp. 92-3) 
 
Furthermore, Clayton does not believe that Śāntideva is logically defendable; but 
this is no concession to Williams, it is the nature of moral philosophy as I have 
said in reference to Hume (above p. 40)184 and Schopenhauer (above p. 44)185 and 
as Clayton does in reference to Hume (op. cit., p. 88). In other words we have no 
explanation as to why some people show more compassion than others and a 
solution to this mystery has hitherto never been found in logic. 
 
My own (limited) experience of formal logic is that it can only test the validity of 
statements (not that I mean to diminish the use and achievements of logic in any 
way) in an utterly emotionless and detached way. It is therefore a highly 
problematic methodology to use when doing moral (or for that matter political) 
philosophy. In other words logic is free from value judgements. Moral philosophy 
is concerned with value judgements. Not, of course that moral philosophy should 
be a free-for-all devoid of rational thinking. On the contrary it must be rational 
and I think Śāntideva’s overall scheme is. What makes it seem less so is the 
isolation of certain verses and their inability to stand up to the logical analysis 
Williams subjects them to. Clayton thinks Williams is being disingenuous (2001, 
p. 88) but I think Williams is genuinely trying, as he himself says, to expose 
Buddhist texts to the kind of rigorous examination that Western philosophy has to 
go through.186
 
Clayton does not accept Williams’ interpretation of the first half of v. 101187 
which Williams takes as meaning that there are no selves of any description 
whatever. If this were the case then there would be some very unpleasant 
consequences for Śāntideva’s philosophy. However this interpretation of 
Williams’, Clayton believes, rests on a mistranslation: 
  
Thus he [Williams] argues that when Śāntideva says, “Continuants 
and collections are fictions (mŗşā)” (BCA 8: 101a), by fiction (mŗşā) 
                                                 
184 Who believes it is enough, at times, to point out what is the case rather than seeking a cause 
then seeking the cause of the cause ad infinitum. 
185 Who believes that truth is paradoxical. 
186 Although I would have assumed it had already done so in the various debates over a long 
period of time amongst its adherents in different schools and against its opponents in the varied 
geographical areas to which its spread. For Williams’ explanation of applying ‘the tools of 
contemporary analytical philosophy to assessing some of Śāntideva’s arguments’ see Williams, 
2000, pp. 424-5. Also see D’Arcy May, 2007, n.4, p. 94. 
187 ‘Continuants and collections are fictions (mŗşā)’ (BCA 8: 101a, (tr.) Williams, 1998, p. 105).  
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he must mean ‘non-existent’, even though mŗşā is usually taken to 
mean ‘false’, ‘wrong’, ‘vain’…it would not make sense to read mŗşā 
here as 'completely non-existent', and it does not make sense to say he 
means that self and other do not exist period. Things, selves, and 
others don't exist independently, inherently, but they do, nonetheless, 
exist in some way. 
(Clayton, op. cit., p. 90) 
 
Williams’ interpretation makes no sense in the context of what Indian 
Mādhyamikas believe. Williams’ claim is that no selves exist at all, and this is 
flatly denied by Nāgārjuna (the co-founder of the Mādhyamaka school which 
Śāntideva followed) who also denies (in the same context) that the ‘cause(s)’ of 
duųkha can be explained in any way: 
 
Sorrow [duųkha] is not self-produced, for that which is produced is 
certainly not produced by that [personality (tr.)]. 
If the “other” (para) is not produced by the individual self (ātma), 
how would sorrow be that produced by another? 
 
Sorrow could be made by both [self and the “other” (tr.)] if it could be 
produced by either one. 
[But (tr.)] not produced by another, and not self-produced – how can 
sorrow exist without a cause? 
 
Not only are the four [causal (tr.)] interpretations [that duųkha is 
caused, uncaused, both or neither] not possible in respect to sorrow, 
[but also (tr.)] none of the four [causal] interpretations is possible even 
in respect to external things (bhāva). 
(MMK 12:8-10, Streng, 1969, p. 197)188
 
Emptiness does not entail non-existence, in fact it is clear from Nāgārjuna that 
persons neither exist, do not exist nor both or neither. (Also see MMK 4:1-7.) I 
take this as applying to Śāntideva’s interpretation of emptiness too.  
 
6.1.3 The Wider Context and Meditation 
Chapter 8 is concerned with meditation and is not intended, as far as I can see, as 
putting forth analytical views.189 I think it is not in the spirit of the chapter to 
disassemble it in the way Williams does (Chapter 9 yes, but not Chapter 8). Many 
things appear in the meditation of vv. 90-119 which, if isolated and examined, 
could lead to strange and wrong conclusions about Śāntideva’s views. For 
example does Śāntideva advocate stealing and mistreating others in v. 8:153 
whilst contradicting this in v. 123?190 I have no doubt that Śāntideva does not 
advocate stealing and mistreating others, but if 8:153 were the only verse of the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra we read then we might draw the conclusion that he has/does. 
                                                 
188 Garfield’s (1995) version is translated from the Tibetan (unlike Streng’s, 1967, Sanskrit 
translation - see p. 12) yet Garfield’s is no more helpful to what I think Williams wants to 
establish. 
189 In fact Murti takes the view that the Mādhyamaka offer ‘a critique of all philosophy’ and as 
such would preclude themselves from offering a view. (See Murti, 1955, p.9. Also see p. 13). 
190 Also contradicting MN 114:5, which, although not a Mahāyāna text, is still considered by the 
Mahāyāna to be part of the Buddha’s teachings. 
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The appearance of this verse is intended to communicate an idea, to serve a 
purpose, not as something to be advocated. Isolating verses in the way Williams 
has done can, I feel, lead to a misinterpretation of what Śāntideva means. I think 
the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached regarding the methodology of 
the arguments against Śāntideva is that Williams’ perspective is, on this occasion, 
narrow. (Also see Wetlesen, 2002, p. 35.) 
 
There are thirty verses alone (vv. 90-119) which deal with the equality of self and 
others and collectively this is one meditation (cf. Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 80) 
which, I would say, has to be looked at in the round: 
 
The central thrust of this meditation, which takes up the next thirty 
verses [my italics] (vv. 90 – 119), is that the meditator should reflect 
upon the equality of oneself and other people, so that one ceases to 
differentiate between the needs and concerns of either. 
(ibid., p. 80) 
 
I do not believe that three verses taken from the Bodhicaryāvatāra encapsulate 
Śāntideva’s wider explanation of altruistic behaviour. Elsewhere, for example, 
Śāntideva is much more explicit about individual actions which cause direct 
duųkha and that desisting from such behaviour results in a cessation of duųkha 
(BCA 8: 122-5). Williams’ selective reading has led to a conclusion which 
ignores what Śāntideva says elsewhere. Śāntideva does not claim that the 
Bodhisattva path is there to cure physical pain191 but that if the Bodhisattva 
teaches emptiness then duųkha will cease as conventional individuals realise there 
is no distinction between themselves and others. It must be remembered that the 
verses at the centre of this debate are a very small part of a chapter which deals 
with meditation: not action. We are asked in that chapter to imagine the equality 
of self and others at a higher level than the conventional and this fact seems to be 
overlooked in Williams’ account. 
 
In his criticisms of Williams, John Pettit (1999) makes claims for a distinction in 
the central part of Chapter 8 between ‘meditative absorption’ and ‘meditative 
aftermath’. I take Pettit as meaning here that there are thoughts such as ‘no beings 
have essence and are all therefore empty’ which only applies during meditation as 
a reflection of ultimate truth, and in the aftermath of that meditation we have to 
deal with the everyday practice which is acting compassionately towards beings 
which suffer as a result of their ignorance of their ultimate indistinctness. 
Compassionate acts are, then, the ‘meditative aftermath’ and this is driven by the 
knowledge of emptiness which comes about as a result of the ‘meditative 
absorption.’ ‘Meditative absorption’ leads to the prajñāpāramitā śūnyatā and 
‘meditative aftermath’ leads to karuňā. This is perfectly in keeping with what 
Mahāyāna Buddhism teaches and with what Śāntideva teaches overall.  
 
when one really meditates effectively on emptiness, no self or other is 
perceived; this is what is ultimately the case. In meditative aftermath, 
it is said, one should perceive all things in the manner of…magical 
illusions, [like] the reflection of the moon in the water, a mirage, and 
so forth. In other words, though one perceives self and other in 
                                                 
191 Nor does it not, nor both nor neither. 
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meditative aftermath, one knows they do not exist as they appear, and 
one acts accordingly. 
(Pettit, 1999, p. 133) 
 
Petitt’s point is that Williams has made a mistake in presuming that the 
Bodhisattva sees all things as empty always, and that means there are no entities 
to cognise at all, when in fact the Bodhisattva simply sees them differently and 
does not deny their existence but does deny their existence as they are commonly 
taken to be. The moon on the water does the job, as any German Idealist will tell 
you, of demonstrating that our senses can be deceived, therefore the world in 
reality (in itself) does not necessarily conform to our interpretation or conception 
of it.192
 
Williams responds to Pettit by mostly sticking to his guns and reiterating that 
Śāntideva’s logic is flawed. He gives the example of stepping on a drawing pin 
and says that since that would result in pain then the Bodhisattva would want to 
remove it. This would require that the Bodhisattva recognise the pain of the 
particular individual in question. Recognising the pain of an individual means 
distinguishing between individuals and that logically destroys the Bodhisattva’s 
motivation to be compassionate, viz to make no distinctions between individuals. 
(See Williams 1999, pp. 145-6.) So Williams sees the ‘problem’ as one of logic 
and is not prepared to consider the context of vv. 101-3, which is in a chapter 
which deals with meditation: 
 
My problem, however, is not psychological, but rather conceptual, 
logical. I find certain inferences Śāntideva wants to make simply do 
not follow. Whether psychologically a person as a matter of fact 
becomes altruistic as a result of the Buddhist arguments against the 
ātman is an empirical matter to which I do not know the answer. 
Meditating has nothing to do with what actually interests me here [my 
italics]. 
(Williams, 1999, p. 146)  
 
In my view it is precisely here that Williams has made the error of taking the 
verses out of context and refusing to allow that they are seen in the way I think 
they were intended – as preparation for the prajñāpāramitā in the next chapter.193 
If Williams had disputed any of the verses in chapter nine on grounds of logic 
then I may have had more sympathy with what he was attempting to do, but it 
seems to me that it is unjustified in the context in which the verses appear. I 
                                                 
192 For example we do not see infra red, as a snake does, we do not hear certain sounds, as a dog 
does, and this means that what eventually gets to our minds or brains is diluted or reduced to 
something we can make sense of.  So when we think about our surroundings we cannot help but 
have only our own picture.  This picture exists at the level of an idea, a representation (or 
vorstellung as Schopenhauer terms it) and it is this series of ideas which constitute human reality. 
This is an Idealist view but there is a clear crossover to Mahāyāna Buddhism. 
193 Note that it is not strictly necessary in Mahāyāna thinking to have to undertake any of the 
preparations for the perfection of wisdom since it is quite possible to have reached enlightenment 
through other means – witness the existence of the Arhat and the Pratyekabuddha and even the 
Samyaksambuddha of which Gautama is representative . However, as we have seen, the Mahāyāna 
regard the first two above as having a lesser form of enlightenment which they (the Mahāyāna) see 
as less compassionate than that of the Bodhisattva. See H.H. the Dalai Lama’s commentary on the 
9th chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra – Transcendent Wisdom, 1988, p. 15. 
Page 129 of 173 
believe the verses are dependent on other parts of not only the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
but the Śikşāsamuccaya and even wider general Mādhyamaka thinking, which 
precludes such an interpretation as Williams’. 
 
Regardless of the fact that the person is ultimately empty, we do, nevertheless, use 
conventions to describe them at the level of relative truth (BCA 9:6). Śāntideva is 
not saying that persons do not exist since this would commit him to nihilism. 
Neither is he saying that the person exists at any more than a conventional level 
since this would commit him to eternalism. The Mādhyamaka is the middle way 
between the two and it seems that Williams tries to commit Śāntideva to a 
position which is not a Mādhyamika one. This position: 
 
avoids eternalism because it does not assume that the person is a 
substantial Self (ātman) with an independent own-being 
(svabhāva)…And it avoids nihilism because it does not assume that 
the person is a pure nothing that can be eliminated by reductive 
analysis, as assumed by the Abhidharma Schools. 
(Wetlesen, 2002, pp. 37-8) 
 
Williams has pressed an alien, reductive Abhidharma position on Śāntideva; a 
position which Śāntideva himself argues against in Chapter 9. What applies to the 
person, as far as I can see, also applies to duųkha. Śāntideva does not deny it 
exists at a conventional level but argues that it is ultimately empty of essence and 
its conventional ‘existence’ only happens as a result of attachment to self. No 
perceived self equals no perceived duųkha.  
 
Wetlesen, rightly in my view, thinks Williams has ignored the holistic nature of 
Śāntideva’s work and the alternative interpretations of vv. 101-3 (Wetlesen, 2002, 
pp. 50 and 80-1). Bearing in mind that these few verses are dwarfed by the rest of 
the Bodhicaryāvatāra, it seems highly unlikely that they could be representative 
of what Śāntideva wants to say as a whole. The Bodhisattva path, therefore, can 
not only be saved but was never really under serious attack. Again, my own view 
is that I admire what Williams was attempting to do (to use analytical tools on one 
of Śāntideva’s arguments) but I believe these analytical tools need to take much 
more into account than Williams was prepared to do on this occasion. There is 
nothing wrong with the tools but the problem was in their particular application. 
 
6.2 Support for Williams? 
Williams appears to have limited support in Mark Siderits who, although not in 
favour of Williams’ conclusion (that Śāntideva destroyed the Bodhisattva path), 
does offer one area of agreement.  
 
He argues that pain is ultimately real but individuals are not. This means pain 
exists as an ultimate truth but only affects conventionally existent people: ‘I think 
Śāntideva is once again reminding us that since persons are ultimately unreal – 
that ultimately there is suffering but none who suffers’ (2000, p. 416) and that: 
 
At the level of conventional truth, there are pains and there are 
subjects who experience them. What Śāntideva’s argument does 
require is that pains also be ultimately real, but that persons are 
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not…This does commit Śāntideva to the ultimate existence of 
subjectless pains, however. So, to this extent, Williams is correct. 
(Siderits, 2000, p. 419) 
 
This view is confusing since it appears not to recognise that Śāntideva follows the 
Mādhyamaka position that everything is ultimately empty. That includes nirvāňa, 
saņsāra, the Buddha and the teachings of Buddhism. If duųkha had svabhāva 
(essence or own nature), then it would be uncaused, unconditioned and would 
exist eternally and could never be removed. Nothing has that property, so I fail to 
see how pains (strictly speaking duųkha) can exist ultimately. It may then seem 
that Śāntideva would regard Siderits’ view (that pains exist ultimately) as a form 
of attachment because Śāntideva is quite clear that when you are no longer 
attached to anything then nothing can arise and that includes duųkha. (See BCA 
9:14-15 and especially 25). This is illustrated in the following translations which I 
have selected on the basis of clarity: 
 
it is refuted here that projection [conventional existence] is real, as 
that is the cause of suffering. 
(BCA 9:25a, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 117) 
 
What needs to be abandoned is the awareness that grasps at truly [i.e. 
conventionally] existent forms and so forth, 
Which is the fundamental cause of all suffering. 
(BCA 9:25b, Kelsang, 2002, p. 152) 
 
Alternatively: 
 
Here that which is seen, heard and cognized is not refuted; rather, the 
conception [of them] as truly existent, which is the cause of suffering, 
is here to be prevented. 
 (BCA 9:25, H. H. the XIV Dalai Lama, Wallace, (tr.) 1988, p. 35) 
  
Śāntideva appears to be saying that suffering is reliant on grasping, unwholesome 
attachment, not that it exists ultimately without persons. However, Siderits 
appears to agree that Chapter 8 must be seen in context, and characterises it as 
part of the training Śāntideva offers the trainee Bodhisattva in preparation for the 
emptiness teaching in Chapter 9: ‘if we see the arguments of chapter 8 as fitting 
into the scheme of progressive teachings, then that makes them provisional, with 
corrections ensuing after the full realization of emptiness (the topic of chapter 9).’ 
(Siderits, op. cit., p. 422.) 
 
It appears, then, that Siderits’ support for Williams is limited to what I take to be 
the rather odd suggestion that there are pains without persons (ibid., p. 419), but 
he ameliorates this by saying that such a conclusion is in the end unsustainable 
when the meditative context of BCA 8:101-3 is taken into account. What appears 
as Siderits’ support for Williams comes only in terms of what he perceives the 
logic of the verses in question to mean (which does not make much sense to me). 
However, Siderits seems prepared to set this in the wider context and in doing so 
moves away from Williams in the end. Thus far, there appears to be no-one in 
favour of Williams’ 1998 thesis nor his further comments in support of it in his 
2002 work. 
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 6.2.1 Minds or Nothing? 
Williams’ response to Siderits need not detain us here since it largely repeats what 
he has already argued. There is one section, though, I think to be of profound 
interest in which he argues that: 
 
The Mādhyamaka (Prasaģgika) position is that all things, no matter 
what, are dependent on minds. It seems clear to me that this commits 
the Mādhyamika to the claim that before there were minds there were 
no things at all.  
(Williams, 2000 p. 441)  
 
This is interesting for at least two reasons and directly pertinent to my immediate 
enquiry for one. Firstly I suspect Williams thinks this does damage to Śāntideva’s 
position, and secondly because it appears again in his later The Unexpected Way 
as an argument in favour of a theistic explanation of the existence and creation of 
the universe. I will deal with the first point here. 
 
The position that before there were minds there were no things at all, if read in a 
certain way, does no damage to Śāntideva because he has anticipated it and has an 
answer to it. Everything depends on minds but there are no ‘real’ minds (‘real’ 
minds is a Yogācārin position). Things depend on the mind in a certain way: for 
an interpretation which results in their temporary and false unity as conventionally 
existent entities. However, since, ultimately, there are no solid minds there are, 
ultimately, no solid entities. That does not mean there is nothing, but that the 
human (and animal) ‘join-the-dots’ picture could be taken any way by any mind194 
and if there were no minds then there would be no picture. That does not mean 
there is nothing with the potential to form a picture or representation, just that 
there is nothing cognised and nothing permanent.  
 
Śāntideva argues for the non-existence of permanent minds as follows: 
 
A (truly existent) mental consciousness does not abide in the sense 
faculties such as the eyes, it does not abide in the objects such as 
visual-forms, and it does not abide in between the two. Neither does a 
(truly existent) mind exist either inside or outside the body, and it is 
not to be found elsewhere. 
 
This (mind) is neither the body nor truly other than it; it is not mixed 
with it nor entirely separate from it; the mind is not in the slightest bit 
truly existent. Therefore all sentient beings have from the very 
beginning been in the natural Nirvana (i.e. their minds have always 
been devoid of true existence). 
(BCA 9:102-3, Batchelor, 1979, p. 153) 
 
In any case it does not matter if Williams believes Śāntideva is committed to 
believing that (1) objects are mind-dependent, (2) minds and objects are mutually 
                                                 
194 When I see what we humans call a newspaper, I see something with coded black shapes which I 
can decipher and which can inform me of events I am unaware of. When my cat sees what I call a 
newspaper, she sees a toy to shred to pieces. Neither is wrong. 
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dependent or (3) minds are object-dependent, since no minds or objects have 
svabhāva or essence: 
 
If consciousness exists prior to what is cognized, on what basis 
does it come into existence? If you argue that consciousness 
arises simultaneously with the object perceived, on what basis 
does it come into existence? 
 
If it arises after the thing to be cognized, then from what does the 
consciousness arise? In this way, it is demonstrated that no 
phenomenon comes into existence. 
 (BCA 9:104-5, Crosby and Skilton, 1995, pp. 125-6) 
 
I think it is quite clear that Śāntideva does argue that duųkha is dependent on the 
(unenlightened) mind but I am not so sure that Śāntideva has stated or that his 
arguments lead to the conclusion that this applies to inanimate objects too. 
(Williams uses the example of a mountain, 2002, pp. 441-3 and n.29, 30, 32.) 
Ultimately, on analysis, there is no essence to be found in objects or minds, but it 
is clear that duųkha exists conventionally. I think Śāntideva’s position only 
commits him to the conclusion that interpretations are mind-dependent195 but that 
any analysis of the permanent existence or total non-existence of anything would 
entail either eternalism or nihilism respectively, and these are positions which the 
Mādhyamika do not hold (see above p. 82). 
 
6.3 Williams’ Further Criticisms of Śāntideva  
In Williams’ 2002 book The Unexpected Way he records his ‘meditations’ (p. xiii) 
on becoming a Roman Catholic and breaking his tantric vows (p. 138). The book 
is mostly unconcerned with the above discussion196 but Williams does briefly 
return to it when he talks about love. His position, as I understand it, is that the 
Bodhisattva is incapable of love since enlightenment is ultimately nondual and 
deals with unconceptualisable ‘entities’. He thinks love (and by extension altruism 
and compassion I take it) requires a strong distinction between individuals which 
Buddhism, in his interpretation, seeks to dissolve:  
 
Inasmuch as liberation in Buddhism involves nonduality and 
nonconceptuality it cannot in itself involve any relationship of love, 
and inasmuch as it involves mental transformation its primary concern 
cannot be with the other… 
(Ibid., p. 76) 
 
This conclusion (amongst others) is challenged by José Cabezón (in D’Arcy May 
2007). Cabezón seeks to establish that it is perfectly possible for a Buddhist to 
love and to show acts of altruism. He echoes Pettit (1999, above p. 128) in saying 
that in order to point out where Williams has got this wrong, we need to 
                                                 
195 Including, in the case of humans (and for all I know some animals) values, wherein moral 
thinking  - the heart of this matter - lies. 
196 This comment does not do this highly interesting and personal account justice nor does it take 
notice of some other very important points Williams wants to make about (Catholic) Christianity 
vis à vis Buddhism. However, for my immediate purposes I am interested in only a very small part 
of the discussion he has on love. (See pp. 75-7.) 
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distinguish between what happens in meditation (to which Williams has restricted 
his analysis) and what happens post-meditation. He gives the example of giving to 
charity – it appears that ‘he’ is giving ‘something’ to ‘someone’ but that 
appearance exists at a certain level.197 The appearance is strong when the act is 
taking place but when giving is meditated upon it is clear that the giver, the object 
of giving and the recipient are empty.  
 
As the mind focuses on the reality of these three things, it becomes ‘as 
if one’…with reality…And it is also true that at that moment I can 
cognise no ‘giving’, ‘giver’ or ‘recipient’, nor therefore can I at that 
moment be engaging in the act of giving. 
(Cabezón, in D’Arcy May 2007, p. 112) 
 
Cabezón’s point comes in quite a different context to Pettit’s (as a response to 
Williams’ The Unexpected Way rather than Altruism and Reality), but his 
treatment addresses the same point: Williams takes what happens in meditation to 
be the reality of what happens outside of it and this places an artificial and unfair 
restriction on the activities of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas.  
 
ordinary beings (non buddhas) cannot have a direct, nonconceptual 
understanding of the reality of charity and be simultaneously engaged 
in charity. Ordinary beings have no choice but to alternate between the 
two. They spend some time in the meditative equipoise on the 
emptiness of (for example) charity, and then they come out of that 
equipoise and engage in real (or rather ‘illusory-like’) acts of 
charity.198  
(Cabezón, op. cit., p. 112) 
 
In other words, Williams’ restriction can be removed by showing that it is 
compatible to believe that compassion, altruism or love requires no distinction to 
be made between persons, whilst at the same time distinguishing between them 
and also holding that there are no persons.199 What saves Śāntideva’s thesis is his 
claim for the existence of the two truths and the fact that compassion, altruism or 
love is easier to realise if we are not attached to differentiation and a way to be 
unattached is to understand that persons are ultimately empty.200
 
6.3.1 Mystical Conclusions 
If we cannot rely on logic to answer the questions of existence, and rationality can 
only take us so far, then we are left with something mysterious. As Schopenhauer 
                                                 
197 This is clearly expressed in BCA 9:75f; the illusion of other people is accepted for the sake of 
compassion. 
198 Although he points out on the next page that buddhas supposedly have a greater and 
unexplained ability to act charitably whilst at the same time seeing the emptiness of so acting. 
199 See AP 1:22, Conze, 1995, p. 90, cf. Schmidt-Leukel, 2006b, p. 118. 
200 Cabezón is attempting to establish that it is possible for the Buddhist to experience love of 
another person whilst holding that there is (ultimately) no self and no person. When I am on earth I 
believe there is gravity. I might experience pain (by falling over) if I do not. However, when I am 
in my spaceship there is no gravity. Gravity both exists and does not exist at the same time 
depending on where you are, just as love and no entity capable of giving or receiving love exists 
depending on whether the Bodhisattva looks from the perspective of conventional or ultimate 
truth. 
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has pointed out (above pp. 43ff), this is the only honest way to approach such 
questions and leaves the philosopher and logician dissatisfied. The Bodhisattva’s 
experience could, then, be described as something mystical and the dissatisfied 
logician (Williams) would find this problematic: 
 
Paul has a problem with ‘experiences’…with ‘mystical experiences’, 
and especially ‘nondualistic and nonconceptual mystical 
experiences’…Obviously, then, Paul is going to have a problem with 
Buddhism. 
(Ibid., p. 107) 
 
Compassion for beings which ultimately do not exist in any definable way is 
possible but goes beyond reason. But claims for something which is, in the end, 
mystical is not some odd ‘anything goes’ new-age-windchimery, it applies to the 
most basic questions of ontology such as ‘are you the same person now as you 
were when you were a baby?’, ‘is the candle flame the same thing throughout the 
burning of the candle?’. (See Mhp 2:40-41, Rhys Davids, 1925, pp. 63-5).201 The 
answer might be both yes and no at the same time. It is similar for the idea of 
duality and nonduality existing at the same time; it depends on what perspective 
you see it from: 
 
Mādhyamakas claim that nonduality is an attribute of the experience 
of reality (and not of reality itself), so that one experiences subject and 
object vanishing, ‘as if object and subject had become one, like milk 
being poured into water’.  
(Cabezón, op. cit., p. 113) 
 
Williams assumes that compassion requires differentiation, but does not appear to 
take notice of an alternative way of looking at compassion, which is that it 
requires fellow-feeling. Fellow-feeling is only possible if one breaks down the 
barriers against others and sees them as equal to yourself – at least in terms of 
their wish to avoid duhkha and to be happy. This is, I think, precisely what 
Śāntideva is trying to establish in BCA 8:101-3 and it makes sense to imagine that 
if breaking down the barriers between self and others encourages feelings of 
compassion, then more compassion can be engendered by exchanging self and 
others completely, as Śāntideva suggests in the last half of Chapter 8. I would 
argue that since there is more than one way to look at compassion, there is more 
than one way to look at any kind of fellow-feeling, altruism or love, and Cabezón 
addresses precisely this last point in his response to Williams’ The Unexpected 
Way: 
 
Of course, if one assumes that there is only one way to love – with 
real you’s and real me’s – then we can see why one might claim that 
the alternative, mystical versions of love found in the Buddhist (and in 
some contemplative Christian and Hindu) sources cannot be instances 
of real love…But that assumption – that there is only one way to love 
– is precisely what we hope to have challenged. 
(Ibid., p. 114) 
 
It does seem that Buddhists are capable of love and compassion even though it 
                                                 
201 This is not a Mahāyāna text but illustrates the point. 
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might be difficult to understand the reasoning behind it, and, hopefully, the 
Bodhisattva path has not been destroyed after all. Williams responds one more 
time to his latest critic with what might appear to be a concession. 
 
6.4 Williams’ ‘Concession’ 
Reply to Cabezón 
Whilst maintaining the view that Buddhism is pessimistic, Williams concedes that 
in the dGe lugs202 view of Buddhism it is possible to be compassionate.203  
 
José [Cabezón] explains at length, and very lucidly, how it is that in 
the Mahāyāna Buddhism of his own tradition a Buddha is fully 
capable, indeed supremely capable, of engaging with the world and 
benefiting sentient beings [in the example of giving to charity]. I am 
happy to hear it. I agree with José completely that this is indeed the 
dGe lugs view. And I make it quite clear in my book that I hold and 
accept that Buddhas, for example, are considered by Buddhists to be 
eminently compassionate. I am delighted to repeat it here too.  
(Williams, in D’Arcy May 2007, p. 149) 
 
So far this is not much of a concession. He is saying that one school’s view 
renders the Buddha capable of love, that criticisms still stand and that he is happy 
to point out that Buddhists consider Buddhas to be compassionate. Of course 
Buddhists consider Buddhas to be compassionate; that was never the issue. 
 
Williams goes on to say that he is ‘impressed’ with what Cabezón says with 
regard to a Buddha being able to love despite not seeing things ‘nondualistically 
and nonconceptually’ (ibid. p. 150). This is not quite what Cabezón did say which 
was that Buddhists can love and be compassionate or altruistic - not just Buddhas. 
Furthermore I have argued, as have others, that Buddhists (whether they be lay, 
monks, nuns, Bodhisattvas or Buddhas204) do not only see things nondualistically 
and nonconceptually as Williams still claims. They also see things dualistically 
when it might be of benefit to sentient beings. Despite being impressed with 
Cabezón’s portrayal of a dGe lugs viewpoint (Cabezón’s treatment is much wider 
in fact and several times he talks about ‘Buddhists’ and ‘Buddhism’ rather than a 
specifically dGe lugs viewpoint), Williams still has ‘philosophical doubts about 
whether even a Buddha could relate to others if he or she were having experiences 
that were not just nonconceptual but were intrinsically nonconceptual.’ (Ibid., p. 
150.) 
 
Williams repeats that love must entail differences, dualism and conceptuality and 
I take it from this that he still holds that Buddhists do not. To me this still seems 
to be a non-acceptance of the existence of the two truths and I cannot see a 
                                                 
202 A Vajrayāna (Diamond Vehicle) or Tantric school of Tibetan Buddhism which adopts ideas 
from both the Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra.  
203 He is less forthcoming about other forms of Buddhism and still maintains that ‘there are those 
in the past [who] have argued’ that since Buddhists aim not to be reborn then that leaves little 
room for compassion (Williams, in D’Arcy May, 2007, p. 149). This sounds like an unfair 
criticism of an Arhat rather than a Bodhisattva this time. 
204 Although, of course, none of us can really know since enlightened thoughts are ineffable. 
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problem for Mahāyāna Buddhism in general or Śāntideva in particular with what 
Williams says here. He points out that he may, in The Unexpected Way have left 
himself open to misunderstandings since he was in fact, at times, 
‘criticising…particular ways of reading the Christian final eschatological goal.’ 
(Ibid., p. 150.) 
 
But looking back at it – yes, I admit that in my book I am not 
sufficiently clear in this. I now think that generalisation from the 
context of the Christian summum bonum in which I was writing…was 
inappropriate. It does indeed invite just the response that he has so 
clearly given. Of course it all depends on what one means by 
‘nondual’ and ‘nonconceptual’. I am delighted to hear from José that 
there are ways of understanding these expressions that render it 
plausible that this is indeed how Buddhas see and are. I concede to 
him.  
(Williams, 2007, op. cit., p. 112) 
 
The problem as I see it, and as I have explained in chapters two and three, is that 
there has been no satisfactory rigorously philosophical explanation to date for our 
‘im/moral’ actions. Why we behave or do not behave in the variety of ways we do 
and do not is so far unfathomed (despite many hypotheses, some of which are 
now hundreds if not thousands of years old) and all we can say about it – at least 
at this stage in our mental and philosophical development – is that it is 
mysterious; it is unexplained and thus far unexplainable. That is not to say that we 
have no need to try to understand nor indeed to attempt explanation, but to force 
logic on something which is by its very nature beyond logical definition is at best 
pointless and at worst can only lead to false conclusions. Williams, as a believer 
in a God whose existence has not been proven, must know that belief plays a part 
in accepting certain ideas in Buddhism and in Western philosophy too.205 That is 
not to say that anything goes, but I feel there is something you either get or do not 
get about a nondualistic ‘entity’ feeling compassion for others which it can no 
longer be distinguished from. I would say that it can and does distinguish at the 
level of Conventional Truth but not at Ultimate Truth. That may lead to the 
question ‘Is this ‘entity’ (the Bodhisattva) dual or not dual or both or neither?’ 
Any attempt to pin it down in order to construct a logical refutation ignores what I 
take to be the obvious answer a Mādhyamika like Śāntideva might give: it is 
śūnya and there is therefore no way of talking about it. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Williams wants to say that it is acceptable for certain kinds of belief to avoid 
being subject to rigorous analysis whilst at the same time maintaining they are 
rational:  
 
What I argue in my book [Altruism and Reality] is that it can be 
shown that belief in God is rational, as rational as the Buddhist denial 
of the existence of God. Belief in God is not the same as knowing that 
God exists, for it is perfectly compatible with belief in something that 
such a thing turns out not to be the case. Hence belief in God does not 
                                                 
205 Even if it is belief that ‘I’ am thinking. 
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necessarily require complete proof. Nevertheless I want to argue that 
believing in God is not irrational, and it is not a matter simply of 
‘blind faith’, as some seem to think. 
(Ibid., p. 139) 
 
I cannot see a problem with this, having argued that BCA 8:101-3 should not be 
subject to such analysis but is nevertheless rational. However I do not think 
Williams would reciprocate. Perhaps Williams’ views here, especially ‘belief in 
God does not necessarily require complete proof’ should be contrasted with ‘My 
contention here is one of logical implication’ (1999, p. 145) and ‘My problem 
[with Śāntideva], however, is not psychological, but rather conceptual, logical. I 
find certain inferences Śāntideva wants to make simply do not follow’ (1999, p. 
146) and ‘I argue on logical grounds that the negation of the ātman will not 
eliminate selfishness’ (1999, p. 146). It appears to me that Williams does not 
allow Śāntideva room to manoeuvre despite the fact that understanding what 
Śāntideva wants to say about Ultimate Truth must necessarily be conducted using 
conventional (and therefore incomplete) communications tools, yet does not invite 
such rigour when explaining his position regarding what he takes to be the 
existence of God. I think there is something in his criticisms of Śāntideva that 
Williams does not see (any more?). I have no wish to criticise or comment on 
Williams’ Christian belief, my point here is that it seems belief in an ultimate does 
not require logical analysis if it is Christian but it does if it is Buddhist. I hope this 
is not unfair to Williams but it does seem to me to be a reasonable conclusion to 
draw given what he has said. 
 
Śāntideva could pull the rug from the whole debate, I feel, by simply stating that 
we cannot use logical analysis to understand something which defies it. That 
something, in this specific case, is the mechanism by which the Bodhisattva 
should feel compassion even as a non-dual ‘something’.206 I think there are 
parallels with the criticisms of Schopenhauer made by Young (and others) which 
miss the point. Schopenhauer explains that this mechanism is unknowable and can 
only be felt ‘mystically’. As I have indicated, this is not good enough if your 
business is analytical philosophy, but analytical philosophy is equally 
handicapped when it comes to explaining compassion. If we look at it the way 
Schopenhauer does - by taking a fact and working backwards - then we can see 
that compassion exists although it cannot be fully explained. That means that both 
Schopenhauer and the Mahāyāna are quite convinced (to use Williams’ 
terminology they believe) that it is possible to be non-dual yet compassionate and 
such a belief (cf. Williams above) does not necessarily require complete proof, but 
is nevertheless not irrational and is not a matter simply of blind faith. 
                                                 
206 Compassion is the (conventional) form taken by the highest Buddha body (the Dharmakāya) 
and nothing can be said about the Dharmakāya so we are left without a comprehensive explanation 
as to the workings of compassion. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this final chapter I will compare some key elements of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy as it relates to Mādhyamaka philosophy, especially as represented in 
Śāntideva. I intend to cover four main areas: (1) Schopenhauer’s dismissal of non-
compassion-based forms of ethics, (2) Schopenhauer’s acquaintance with 
Buddhism, (3) general comparisons (including some made by other scholars), and 
(4) specific comparisons between Schopenhauer and Śāntideva. I would remind 
the reader of the earlier distinction I make between Will and will: Will is found as 
noumenon and will is its manifestation in phenomena. 
 
7.1 Schopenhauer’s Dismissal of other Forms of Ethics 
As we have seen (above pp. 16ff) Schopenhauer’s approach to ethics is to observe 
what is the case then suggest why that might be so. He does not see himself as a 
prescriptive moralist and sees moral philosophy as a way of discovering truth 
rather than attempting to provide reasons as to why people should behave in 
certain ways. He thinks that producing prescriptive ethics is a mistaken way of 
doing moral philosophy and that any system of ethics which seeks to offer 
anything practical is flawed since the job of ethics is theoretical only: 
 
In my opinion…all philosophy is always theoretical, since it is essential 
to it always to maintain a purely contemplative attitude…to enquire, not 
to prescribe. But to become practical, to guide conduct, to transform 
character, are old claims which with mature insight it ought finally to 
abandon. 
(WWR1 §53, Payne, 1969, p. 271) 
 
This does not mean that Schopenhauer’s ethics is pointless in terms of finding 
liberation from suffering. On the contrary, discovering the truth that we are only 
phenomenally different from one another but are in reality an underlying unity, 
leads to a lessening of the hold Will has upon us. In some sense the power of this 
negative Will is diluted and that in turn reduces craving, the absence of which 
leads to freedom from suffering. What Schopenhauer does not offer, indeed what 
he thinks ethics should not offer is a system which tries to make people ‘good’ or 
happy or which seeks to satisfy their ego-driven desires. That rules out Aristotle, 
Kant and utilitarianism and he sees all of them as ignoring the facts on the ground: 
i.e. that throughout time, geography and the rise and fall of cultures we will find 
some people acting selfishly, some acting compassionately, some acting 
maliciously and some (like the ascetic) who are beyond engaged action altogether. 
 
Schopenhauer’s reasons as to why he does not offer moral prescriptions are 
complex and involve an extended discussion on free will and determinism which 
is not essential to this enquiry. In brief, the Will is what drives us and the Will is 
beyond the systems of the professors of moral philosophy, so it is pointless to 
come up with rules which will not be taken notice of. When it comes to people, 
they are free to do as they choose in one sense (and following rules makes them 
unfree) but are not free to will as they choose. This means that they are driven by 
something predetermined in the Will and only modify their behaviour to satisfy 
the wants of the Will. For example, their own will (a manifestation of the Will) 
might direct them to act selfishly but if the law punishes selfish behaviour then it 
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is in their interests (in the service of their will to protect the self) to adhere, albeit 
reluctantly, to that law. No matter how much someone beats a dog for stealing the 
sausages it still wills sausage-stealing. Forcing someone to behave in certain ways 
does not result in a genuine change in their behaviour and so Schopenhauer 
believes moral rules will be ignored when it suits people to do so. He sees 
university moral philosophy as a kind of odd and ultimately vacuous pursuit 
which is always contradicted by reality:  
 
Ethical writers who promise to produce a system of ethics that will 
morally improve man and who speak of a progress in virtue are 
always triumphantly refuted by reality and experience, which have 
demonstrated that virtue is inborn and cannot result from sermons. 
(OBM §20, Payne, 1995, p. 190) 
 
Attempts to produce happiness207 in this wretched world are also pointless since 
we will always strive for more satisfaction, and happiness as a teleological goal 
will always move away from us as we get nearer to it. He thinks Aristotle is quite 
wrong to assume there is a terminus for striving and desire.208 The Will cannot be 
tamed and comes before moral thinking. That means that any teaching of ethics 
will at best only apply to a superficial side of an individual and can never make its 
way down to their core of Will: 
 
The [W]ill was even regarded as an act of thought, and was identified 
with…judgement, especially by Descartes and Spinoza. According to 
this, every man would have to become what he is only in consequence 
of his knowledge. He would come into the world as a moral cipher, 
would know the things in it, and would then determine to be this or 
that, to act in this or that way...According to the whole of my 
fundamental view, all this is a reversal of the true relation. The [W]ill 
is first and original; knowledge is merely added to it as an instrument 
belonging to the phenomenon of the [W]ill…Therefore he knows 
himself in consequence of, and in accordance with, the nature of his 
will, instead of willing in consequence of, and according to, his 
knowing, as in the old view. According to this view, he need only 
consider how he would best like to be, and he would be so…I, on the 
other hand, say that…he cannot decide to be this or that; also he 
cannot become another person, but he is once for all, and subsequently 
knows what he is. With those other thinkers, he wills what he knows; 
with me he knows what he wills. 
(WWR1 §55, Payne, 1969, pp. 292-3) 
 
It seems then that the egoist is given his ignorance of the Will (the noumenon) by 
nature and the altruist is likewise given his insight which takes them beyond the 
                                                 
207 I.e. any form of eudaimonism or any attempt to minimise pain and to maximise pleasure 
(utilitarianism). Happiness means something different for Schopenhauer: it is the absence of 
suffering. Suffering is normal and although that does not make it good or desirable, no moral 
system can magic it away therefore no moral system can deliver happiness. Also see his dismissal 
of Kant in WWR1 pp. 413-534 and in OBM, §19, pp. 167-70 where he also dismisses Fichte, 
Adam Smith, Wollaston and Hutcheson. 
208 Aristotle sees all actions as subordinated to happiness, but happiness is an end in itself. (See 
Nicomachean Ethics Book 1, Ch. 7.) 
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principium individuationis209 and results in compassionate behaviour. This is not 
to say that people cannot change at all, just that moral philosophy cannot change 
them, however it appears that true knowledge can, although this is only open to 
the few. Schopenhauer rejects all previous Western moral theories and believes 
his ethics is more akin to Indian thought. A natural question, then, is what did 
Schopenhauer know of Indian philosophy at the time of writing his magnum opus: 
The World as Will and Representation. 
 
7.2 Schopenhauer’s Acquaintance with Indian Thought 
Schopenhauer first became acquainted with Hinduism210 and Buddhism in 1813 
when he was introduced to the Orientalist Friedrich Maier, probably at his 
mother’s literary salon in Weimar.211 What exactly he picked up will never be 
known but it appears that at this early stage he could have gained very little 
knowledge of Buddhism and probably nothing of any significance. It seems that 
until 1819 (when he published WWR1)212 he could only have come across two 
references to Buddhism in the journal Asiatic Researches plus whatever he had 
picked up from Maier. At this point he was better acquainted, but still in a very 
limited way, with Hinduism through his 1801 copy of the Oupnek’hat – a Latin 
retranslation by Anquetil-Duperron of the Persian translation of the Upanişads. 
Even with this book, though, it must be doubtful that Schopenhauer had anything 
but a rudimentary understanding of any central Hindu ideas.213 He also had access 
to references to Hinduism in the above journals but it is not clear what he gained 
from them.214 He says himself that, in the case of Buddhism, he had reached his 
conclusions without knowing much about it: 
 
In my philosophizing I have certainly not been under its [Buddhism’s] 
influence. For up till 1818, when my work [WWR1] appeared, there 
were to be found in Europe only a very few accounts of Buddhism, 
and those extremely incomplete and inadequate, confined almost 
entirely to a few essays in the earlier volumes of the Asiatic 
Researches, and principally concerned with the Buddhism of the 
Burmese [i.e. Theravāda Buddhism]. Only since that time has fuller 
information about this religion gradually reached us, chiefly through 
the profound and instructive articles of that meritorious member of the 
                                                 
209 The principle of individuation, which is a form of ignorance that stops a person seeing others as 
their self. 
210 ‘Hinduism’ as a description of one religion appears to have been initially used by British 
colonial administrators in order to group the various Brahmanical sects. I have used it (unless there 
is reason not to) when referring to what Schopenhauer calls ‘Brahmanism’ and also because it is a 
term currently acceptable to the broad religious group Schopenhauer has in mind. 
211 Welbon, 1968, conjectures that it is conceivable that Schopenhauer came into contact with 
Maier earlier, 1807-9, and that Maier’s ideas could have been communicated to Schopenhauer via 
the latter’s association with Goethe and Schlegel who both knew Maier (p. 158, n.6). 
212 Most sources (including Schopenhauer himself) say, wrongly, 1818. The book was completed 
then but was not published until 1819. 
213 This translation of a translation ‘was written in so utterly unintelligible a style, that it required 
the lynx like perspicacity of an intrepid philosopher, such as Schopenhauer, to discover a thread 
through such a labyrinth’ (Müller, 1879, pp. lviii–lix). 
214 Nicholls (in Janaway, 1999) also points out that the Bhagavadgita had been translated into 
English in 1785 and that the Vedas appeared in English (tr. Colebrooke) in 1805 (see Nicholls, pp. 
177-9 and n.27 and 28, p. 207). Since Schopenhauer could read English (and French) from 
childhood it is possible that he could have come across these sources before composing WWR1 
but there is no evidence that he did. 
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St. Petersburg Academy, I. J. Schmidt, in the records of his Academy, 
and then in the course of time through several English and French 
scholars, so that I have been able to furnish a fairly numerous list of 
the best works on this religion in my book On the Will in Nature 
[1836]. 
(WWR2, Ch. XVII, Payne, 1969, p. 169) 
 
And: 
 
On the whole, the harmony [of Buddhism] with my teachings is 
wonderful, all the more so because I wrote the first 
volume…[WWR1]… between 1814 and 1818 and did not, nor could 
not, have known of all that. 
(Briefe, Deussen XI, p. 470, cited in Halbfass, 1988, p. 107) 
 
There is a suggestion that Schopenhauer modified his concept of the thing-in-
itself (the noumenon or world as Will) in his 1844 revision of WWR1 (i.e. 
WWR2) possibly as a result of what he had subsequently understood of Hinduism 
and Buddhism as the 19th century progressed.215 However, I agree with Welbon 
(1975) that Indian influence or no Indian influence, Schopenhauer does not 
mention Buddhism at all when giving his instructions on how to read WWR1,216 
and ‘I can well imagine Schopenhauer’s work without Indian content (or 
examples), but there is no Schopenhauer without Kant’ (Welbon, 1975, p. 159). I 
think Welbon defends Schopenhauer well against what might be seen as an 
accusation of plagiarism when he offers this summary of his argument: 
 
it would be unreasonable to maintain that Schopenhauer’s system is 
only a translation of terms and concepts from India into a more or less 
Kantian framework. Schopenhauer, writing when scientific 
Indological research was in its infancy, simply did not have access to 
sufficient Indian materials to have borrowed a system. We must assign 
independence to his achievement [217] [and, furthermore,] 
Schopenhauer did not know Sanskrit let alone Pali… 
(Ibid., p. 166) 
 
What is clear regardless of how much or little he knew of Buddhism, is that it 
contains some remarkable resemblances to his own philosophy. 
 
7.3 General Comparisons 
There have been comparisons made between Indian thought (both Hindu and 
Buddhist) and Schopenhauer’s philosophy (or vice versa) for some time, but there 
is an enormous variety of opinion and conclusion in this area which do not help 
our current enquiry. For example, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics has been seen as 
sharing only superficial features with Buddhism (Copleston, 1946, Kishan in Fox, 
1980) or has been seen as the closest philosophy in the West to that of the 
Mahāyāna (Muses, 1955, Dauer, 1969). Another view is that Schopenhauer is 
                                                 
215 See Nicholls ‘The Influences of Eastern Thought on Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Thing-in-
itself’ (in Janaway, 1999), pp. 171-212. This is highly debateable. 
216 He says we need to know Plato and Kant and would benefit from also being acquainted with 
the Vedas, WWR1, pp. xxiii-xxiv. Also see Welbon, p. 157. 
217 Nicholls does not claim that Schopenhauer borrowed a system but that he was influenced in his 
later work by what became available as time passed. This is, of course, disputable. 
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comparable in certain areas to Theravādin Buddhism and in others to Tibetan 
Mahāyāna (Nanajivako, 1970). Peter Abelsen seems to suggest that all 
comparisons are flawed and that Schopenhauer is not compatible with Mahāyāna 
or non-Mahāyāna forms of Buddhism (Abelsen, 1993) whereas Nicholls (in 
Janaway, 1999) specifically disagrees with Abelsen’s view and offers a general 
comparison with the essential teachings of Buddhism and Hinduism. Welbon 
(1975) concentrates on Schopenhauer’s interpretation of nirvāňa, Halbfass 
broadly finds similarities in Schopenhauer to ‘Indian’ ideas and Conze believes 
that Schopenhauer’s work bears ‘numerous, and almost miraculous, coincidences 
with the basic tenets of Buddhist philosophy’ (Conze, 1968, p. 222). In fact 
Conze, rather enthusiastically, claims that ‘[i]t is only on two points that he 
[Schopenhauer] differs from Buddhism.’ (Ibid., p. 223.)218 We must take this 
claim in the context of a general comparison and Conze seems to rein his 
comments in again just one page later. 
 
Schopenhauer himself, rather than simply stating that there are comparisons 
between his system and Buddhism, gives some limited examples of where he 
thinks the similarities lie. For example, he is aware (by WWR2 in 1844) of the 
Four Noble Truths, all of which are mirrored in Schopenhauer: 
 
[In Buddhism]…all improvement, conversion, and salvation to be 
hoped for from this world of suffering, from this Samsara, proceed 
from the knowledge of the four fundamental truths: (1) dolor, (2) 
doloris ortus, (3) doloris interitus, (4) octopartita via ad doloris 
sedationem.219
(WWR2, Ch. XLVIII, Payne, 1969, p. 623) 
 
These truths, of course, are common to all Buddhist schools and cannot be taken 
as any more than evidence of Schopenhauer having a general acquaintance with 
Buddhism. Even by the time he wrote WWR2 it is still highly doubtful, in my 
view, that he would have known of the subtle differences between the major 
schools of Buddhism which later scholarship has afforded and it is therefore very 
difficult to ascertain whether or not he knew there were different schools; he, for 
example, tends to refer to Buddhism as it existed geographically (in Burma, 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), China, Japan and Tibet) but it is not at all clear that he had a 
good grasp of what the differences were.220 He is aware of the perfection of 
wisdom, and although (in this context) he mentions the Mahāyāna, there is no 
                                                 
218 Conze thinks Schopenhauer does not realise that meditation is important and that he 
misunderstands the relationship of craving to nirvāňa. I am not so sure Conze is right about a lack 
of meditation in Schopenhauer. (For example, see WWR1 §39, especially pp. 203-4 in Payne’s 
translation.)  
219 (1) suffering’s existence, (2) suffering’s cause, (3) suffering’s end, (4) the eightfold path to the 
relief of suffering. (My translation.) There is at least an implicit acknowledgement from 
Schopenhauer here that in Buddhism knowledge has an impact on behaviour and that if knowledge 
improves, behaviour changes. He does not accommodate that view in his own philosophy but 
neither is he critical of it in Buddhism. He does think that knowledge can help people to transcend 
suffering but does not accept that our moral character is changeable. 
220 For what it is worth, he does not refer to Christianity by geographical area but talks about 
Protestant and Catholic. He also talks about ‘the Mohammedans’ as though it were a collective 
without differentiation. These do not give any real clues, I feel, as to what he understood of the 
differences between the schools of Islam or of Buddhism or if he was even aware that there were 
any more than regional variations of one thing in the case of the latter. 
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clear evidence that he knew what made it distinct from non-Mahāyāna forms of 
Buddhism or even if he knew that Buddhism was anything other than Mahāyāna, 
even in Burma and Ceylon. In fact, he mentions the prajñāpāramitā as though it 
were generally Buddhist rather than specifically Mahāyāna Buddhist: 
 
to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real 
world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is – nothing…This is also 
the Prajna-Paramita of the Buddhists, the “beyond all knowledge,” in 
other words, the point where subject and object no longer exist. See I. 
J. Schmidt, Ueber das Mahajana und Pradschna-Paramita. 
 (WWR1 §71, Payne, 1969, p. 412) 
 
This is in WWR1 and by WWR2 he does not seem to have advanced his 
knowledge of the idea or school from which it comes nor does he mention that it 
is related to the Noble Eightfold Path (which he knows about by this time too, see 
WWR2, Payne, 1969, p. 623) nor does he mention it in context with the other five 
pāramitās. In fact his source for the prajñāpāramitā is exactly the same in both 
volumes (despite being around 26 years apart) and is not supplemented by any 
other references to the pāramitās at all. The reference, 26 years later, again is to 
Schmidt: 
 
knowledge and plurality, or individuation, stand and fall together, for 
they condition each other. It is to be concluded from this that, beyond 
the phenomenon, in the true being in-itself of things, to which time 
and space, and therefore plurality, must be foreign, there cannot exist 
any knowledge. Buddhism describes this as Prajna Paramita, i.e., that 
which is beyond all knowledge. (See I. J. Schmidt, On the Mahayana 
and Prachna- Paramita.) 
 (WWR2, Ch. XXII, Payne, 1969, p. 275) 
 
This might tell us that he was unaware of the other pāramitās or their relationship 
to the Eightfold Path, or it might tell us that he did not consider the other 
pāramitās important enough to mention. Any conclusion on this would be a 
matter of conjecture.  
 
Returning to the Four Noble Truths, comparisons can be made with 
Schopenhauer’s idea that (1) the world is a place of suffering and all sentient 
creatures experience that suffering in it, (2) suffering is caused by a kind of desire 
or craving, (3) it might be possible to overcome this suffering and (4) that the way 
of overcoming involves a path of knowledge and certain kinds of action.221  
 
As far as other general comparisons go, both Conze and Dauer go so far as to say 
that the similarities between Schopenhauer and Buddhism are so obvious that a 
comparison should only point out the differences. (See Conze, 1968, pp. 222ff and 
throughout Dauer’s short 1969 commentary.)  
 
However, despite this claim I believe there are at least two major areas of 
comparison which have been largely overlooked by other commentators: 
                                                 
221 Cf. Nicholls (in Janaway 1999, pp. 189-96) who believes that ‘what can be compared is a 
general [my italics] outline of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and what is commonly taken to be the 
essential teaching of Buddhism.’ (Nicholls in Janaway 1999, p. 188.) 
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Schopenhauer’s principle of sufficient reason vis à vis dependent origination and 
the concept of rebirth. 
 
7.3.1 The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Dependent Origination 
Sufficient Reason 
Schopenhauer sees a version of the world (our version) as existing at the level of 
(our) ideas. Whatever we take to be ‘real’ in these ideas is, for Schopenhauer, not 
the way things really are and is only apparently real as a result of our mental 
constructs. In other words, for Schopenhauer the things which appear to exist in a 
certain way (i.e. as cognisable objects to sentient animals) do so only as a result of 
the forces which suspend them in the artificial realm of cognisance and that means 
there is a dependent relationship between objects and their representation as 
apparently projected permanencies to us. Schopenhauer (after Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hume, Kant, Wolff and others: see FR, §1-10, 
Payne, 1995, pp. 5-31) calls this sufficient reason; in other words things have their 
apparent existence in dependence on other factors. I think this can be compared to 
the Buddhist concept of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and I think it 
does the same job in both philosophies.  
 
Although Schopenhauer acknowledges that the principle of sufficient reason ‘has 
frequently been stated in a general way long ago’ (ibid., p. 2, also see p. 9) he 
goes on to point out that he is the first to examine it in adequate detail (ibid., pp. 
2-3). The most concise summary of it comes as ‘everything has a reason or 
ground which justifies us in everywhere asking why’ (ibid., p. 5). In other words 
when we ask why something is the case, there will be a reason(s) why it is so. In 
fact this must be the case with everything, he thinks, and he accepts Wolff’s 
assertion that ‘Nothing is without a ground or reason [as to] why it is’ (ibid., p. 6). 
 
In explaining the principle of sufficient reason in FR, Schopenhauer refers us to 
both WWR1 and WWR2 where, as he himself points out, the arguments are more 
of a summary and repetition of what he has already explained more fully in FR. 
Nevertheless, there are illuminating passages in both WWR1 and 2 which help 
explain the relationship between one state or thing and another: 
 
The consequence of the action of every material object on another is 
known only in so far as the latter now acts on the immediate object in 
a way different from that in which it acted previously…[t]hus cause 
and effect are the whole essence and nature of matter; its being is its 
acting. 
(WWR1 §4, Payne, 1969, p. 9) 
 
Something similar is advanced in WWR2 where he tells us that ‘Every change in 
the material world can appear only in so far as another change has immediately 
preceded it; this is the true and entire content of the law of causality’ (WWR2, 
Payne, 1969, ch. 4, p. 39). Then, returning to FR, he explains how we got to the 
stage we are now and implicit in this, I think, is the suggestion that incremental 
changes will drive us forward to our next definable state:  
 
we again find ourselves on the ladder of causes up which we are 
whipped by the inexorable law of causality higher and higher, ad 
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infinitum, ad infinitum…[t]he law of causality is therefore not so 
obliging as to allow itself to be used like a cab which we dismiss after 
we reach our destination.  
(FR §20, 1995, Payne, p. 58) 
 
Although I see no developed analogue to karma in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
the above passage does suggest that he has some idea of cause and effect and 
changes occurring due to what has previously been done. Part of the reason I am 
cautious about making a comparison here is that it would require a very detailed 
analysis of what he takes to be the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient 
reason and the comparison I have thus far made looks at only one class of the four 
roots. The principle of sufficient reason is constituted, for Schopenhauer, of four 
classes of object (material, logical, mathematical and moral) and an extended 
treatment of them is beyond the scope of the current work. However, if we 
continue to look only at the first one (material form), then Schopenhauer believes 
nothing comes into being or exists in isolation: 
 
the principle of sufficient reason appears as the law of causality, and I 
call it as such the principle of sufficient reason or ground of 
becoming…[t]hrough it are mutually connected all the objects 
presenting themselves in the entire general representation, which 
constitutes the complex of the reality of experience, as regards the 
appearance and disappearance of their states…[t]he principle is that, if 
a new state of one or several real objects appears, another state must 
have preceded it upon which the new state follows regularly… 
(Ibid., pp. 52-3) 
 
In other words things are the way they are as a result of what has preceded them. 
This general principle is intended to cover everything which is in the phenomenal 
world. I think Richard Taylor in his introduction to FR gives a pertinent example 
of what Schopenhauer means in the above explanation when he says: 
 
No thing ever comes into being or ceases to be. Causes and effects are 
always changes in what already existed. We think, for example, of a 
flower coming into being and then perishing, but in fact what has 
happened is this: Matter…undergoes certain changes, losing certain 
properties and acquiring others, until at a given point in time and 
space it has the properties of a flower. Subsequently, these particular 
properties are replaced by others, and we say that the flower has 
perished…  
(FR, 1995, Payne, from the Introduction by Richard Taylor, p. xiii) 
 
Schopenhauer has already said as much in a different example (see below, p. 149) 
when he talks about living creatures as constituted by what was considered in the 
past to be mere dust and ashes. Everything changes and whatever seems to exist 
only does so in relation to other things; nothing exists absolutely, nothing exists in 
isolation, nothing comes into or out of being without a cause or causes – 
everything is dependent on other things which are in turn dependent on others ad. 
infinitum. 
 
an unbroken chain of causes and effects fills the whole of time…the 
changes (in other words, the succession of states or conditions) are a 
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continuum, like the time they fill…and each of them with reference to 
the one preceding it is called “effect,” and with reference to the one 
succeeding it, “cause.” 
(WWR2, Ch. Ch. IV, Payne, 1969, p. 39) 
 
Schopenhauer believes that his idea of the grounds of sufficient reason shows that 
objects only appear to be existent and that if we look for justification for 
believing such objects are real, we will find it since there is a chain of what seem 
to be causal relationships which all lead up to the apparent reality. In fact this is 
no proof that the things in question are real – just that what artificially makes 
them so is so. In other words, when we look for a validation of conventional 
reality and our means of validation are restricted to conventional reality, then we 
will find our justification. That does not mean that conventional reality is real 
reality. If a very intelligent fish in Loch Lomond looked for evidence there of life 
forms which do not live under water, it would not find them since it is limited to 
an underwater life itself. It may then erroneously conclude that life consisted 
solely of fish and the world was limited to Loch Lomond. The unenlightened 
human can no more step outside of its life-picture than can the fish. 
 
7.3.2 Dependent Origination222
In Buddhism the concept of dependent origination is a way of explaining the 
states we find ourselves in in saņsāra: that can be a state of suffering as well as 
states of pleasure and everything in between. Dependent origination explains the 
causal links between things and a very general way to summarise the idea is to 
say, as earlier when looking at the principle of sufficient reason, that things are the 
way they are in dependence on what caused them. In Buddhism, as in 
Schopenhauer, nothing self-creates so both rule out the idea of creation from 
nothing; in fact, not only is creation from nothing ruled out in both Buddhism and 
Schopenhauer, but the idea of a self-created omnipotent God is ruled out.  
 
Everything has a cause behind it and in Buddhism this is expressed in the form of 
a chain with twelve links: ignorance has a causal link to formations which have a 
causal link to consciousness, which links to mind and form/body, then senses, 
sense contact, feeling, craving, grasping, becoming, birth, old age and death. (See 
SN II:12:1.) 
 
If everything is dependent on a cause or causes then nothing exists independently 
or permanently; things only exist for as long as their causes exist and in this way 
saņsāra is seen as the realm of transient things. Dependent origination provides a 
principle which accounts for everything in saņsāra:223
 
All elements of saņsāra exist in some sense or another relative to their 
causes and conditions. That is why they are impermanent, for if the 
cause is impermanent then so too will be the effect. In particular, our 
                                                 
222 Also known as ‘conditioned arising’ and ‘conditioned co-production’. 
223 Although see Conze, 1962, Ch. 2, p. 158 who takes this to be an Abhidharma idea and points 
out that: ‘Some schools maintained that conditioned co-production is unconditioned. As one may 
say that nothing is permanent except impermanence, so also that nothing is unconditioned except 
that everything is conditioned. This had great consequences for the future.’ 
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own existence as embodied individuals is the result of the coming 
together of appropriate causes, and we exist just as long as appropriate 
causes keep us in existence. 
(Williams and Tribe, 2003, p. 64) 
 
Although everything in saņsāra is transient, most sentient creatures are ignorant 
of this. That ignorance is what keeps them from seeing the reality of the situation 
and seeing that reality is what differentiates the enlightened from the 
unenlightened, the sufferers from those who have found liberation from suffering. 
Just as there is a chain of causal dependence, there is a way to destroy the chain 
through taking away the conditions to which the links attach. Tŗşňā (thirst, 
craving) is crucial here: 
 
This, monks, is the truth of suffering: 
Birth is suffering; ageing is suffering; sickness is suffering; death is 
suffering; 
association with what one dislikes is suffering; separation from what 
one likes is suffering, not to get what one wants is suffering; 
in short, the five groups of grasping[224] are suffering. 
 
This, monks, is the truth of the cause of suffering: 
It is thirst, that leads to rebirth, accompanied by pleasure and lust, 
finding its delight here and there, the thirst for sensual pleasures, the 
thirst for existence, the thirst for non-existence. 
 
This, monks, is the truth of the cessation of suffering: 
It is the complete fading and cessation of this thirst, 
its forsaking and giving up, the liberation and detachment from it. 
(SN II: 12:20, Bodhi, 2000 (my modification)) 
 
The way to overcoming this thirst (tŗşňā) it is to follow the Eightfold Path. 
Following the path creates the conditions in which the chain can be broken and 
the conditions on which it relies no longer pertain. 
 
If suffering ceases because the causes of suffering cease and the causes of 
suffering cease when grasping/thirst/craving ceases, then there is a parallel in 
Schopenhauer who also has a soteriological exit with his idea of liberation from 
suffering through the negation of willing altogether. In other words if you do not 
crave then you do not suffer. 
 
Dependent origination has a clear connection to rebirth in that if you destroy the 
chains which cause arising then there is nothing to arise or be reborn. Rebirth is a 
concept Schopenhauer was aware of and he believes his own philosophy 
accommodates it closely. 
 
7.3.3 Rebirth 
Rebirth has an analogue in Schopenhauer but, despite his claims for affinity with 
Buddhism, I think it turns out to be an area of divergence, at least when compared 
to Mādhyamaka Buddhism.  When examining the coming into being of apparently 
                                                 
224 form, feelings, cognitions, inclinations, and perceptions (knowledge or consciousness). 
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new life, Schopenhauer is happy to accept that creatures were not created by an 
omnipotent god (as we have seen as a consequence of his principle of sufficient 
reason, see above p. 147, although that is not the only reason) but believes they 
have a link with what has happened in the past:  
 
the millions of animals of every kind which come into existence at 
every moment in endless variety, full of force and drive, can never 
have been absolutely nothing before the act of their generation, and 
can never have arrived from nothing to an absolute beginning. 
(WWR2, Ch. XLI, Payne, 1969, p. 476) 
 
Creatures come into being as a result of previous ones following the ego-driven 
will whose strongest manifestation is the impulse to procreate. The will drives all 
creatures ever onward to produce more willed beings, and although 
Schopenhauer’s writings come well before developed evolutionary theory, he 
does suggest that we are prepared to undergo all manner of avoidable dangers 
simply in order to reproduce, thus satisfying the will of nature: ‘If in our 
conception of the world we start from the thing-in-itself, we find as its kernel and 
greatest concentration the act of generation’ (PP2, §166, Payne, 1974, p. 316). 
This act of generation burdens us with even more than we had previously had to 
endure: ‘in the case of man, there is associated with sexual satisfaction an 
obstinate selection, peculiar to him alone, which rises sometimes to a more or less 
passionate love…In this way, it becomes for him a source of much suffering and 
little pleasure’ (PP2, §153, Payne, 1974, p. 295).  
 
There are also all manner of dreadful things we are prepared to do to simply 
continue our existence for another five minutes but even this personal 
continuation can be overcome, although not by everyone, if the survival of our 
offspring is jeopardised. Although we are phenomenally different from others, 
including our offspring, we are noumenally the same. Phenomenon is the world of 
appearance and it may appear to us that egotistical actions are sensible but the 
whole thing is an illusion. 
 
If we imagine ourselves as just matter, we know that regardless of how that matter 
came into being in the first place, once it is in existence it is neither created nor 
destroyed. It may be manifested as energy, it may appear on its own or it may be 
manifested as part of a conglomerate with other matter. There is a temptation to 
think that ‘lifeless’ matter, say in the form of the dust and ashes to which our 
corporeal bodies return, is in some way inferior to matter which has organised 
itself into the form of human beings who are conscious. Schopenhauer advises us 
not to be dismissive of this dust and ashes and not to regard it as permanently 
lifeless and static – we are it and it is us: 
 
But it will be asked: ‘How is the permanence of mere dust, of crude 
matter, to be regarded as a continuance of our true inner nature?’ Oh! 
Do you know this dust then? Do you know what it is and what it can 
do? Learn to know it before you despise it. This matter, now lying 
here as dust and ashes, will soon form into crystals when dissolved in 
water; it will shine as metal; it will then emit electric sparks. By 
means of its galvanic tension it will manifest a force which, 
decomposing the strongest and firmest combinations, reduces earths to 
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metals. It will, indeed of its own accord, form itself into plant and 
animal; and from its mysterious womb it will develop that life, about 
the loss of which you in your narrowness of mind are so nervous and 
anxious. 
(WWR2, Ch. XLI, Payne, 1969, p. 472) 
 
We have a false view of reality and do not see that there is a permanent organising 
and reorganising of non-living things into living ones then living ones into non-
living things. The people who will be around in their billions in the future will be 
composed of the dust and ashes which is present now. Time is what makes dust 
and ashes appear to be separate from conscious living entities and time is, for 
Schopenhauer, ‘a form and limitation of our intellect’ (ibid., p. 479). 
 
For Schopenhauer there is constant rebirth or rebecoming (although not the 
reincarnation of an ātman or soul) but time prevents us from seeing that. Time 
(along with space and causality) is the artificial construct of sentient creatures. 
Sentient creatures fail to see that there is endless becoming (an idea Schopenhauer 
will have encountered in Plato; see, FR, Payne, 1995, p. 232), and wrongly 
assume an individual life starts at one point and ends at another. We should 
remember that this is seen at a conventional (or phenomenal) level for 
Schopenhauer. Ultimately (noumenally) existence is not the way we see it and it is 
therefore not clear how similar or different he is to a Buddhist idea of rebirth or to 
a Mādhyamaka idea of the emptiness of self.225 He himself, at least, believes his 
idea of rebirth is to some extent similar: 
 
it appears that there are in Buddhism, as regards continued existence 
after death, an exoteric and an esoteric doctrine. The former is just 
metempsychosis as in Brahmanism, but the latter is a palingenesis 
which is much more difficult to understand and is very much in 
agreement with my doctrine of the metaphysical permanence of the 
[W]ill in spite of the intellect’s physical constitution and fleeting 
nature in keeping therewith. 
(PP2, §140, Payne, 1974, pp. 276-7) 
 
Schopenhauer thinks that this small droplet of impermanent will returns to the 
non-plural pool of Will. It was never anything other than part of the pool but we 
tend to labour under the misapprehension that it was, in the same way as a wave, 
despite being made entirely of water, appears to be distinct from it. It both is and 
is not. He likens the varieties of life and their relation to Will as a kaleidoscope 
‘that shows us a new configuration at every turn, whereas really we always have 
the same thing before our eyes’ (WWR2, op. cit., p. 478). 
 
I read him as differing from Śāntideva in that he believes (notwithstanding his 
claim to reject metempsychosis) that there is some permanent core to us which is 
the noumenal Will and it is this which maintains constant rebirth: ‘man as 
phenomenon is certainly perishable, yet his true inner being is not affected by this. 
Hence this true inner being is indestructible [my italics].’ (Ibid., p. 494). 
Schopenhauer is quite clear that what is impermanent is the phenomenon (which 
                                                 
225 Whether or not he would accept the pre-Mahāyāna idea of a person being constitutive of 
consecutive dharmas or the Mādhyamaka idea of nothing having any discernable beginning or end 
(including dharmas) is unclear. 
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is the same in Mādhyamaka Buddhism) but what is permanent is the Will – which 
is not the same: 
 
with death consciousness is certainly lost, but not what produced and 
maintained consciousness; life is extinguished, but with it not the 
principle of life which manifested itself in it. Therefore a sure and 
certain feeling says to everyone that there is in him something 
positively imperishable and indestructible [my italics]. 
(Ibid., p. 495) 
 
And: 
 
Consciousness is the life of the subject of knowing, or of the brain, 
and death is its end. Therefore consciousness is finite, is always new, 
beginning each time at the beginning. The [W]ill alone is permanent 
[my italics]. 
(Ibid., p. 500) 
 
When we die it is not that ‘we’ return to ‘our’ original place or position but, 
rather, that the coalescing ideas contained within the space-time framework 
(which are taken as individuality) no longer coalesce, but there is something 
permanent and indestructible which underlies everything which appears as 
fleeting phenomena.  
 
When Schopenhauer examines death he looks at animals, who are not, he thinks, 
aware of the possibility of their own death, but humans are and this knowledge 
terrifies us. We can compensate to a certain extent by having metaphysical ideas 
which can offer some consolation and these take the form of religion and some 
philosophies. It is incorrect to think of death as complete annihilation or as 
immortality ‘but we have not so much to find a correct mean as rather to gain the 
higher standpoint from which such views disappear of themselves’ (ibid., p. 464). 
 
He thinks it is irrational to fear being dead since this will be exactly the same 
situation as it was before our birth. Since we do not fear those countless eons then 
we should not fear the ones after our phenomenal entity ceases to exist. He thinks 
these two periods of non-existence are divided only by ‘the intervention of an 
ephemeral life-dream’ (ibid., p. 467). 
 
This life-dream is a temporary identification as a projected entity which comes 
from Will. That entity ceases to exist upon death with conscious life having been 
nothing but a temporary aberration: 
 
I stood on a mercury trough and with an iron ladle drew off a few 
drops. I threw them up and again caught them in the ladel [sic]. When 
I missed, they fell back into the trough and nothing was lost except 
their momentary form; and so success and failure left me somewhat 
indifferent. Thus is the natura naturans or inner nature of all things 
related to the life and death of individuals. 
(PP2, §384, op. cit., p. 648) 
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We should be happy about the certainty of our phenomenal extinction, he thinks, 
since that extinction is effectively release from the abnormality which we call 
‘life’. This cheerful resignation to death is simply the abandoning of the 
individual will to life; a will which is the source of all our moral conflicts. The 
will-less state beyond our conception is nothingness, which he likens to nirvāňa: 
 
to die willingly, to die gladly, to die cheerfully, is the prerogative of the 
resigned, of him who gives up and denies the will-to-live. For he alone 
wishes to die actually and not merely apparently, and consequently 
needs and desires no continuance of his person. He willingly gives up the 
existence that we know; what comes to him instead of it is in our eyes 
nothing, because our existence in reference to that one is nothing. The 
Buddhist faith calls that existence Nirvana, that is to say, extinction. 
(WWR2, op. cit., p. 508)226
 
He thinks that since this extinction, or death, is when our consciousness ceases, it 
can be likened to an extended fainting fit or sleep and that we experience a little 
bit of death every night when we go to bed. We would be none the wiser if we 
slept for a hundred years or were in a coma for months – life is only life for us 
when we are conscious of it.  
 
there is just as little occasion for concluding that, because organized life 
has here ceased, the force that actuated it hitherto has also become 
nothing; just as little as there is to infer from the stopping of the 
spinning-wheel the death of the spinner. If, by finding its centre of 
gravity again, a pendulum finally comes to rest, and thus its individual 
apparent life has ceased, no one will suppose that gravitation is 
annihilated, but everyone sees that now as always it is active in 
innumerable phenomena. 
(Ibid., pp. 470-1) 
 
Will, or Life-Force or Inner Nature finds different forms – sometimes rocks and 
fish and at other times sentient self-aware creatures. 
 
taken already as a force of nature, vital force remains entirely untouched 
by the change of forms and states, which the bond of cause and effect 
introduces and carries off again, and which alone are subject to arising 
and passing away, just as these processes lie before us in experience. To 
this extent, therefore, the imperishableness of our true inner nature [my 
italics] could already be certainly demonstrated. 
(Ibid., pp. 470-1) 
 
The intellect ceases when the body it relies on no longer functions. Thus for 
Schopenhauer the intellect which has created the world as its own idea vanishes 
and reality returns to being unperceived and to its original core of timeless Will. 
He is sure that our phenomenal existence ceases but that something continues. 
                                                 
226 Schopenhauer has a footnote to ‘Nirvana’ where he explains various other translations of the 
word, such as nera (without) vana (life); without sinful desires; departed or escaped from misery; 
the opposite of saņsāra; complete vanishing. Schopenhauer also acknowledges here that in 
WWR1 from 1818, he had not really understood this concept and was now better informed. 
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This something exists before the thing we call ‘I’ and it does not cease with our 
physical death. 
 
man as phenomenon is certainly perishable, yet his true inner being is not 
affected by this. Hence this true inner being is indestructible [my italics], 
although, on account of the elimination of the time-concepts which is 
connected with this, we cannot attribute continuance to it. Accordingly, 
we should be led here to the concept of an indestructibility that was 
nevertheless not a continuance. 
(Ibid., p. 494)227
 
Will is the part of us, the inner-nature, which survives death, but intellect – the 
part which mistakenly tells us we exist as a personal entity – does not. 
 
Accordingly, the word palingenesis is more correct than metempsychosis 
for describing this doctrine [that intellect is temporary and does not 
remember previous life and that the Will alone is permanent]. These 
constant rebirths then constitute the succession of the life-dreams of a 
[W]ill in itself indestructible [my italics]. 
(Ibid., pp. 502-3) 
 
Śāntideva would not make a positive statement about a permanent core and we 
may assume that this idea of Schopenhauer’s is incompatible with what Śāntideva 
(and indeed the Mādhyamaka more generally) taught.228
 
Schopenhauer seems to have unwittingly come up with some Hindu-Buddhist 
hybrid interpretation of rebirth. The Hindu component is that, like the mercury 
trough, there is something permanent to which we (the mercury drops) return after 
death; the trough can be likened to Brahman.229 The Buddhist component is that 
during the ‘life dream’ the entity, like the mercury drops, only exists in a 
conventional or relative sense and has no permanency. However, the traditional 
Buddhist idea of rebirth would be more of a chain of consecutive karmic 
formations which produce similar karmic formations and through that a certain 
direction appears. This is not metempsychosis, but neither is it a return to some 
kind of ‘mother’ form as it seems to be in Schopenhauer. 
 
If we had a complete knowledge of our own true nature through and 
through to its innermost core, we should regard it as ridiculous to 
demand the immortality of the individual, since this would be equivalent 
to giving up that true inner nature in exchange for a single one of its 
innumerable manifestations, or fulgurations. 
(PP2 op. cit., §137, p. 271) 
 
Schopenhauer thinks there is a core. It is beyond the individual but is, he believes, 
at the centre of existence and seems to transcend the phenomenal world. However, 
                                                 
227 Because any knowledge we have is still a representation of something else, therefore we can 
never fully know anything. 
228 Although that might not be the case with the concept of Buddha-nature which was widely 
adopted in Mahāyāna after the time of Śāntideva. It might be fruitful to examine this in future 
studies of the relationship between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and that of the Yogācāra. 
229 Although strictly speaking the ‘reunification’ with Brahman takes place only when you reach 
salvation. 
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in Mādhyamaka Buddhism there is no core, no permanency and nothing has 
essence. As I have indicated earlier, this is largely the case for Theravāda and 
Yogācāra Buddhism too; in fact one of the things which sets Buddhism in 
opposition to Hinduism is the idea of nothing existing independently and nothing 
being permanent.230 Again, Schopenhauer sounds more Hindu than Buddhist here. 
 
I would not wish, however, to draw too strong a comparison with Hindu ideas of 
reincarnation since there are, I believe, some inconsistencies in his treatment of it 
which leave the door open a little to more than one interpretation. The most 
pertinent is a non-specific comment he makes which may be taken as an 
(unknowing) nod to the śūnyatā doctrine: 
 
To begin, to end, and to continue are concepts that derive their 
significance simply and solely from time; consequently they are valid 
only on the presupposition of time. But time has no absolute existence; it 
is not the mode and manner of the being-in-itself of things, but merely 
the form of our knowledge of the existence and inner being of ourselves 
and of all things; and for this reason such knowledge is very imperfect, 
and is limited to mere phenomena. Thus in reference to this knowledge 
alone do the concepts of ceasing and continuing find application, not in 
reference to that which manifests itself in them, namely the being-in-
itself of things; applied to this, such concepts therefore no longer have 
any true meaning…We might indeed assert that our being-in-itself 
continues after death, because it would be wrong to say that it was 
destroyed; but we might just as well assert that it is destroyed, because it 
would be wrong to say that it continues; at bottom, the one is just as true 
as the other. 
(WWR2, op. cit., p. 493) 
 
Overall I do not find his claims for affinity with a Buddhist conception of rebirth 
(or palingenesis as he calls it) as convincing as he does. 
 
 
7.4 Schopenhauer and Mādhyamaka Buddhism 
I agree with the various commentators (above) that some general areas of both 
systems of thought are compatible, but I think a more detailed comparison can be 
made in the specific area of compassion as the central element of ethics and in 
what both Mādhyamaka Buddhism and Schopenhauer take to be the wisdom or 
knowledge required to find liberation from the sufferings of existence. 
 
In the few comparisons already made, what has emerged is that there is no clear 
consensus as to whether Schopenhauer’s philosophy is similar to Buddhism in 
general or to any school in particular. Amongst those who believe a comparison is 
fruitful, there is likewise no clear consensus as to how deep the comparison can 
go – in which case there might be only superficial similarities. I would like to 
avoid making too much of comparisons which look at superficial points (such as 
the fact that in both systems there is the idea that living involves suffering/duųkha 
and both advocate non-cruelty to animals, cf. Abelsen, 1993, p. 256) and this can 
be achieved by comparing Schopenhauer’s specific moral value of compassion to 
                                                 
230 Although, as we have seen, in Theravāda there are dharmas which, arguably, ‘exist’ and in 
Yogācāra and later Mahāyāna there is the concept of Buddha Nature. 
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that of the Mādhyamaka. Śāntideva, to me, embodies the central idea of 
compassion in the Mādhyamaka and the emphasis is therefore on Schopenhauer’s 
ideas in relation to Śāntideva’s. 
 
7.4.1 Morality and the World as Idea 
If we accept Schopenhauer’s argument that our world exists at the level of ideas 
and the Mādhyamaka view that the conventional world is not reality (a view 
shared by Schopenhauer) then it might seem that compassion as the basis of 
morality makes no sense since compassion does not appear to deal with reality but 
only with its representations in the conventional ‘dreamlike’ world. This objection 
is exactly like Śāntideva and the Yogācāra having their discussion about whether 
or not there is anything wrong in killing someone who (according to the 
Mādhyamaka and to Schopenhauer) does not ultimately exist (see BCA 9:11). We 
are actually in the illusion right now and none of us even as illusions would enjoy 
the prospect of being ‘illusorily’ killed. Another side of the same thing is that 
most of us would be quite happy if we were shown ‘illusory’ compassion despite 
the fact that our existence cannot be proven. This problem (discussed above p. 
124) is explicitly mentioned by Śāntideva in BCA 9:75ff and he says that for the 
sake of compassion we do not reject illusion.  
 
As far as the ‘illusory’ world goes morality has to operate in it since that 
‘dreamworld’ is the one we (ignorantly) inhabit. Mādhyamaka Buddhism and 
Schopenhauer both offer to wake us up through the understanding of our situation. 
Neither claim (as some have assumed) that the conventional world does not exist, 
just that it is not as we assume. Śāntideva discusses this when he talks about the 
ignorant and the wise (BCA 9:5), where the ignorant think that conventional 
things are true and the wise understand that the conventional world is not 
ultimately real.231
 
This ‘metaphysical superstructure’ in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is what 
underpins his ethics and I think Schopenhauer is right to say that moral 
philosophy finds its best application in a university rather than in the real world 
and experience shows that in recorded history people seem to be stubbornly 
immune to adhering to university-invented systems but, instead, stick to the kind 
of behaviour Schopenhauer observes. This may seem like a pessimistic conclusion 
whereas there is more optimism in Buddhism about our ability to find salvation 
from suffering. The reason Schopenhauer’s conclusion is pessimistic is, I believe, 
largely as a result of his belief that people cannot morally ‘improve’, which itself 
is due to his belief that there is a core Will which cannot be changed. Obviously at 
this point there is an important difference between Buddhist ethics and 
Schopenhauer’s. I do not accept Schopenhauer’s thesis of an unchangeable core 
and think that if he dropped that quasi-Platonic idea then we would not be left 
with a pessimistic conclusion as to the possibility of escaping suffering. This is 
something I think he could learn from Buddhism and adapt to his system and it is 
difficult in this respect to agree with him that his conclusions are remarkably 
similar to those found in Buddhism. Having said that, there are times when 
Schopenhauer is quite correct to compare his ethics with Buddhist ethics, but is 
                                                 
231 Note he does not say that the wise have a perfect understanding of reality. 
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mistaken in another very important area: that of drawing a comparison between 
himself and Buddhism when it comes to the finer detail of the path to liberation 
from suffering. As we have seen (above pp. 19ff), Schopenhauer (rightly in my 
view) thinks it is not possible to examine his moral system in isolation from the 
metaphysical superstructure which lies behind it, and it is worth summarising that 
metaphysical system in order to illuminate the ethics. 
 
7.4.2 Summary of Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics 
For Schopenhauer the world exists in two ways: as it really is and also as revealed 
to us in perception; hence the World as Will and Representation respectively. 
Animals and ordinary humans readily know only the world as representation.232 
Sentient creatures see the world as dependent on what he calls sufficient reason: 
i.e. three dimensions of space, linear time and causality which appear to give us 
empirical reasons for justifying our view as ‘real’. Were any or all of these three 
elements to be missing, then our view of the world would be radically different. 
Our view is not the correct view: it is merely a possible view and is incomplete: 
‘This actual world of what is knowable, in which we are and which is in us, 
remains both the material and the limit of our consideration’ (WWR1, op. cit., p. 
273). The world as it actually is (beyond our experience), the world as Will, has 
manifestations as phenomena and the Will can be seen as a force or property of 
energy which exists in all phenomenal things. The wish to procreate is an example 
of the underlying Will, the wish to stay alive is another very strong one in all 
animals. The Will is also manifested in less significant things such as the wish to 
move one’s arm, turn one’s head or even in the form of gravity found in inanimate 
objects. Influenced by our perception of reality as one which resides within space, 
time and causality, we readily identify with a ‘self’ which we distinguish from 
‘others’. Being driven on by the relentless force of Will and accepting that there 
are differences between ourselves and others contributes to the sufferings of the 
world since we are self-absorbed and less interested in the sufferings of others 
than we are in our own. This world as representation is one of suffering, fear and 
death (see PP2, Ch. XII, pp. 291-305233). However, the primary source of 
suffering is not the activities of others but our own will which drives us ever 
onward with three possible outcomes: firstly the possibility of temporarily 
satisfying the will, secondly the disappointment of failing to temporarily satisfy 
the will and thirdly the disappointment of failing to permanently satisfy the will. 
In the first case imagine the craving for a cigarette; smoking it gives you 
temporary satisfaction. In the second case being denied a cigarette when you want 
one causes (at least) disappointment since the will is not satisfied. In the third 
case, adding up all the small cravings such as the wish for cigarettes and all the 
larger cravings such as not wishing to get old, ill, or to die, combine to create a 
greater form of suffering and in humans there is also the realisation of this and the 
fact that we are impotent (prior to Schopenhauer’s philosophy) in terms of finding 
a solution. Being born, then, is the ‘crime’ for which we suffer, but Schopenhauer 
thinks he has found two solutions, which I would term his minor and major 
solutions to the problem of the sufferings of the world.  
                                                 
232 This is no advance on Kant so far, except that the world as Will, for Schopenhauer, is not 
plural. 
233 This is just for a summary of his explanation of suffering.  There are references too numerous to 
mention throughout WWR1 and 2 and in OBM. 
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 7.4.3 Schopenhauer’s Minor Solution to Suffering 
Schopenhauer believes that we can find a minor form of liberation from suffering 
through aesthetic contemplation. Since phenomenal existence is marked by 
identification with self and the natural condition of that self is one of suffering,234 
it follows that any way we can ‘forget’ the self will result in non-suffering. 
Contemplation which is deep enough to allow one to forget oneself results in 
freedom from suffering, which is essentially freedom from willing. This can be 
achieved by reflecting on works of art, poetry, philosophy and music.235 In fact I 
cannot see Schopenhauer disagreeing with the idea that anything which produces 
a contemplative experience would result in freedom from willing and with it 
freedom from suffering. The point is that we are detached from identification with 
self and object, with perceiver and perceived and in this way the Will is made 
quiet, but it is still there in the background even though we have temporarily 
transcended it by overcoming the principle of sufficient reason as found in space, 
time and causal relationships. The distinction between subject and object no 
longer exists in the contemplator and s/he no longer suffers. The only problem 
with aesthetic contemplation as a solution to suffering is that it offers only a 
temporary solution.236 Schopenhauer was well aware of this and now offers his 
major solution to the sufferings of existence. 
 
7.4.4 Schopenhauer’s Major Solution to Suffering 
Although Schopenhauer does not, in the strict sense, offer a path to salvation (in 
contrast to Śāntideva), he does identify what we might take to be a gradation of 
moral behaviour which has similarities with elements of the path found in the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra. This gradation can be seen as threefold with the first kind of 
behaviour being unable to find salvation and the last as the most able. The first is 
found in the pure egoist, who identifies strongly with their own self and is 
therefore most comprehensively under the influence of the Will. This person 
demands the satisfaction of all their desires and is not interested in the desires of 
others. In fact such a person would have no qualms about using others (people and 
animals) to satisfy their own wants. The second person is one in whom the 
barriers between self and other are beginning to break down and s/he can see 
beyond what Schopenhauer calls the principium individuationis, or the principle 
of individuation. Such a person begins to do exactly as Śāntideva in BCA 8:90-
119 and equalise self and others. They recognise that others are victims of the 
power of Will-driven craving, and as a result, suffer in the same way:  
                                                 
234 This might seem strange from the perspective of the 21st century first world, but at the time of 
writing, Schopenhauer’s developed world was still one where life was incomparably harder and 
shorter than today. He takes suffering to be the natural state of things and for humankind it has 
always been, on the whole, war, famine, disease and want. 
235 Music is a special case where he thinks it is not a representation of a representation (say in the 
way a painting of a landscape might be) but it is a representation of the Will itself. Regardless, it 
does the same job here as the other objects of, and means to, contemplation. 
236 There appears to be special dispensation for the genius, who is able to maintain contemplation 
for longer than others: ‘genius is the capacity to remain in a state of pure perception’ (WWR1, 
Payne, 1969, p. 185). The result of this longer freedom from our skewed view of reality appears to 
be the production of works of art. Cf. the Buddha’s dissatisfaction with his first two meditation 
teachers. Meditation provided only a temporary escape from suffering. 
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But now how is it possible for a suffering which is not mine and does 
not touch me to become just as directly a motive as only my own 
normally does, and to move me to action? As I have said, only by the 
fact that although it is given to me merely as something external, 
merely by means of external intuitive perception or knowledge, I 
nevertheless feel it with him, feel it as my own, and yet not within me, 
but in another person; and thus there occurs what is expressed by 
Calderon…“that there is no difference between suffering and seeing 
suffering.”  
(OBM §18, Payne, 1995, pp. 165-6) 
 
Schopenhauer thinks that it is in fact rather obvious that apparent differences 
between creatures are only superficial, and we might assume, then, that the 
egoist’s view is defective: ‘One must be really quite blind or totally 
chloroformed…not to recognize that the essential and principal thing in the 
animal and man is the same’ (ibid., §19, p. 178). The compassionate person does 
not seek to exploit others nor has s/he any wish to harm them, but instead seeks to 
help them as much as possible: 
 
Boundless compassion for all living beings is the firmest and surest 
guarantee of pure moral conduct…Whoever is inspired with it will 
assuredly injure no one, will wrong no one, will encroach on no one’s 
rights; on the contrary, he will be lenient and patient with everyone, 
will forgive everyone, will help everyone as much as he can, and all 
his actions will bear the stamp of justice, philanthropy, and loving-
kindness…Tastes differ, but I know of no finer prayer than the one 
which ends old Indian dramas…“May all living beings remain free 
from pain.” 
(Ibid., pp. 171-3) 
 
Schopenhauer’s compassionate person cannot be explained: s/he just is. 
Schopenhauer is not concerned with explaining how someone naturally comes to 
be compassionate, i.e. how someone is imbued by nature with the ability to see 
beyond the principium individuationis, but just takes it as a fact of life which I 
think is no stranger than the fact that some people are just born more intelligent 
than others and we, to this day, have no comprehensive explanation as to why this 
is the case.  
 
Every purely beneficent act, every instance of wholly and truly 
disinterested help, which as such has another’s distress as its motive, 
is, if we probe the matter to the bottom, really a mysterious action. It 
is practical mysticism insofar as it ultimately springs from the same 
knowledge that constitutes the essence of all mysticism proper. In no 
other way can it be truly explained. 
(Ibid., §114, p. 212) 
 
The altruist, despite alleviating the sufferings of other sentient creatures, does not 
find full liberation from suffering themselves through being compassionate. That 
comes in the form of the third kind of person who can permanently transcend 
suffering (the ascetic) and this is where I think Śāntideva and Schopenhauer part 
company in quite a significant way. As we have seen, Śāntideva at this point takes 
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the equality of self and others further, to the point of exchanging them and seeing 
no difference between the two. Schopenhauer claims that the way to permanently 
transcend the sufferings of the world caused by the Will, is to deny the Will 
completely. This means transcending everything given to us in perception by 
space, time and causality, transcending our entire world view and negating it 
completely so that the world as representation no longer exists (to us – it will exist 
for those who do not undergo this transcendence): ‘Absolute freedom consists 
simply in there being something not at all subject to the principle of sufficient 
reason’ (WWR2, Ch. XLIII, Payne, 1969, p. 530). The means to that end is the 
very unBuddhist life of the ascetic. The ascetic goes beyond all willing and is 
impervious to the workings of the Will: 
 
The will now turns away from life; it shudders at the pleasures in 
which it recognizes the affirmation of life. Man attains to the state of 
voluntary renunciation, resignation, true composure, and complete 
willessness….We would like to deprive desires of their sting, close the 
entry to all suffering, purify and sanctify ourselves by complete and 
final resignation…the man who sees through the principium 
individuationis, and recognises the true nature of things-in-
themselves…withdraws. His will turns about; it no longer affirms its 
own inner nature, mirrored in the phenomenon, but denies it. The 
phenomenon by which this becomes manifest is the transition from 
virtue to asceticism.237
(WWR2, Ch. XXXI, op. cit., pp. 379-80) 
 
This is a denial of life, at least as it is conventionally taken to be and, for 
Schopenhauer, becoming an ascetic entails giving up on all life altogether, it 
requires ‘the euthanasia of the will.’ (WWR2, Ch, XLIX, op. cit., p. 637). 
Schopenhauer seems to think that this is in tune with Buddhist thinking (the most 
pertinent examples being in his later works, especially at WWR2 pp. 560, 604, 
628, 623, 643, 645) but it clearly is not and radical asceticism was specifically 
identified by the Buddha as a false way of trying to attain liberation. In fact in 
Buddhism there is no conflict between virtue (or morality) and liberation – a view 
which Schopenhauer misunderstands.  
 
Schopenhauer at times seems to almost make the step Śāntideva does, by 
exchanging self and others, but in the end does not attribute sufficient strength to 
this to suggest it as a means of permanent liberation.  
 
But this [feeling another’s suffering as your own] presupposes that to 
a certain extent I have identified myself with the other man, and in 
consequence the barrier between the ego and non-ego is for the 
moment abolished; only then do the other man’s affairs, his needs, 
distress, and suffering, directly become my own. I no longer look at 
him as if he were something given to me by empirical intuitive 
perception, as something strange and foreign, as a matter of 
indifference, as something entirely different from me. On the contrary, 
                                                 
237 This last line is an example of the kind of early view of Buddhism which led to later Western 
misinterpretations (such as King’s and Spiro’s). Some still view Buddhism through the 19th 
century prism and think that liberation is beyond virtue. 
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I share the suffering in him, in spite of the fact that his skin does not 
enclose my nerves. Only in this way can his woe, his distress, become 
a motive for me; otherwise it can be absolutely only my own. I repeat 
that this occurrence is mysterious, for it is something our faculty of 
reason can give no direct account of, and its grounds cannot be 
discovered on the path of experience. And yet it happens every day… 
(OBM, §18, op. cit., pp. 165-6) 
 
Had Schopenhauer lived long enough to gain knowledge of Mādhyamaka 
philosophy, he might well have seen that the exchange of self and other in itself 
could be enough to negate the will rather than making the step to asceticism as he 
does. It is at this point he goes in a direction which is no longer compatible with 
Śāntideva. 
 
Perhaps we could conclude that Śāntideva’s path is intended to offer a long-term 
solution to duųkha which will take (almost) endless amounts of time until all 
sentient creatures are free, whereas Schopenhauer’s permanent solution is only for 
certain human beings in the here and now with the compassionate person 
alleviating the sufferings of unfortunate humans (such as slaves and child mill 
workers, WWR2, p. 578) and animals through not harming them and through 
helping them as much as possible. The best way to reach salvation from suffering 
is by following: 
 
the narrow path of the elect, of the saints, and consequently is to be 
regarded as a rare exception. Therefore without that first path 
[compassion and aesthetic contemplation], it would be impossible for 
the majority to hope for any salvation. 
(WWR2, Ch. XLIX, op. cit., p. 638) 
 
He recommends equalising self and others, acting compassionately and seeing 
through the principium individuationis, all of which can be compared to what 
Śāntideva advocates. However, the problem in the comparison comes with 
Schopenhauer’s recommendation of asceticism and Schopenhauer’s ascetic is not 
anywhere near as compatible to a Buddhist solution as he took it to be. In fact it 
seems that, for Schopenhauer, there are several ways to limit suffering: 
experiencing temporary aesthetic contemplation; experiencing extended periods of 
aesthetic contemplation (the genius); benefiting from acts of compassion from 
those who can see beyond the principium individuationis; denying the will 
altogether through asceticism. This begins to sound rather unlike what Śāntideva 
taught. The perfected Bodhisattva (or Buddha) is free from attachment but 
Schopenhauer’s ascetic saint is free from willing altogether which makes 
Schopenhauer’s enlightened person one who is beyond morality and therefore 
very unlike the Bodhisattva or even the Arhat. It seems that King’s and Spiro’s 
interpretations of the Arhat might be more applicable to Schopenhauer’s ascetic 
saint, and in that respect Schopenhauer’s ethics does not chime with Śāntideva’s. 
 
It seems that the ascetic saint finds salvation in a different way to Śāntideva’s 
Bodhisattva i.e. by renouncing the world. He also thinks the ascetic is an advance 
on the compassionate person and in that respect is not compatible with what 
Śāntideva taught as the focus of morality: 
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it is no longer enough for him [the ascetic] to love others like himself, 
and to do as much for them as himself, but there arises in him a strong 
aversion to the inner nature whose expression is his own phenomena, 
to the will-to-live, the kernel and essence of that world recognized as 
full of misery. He therefore renounces precisely this inner 
nature…[and]…tries to establish firmly in himself, the greatest 
indifference to all things. 
(Ibid., XXXI, p. 380) 
 
Again this sounds more like the kind of claim King and Spiro (mistakenly) make 
in relation to Theravāda Buddhism.  
 
Those lesser beings in Schopenhauer’s scheme who are unable to be ascetic saints 
are the ones who practice equalisation of self and other, but they do not have the 
prajñāpāramitā. Schopenhauer claims that the ascetic does, and sees that ‘this 
very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is – nothing’ (WWR1, §71, 
p. 412). Compassion, then, plays a less important role in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy than in Śāntideva’s and does not offer liberation from suffering in any 
significant way.238 It can be regarded more as a sign of someone who has a better 
grasp of what unites creatures rather than what divides them – the principium 
individuationis which the egoist (wrongly) takes to be reality. Were the 
compassionate person to understand the prajñāpāramitā then, in Schopenhauer’s 
view, s/he would be beyond good and evil and as a life-denying ascetic would 
have no further use for compassion since s/he would have completely renounced 
the world. Clearly this is at odds with Śāntideva’s account of compassion and its 
significance in his philosophy, and in this respect compassion in Buddhism and in 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy do not fulfil the same function. 
 
 
                                                 
238 No matter how altruistic people are to other people and to animals, the fact remains that they all 
experience unsatisfied craving which comes in the ultimate forms of illness and death which no 
amount of compassion can end. Our sufferings are only diluted by compassion but are not ended. 
 Appendix 1: BCA Chapter Outline. 
Ch. Tun-huang Recension Ch. Batchelor, 1979 Crosby and Skilton, 1995 Kelsang, 2002 Berzin, 2004 
1  Untitled 1 The Benefits of the Awakening Mind 
Praise of the Awakening 
Mind 
An Explanation of the 
Benefits of Bodhicitta  
The Benefits of 
Bodhichitta 
2 Disclosure of Evil Confession of Faults Purifying Negativity Openly Admitting Previous Negative Acts 2 Adopting the Awakening Mind (bodhicitta-parigraha) 3 Full Acceptance of the Awakening Mind 
Adopting the Awakening 
Mind 
Generating Engaging 
Bodhicitta  
Gaining Hold of a 
Bodhichitta Aim 
3 Selflessness (nairātmya) 4  Conscientiousness
Vigilance regarding the 
Awakening Mind Relying on Conscientiousness 
Taking Care (about 
Bodhichitta) 
4 The Guarding of Awareness (samprajanya-rakşaňa) 5  Guarding Alertness
The Guarding of 
Awareness Guarding Alertness 
Safeguarding with 
Alertness 
5 Forbearance (kşānti) 6  Patience
The Perfection of 
Forbearance Relying upon Patience Showing Patience 
6 Vigour (virya) 7 Enthusiasm The Perfection of Vigour Relying upon Effort Joyful Perseverance 
7 Meditative Absorption (dhyāna) 8  Meditation
The Perfection of 
Meditative Absorption 
Relying upon Mental 
Stabilization 
Far-Reaching Mental 
Stability 
8 Understanding/Wisdom (prajña) 9  Wisdom
The Perfection of 
Understanding The Perfection of Wisdom 
Far-Reaching 
Discriminating Awareness 
9 Dedication (pariňāmanā) 10    Dedication Dedication Dedication Dedication 
 
Page 162 of 173 
Page 163 of 173 
Appendix 2: BCA 8:101-3 
 
Batchelor, 1979 Crosby and Skilton 1995 Williams, 1998 Kelsang, 2002 Berzin, 2004 
Such things as a continuum and an 
aggregation 
Are false in the same way as a rosary and 
an army. 
There is no (real) owner of suffering, 
Therefore who has control over it? 
The continuum of consciousnesses,  
like a queue, and the combination of 
constituents, like an army, are not 
real.  
The person who experiences 
suffering does not exist.  
To whom will that suffering belong? 
A continuant and a 
collective - such as a (caste) 
row (paģkti) or an army - 
are fictions (mŗşā)  
The one of whom there is a 
pain (duųkha) does not 
exist. Therefore of whom 
will there be ownership of 
that? 
Things that we call 
“continuums” or “collections”, 
Such as rosaries or armies, are 
falsely existent. 
Thus, there is no independent 
possessor of suffering, 
For who is there who has 
control over it? 
What are called “a continuum” and 
“a group,”  
Such as a rosary, an army, and the 
like, 
are not truly (a findable whole),  
And so, since a possessor of 
suffering doesn't exist,  
Whose responsibility is it (as 
“mine”)? 
Being no (inherent) owner of suffering, 
There can be no distinction at all between 
(that of myself and others). 
Thus I shall dispel it because it hurts : 
Why am I so certain (that I shouldn’t 
eliminate the suffering of others)? 
Without exception, no sufferings 
belong to anyone.  
They must be warded off simply 
because they are suffering.  
Why is any limitation put in this? 
Pains without an owner are 
all indeed without 
distinction  
Because of its quality as 
pain indeed it is to be 
prevented. What 
limitation can be made 
there?  
Since there is no independent 
possessor of suffering, 
There is no real difference 
between my own and others’ 
suffering. 
Thus, we should dispel all 
suffering simply because it is 
painful –  
Why cling to false distinctions 
with such certainty? 
In their being without an owner,  
All sufferings lack a distinction:  
So it’s (simply) because they're 
suffering  
that they're to be averted.  
Why are there fixed (limitations) 
made here? 
[Question] - But, (since neither the 
suffering nor the sufferer truly exist,) why 
should I turn away the misery of all ?- 
[Mādhyamika] This is no ground for 
argument, 
For if I prevent my own (sufferings), surely 
I should prevent the (sufferings) of all. 
If not, since I am just like (other) sentient 
beings, 
(I should not prevent my own suffering 
either). 
If one asks why suffering should be 
prevented,  
no one disputes that! If it must be 
prevented, then all of it must be.  
If not, then this goes for oneself as 
for everyone. 
 
If one asks why pain is to be 
prevented (Tib. “the pain of 
all is to be 
Prevented”), it is (accepted) 
(Skt. “by all”) without 
dispute  
If it is to be prevented, all is 
also thus. If not oneself also 
is like (other) beings. 
[Opponent] “There is no need 
to dispel everyone else’s 
suffering!” 
[Mādhyamika] This is not a 
valid argument. 
If my suffering should be 
dispelled, so should everyone 
else’s; 
And if others’ suffering should 
not be dispelled, neither should 
mine. 
[Question] “But why is the 
suffering of everyone to be 
averted?”  
[Mādhyamika] Well, it's 
indisputable:  
If (anyone's) is to be averted, then 
everyone's is to be averted;  
If not, (that applies) to me as well,  
just like to (every other) limited 
being. 
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